Swimming Against the Tide by Holden, Paul et al.
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Swimming Against the Tide
Paul Holden and Sarah Holden and Bale Malcolm
Asian Development Bank
2004
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/4207/
MPRA Paper No. 4207, posted 23. July 2007
iSwimming Against the Tide?
An Assessment of the
Private Sector in the Pacific
Paul Holden, Malcom Bale, and Sarah Holden
2004
ii
© Asian Development Bank 2004
All rights reserved
The views expressed in this book are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views and policies
of the Asian Development Bank (ADB), its Board of Governors, or the governments they represent. ADB
does not guarantee the accuracy of the data included in this publication and accepts no responsibility for any
consequences of their use. Use of the term “country” does not imply any judgment by the authors or ADB as
to the legal or other status of any territorial entity.
ISBN 971–561–534–1
Publication Stock No. 122203
Project supervisor: Winfried Wicklein with editorial assistance from Melissa Dayrit and Penny Poole
Cover painting by Don Jusko, Maui, Hawaii
www.mauigateway.com/~donjusko/waves.htm
www.mauigateway.com/~donjusko/newcolorwheel.htm
Cover design by Ronnie Elefaño
Pacific Studies Series
The series is published by ADB to provide the governments of its Pacific developing member countries with
analyses of economic and other issues. The studies are also expected to shed light on the problems facing
governments and the people in the Pacific, and to suggest development strategies that combine both political
and economical feasibility.
Recent Publications
Pursuing Economic Reform in the Pacific (October 1999)
Reforms in the Pacific: An Assessment of the ADB’s Assistance for Reform Programs in the Pacific
(October 1999)
Republic of the Fiji Islands: 1999 Economic Report [PIER] (April 2000)
Samoa 2000: Building on Recent Reforms (November 2000)
Republic of the Marshall Islands: Meto 2000—Economic Report and Statement of Development
Strategies (April 2001)
Tuna: A Key Economic Resource in the Pacific Islands (April 2001)
Vanuatu: Agriculture and Fisheries Sector Review 2000 (June 2001)
Financial Sector Development in Pacific Island Economies Volume 1 (September 2001)
Financial Sector Development in Pacific Island Economies Volume 2 (September 2001)
The Contribution of Fisheries to the Economies of Pacific Island Countries (December 2001)
Tonga: Natural Resource Use and Sustainable Socioeconomic Development (April 2002)
Vanuatu 2001 Economic Report: Economic Performance and Challenges Ahead (April 2002)
Vanuatu: Policy Issues in the Agriculture, Fisheries, and Forestry Sectors (May 2002)
Tuvalu: 2002 Economic and Public Sector Review (November 2002)
Cook Islands 2001 Economic Report: Policies for Progress (December 2002)
Kiribati: Monetization in an Atoll Society—Managing Economic and Social Change (December 2002)
Information and Communication Technology for Development in the Pacific (July 2003)
Moving Toward a Sector-Wide Approach: Papua New Guinea—The Health Sector Development
Program Experience (August 2003)
While Stocks Last: The Live Reef Food Fish Trade (December 2003)
Orders can be placed with
The Publication Unit
Office of External Relations
Asian Development Bank
P.O. Box 789, 0980
Manila, Philippines
E-mail: adbpub@adb.org
iii
Contents
FIGURES, TABLES, AND BOXES......................................................... vii
ABBREVIATIONS ................................................................................... ix
FOREWORD .......................................................................................... xi
I. DIAGNOSIS AND SYNOPSIS ........................................................ 1
Constraints of the Private Sector in the Pacific ............................. 4
Conclusions ................................................................................... 9
II. INTRODUCTION .......................................................................... 11
Low Growth in the Pacific: Critiquing the Usual
Assertions .................................................................................. 12
The Private Sector in the Pacific ................................................... 13
Private Sector Development, Growth, and Poverty
Reduction .................................................................................. 15
Private Sector Assessments in the Pacific:
A Framework ........................................................................... 17
Overview of the Report ............................................................... 18
III. ANALYTIC APPROACH ............................................................... 20
What Promotes Growth? ............................................................ 21
What Drives Private Sector Growth? .......................................... 24
Business Dynamism ................................................................ 24
Transaction Costs .................................................................... 25
Institutions .............................................................................. 27
IV. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE PACIFIC COUNTRIES ............ 29
Small Size: Issues and Implications ............................................ 31
Small Population ....................................................................... 31
Small Local Market ................................................................. 32
Remoteness and Geographic Dispersal .................................. 33
Susceptibility to Natural Disasters ......................................... 34
Limited Access to Capital ....................................................... 35
Reliance on ODA and Remittances ....................................... 36
Large Presence of the State ...................................................... 36
Myths Concerning Small States ................................................. 38
iv
V. MAIN ISSUES FACED BY THE PRIVATE SECTOR IN
THE PACIFIC ................................................................................ 42
State Interference ........................................................................ 42
Relationship with the Public Sector ........................................... 44
Public Goods ............................................................................... 46
High Costs .................................................................................. 46
Transport Issues ........................................................................... 47
Finance ........................................................................................ 48
Natural Resource Issues .............................................................. 50
Investment Policy ........................................................................ 52
Why Foreign Investment Is Good .......................................... 53
Foreign Investment Regulation .............................................. 54
VI. FINANCIAL MARKETS IN THE PACIFIC................................... 56
Financial Markets and Economic Development ........................... 56
Financial Markets in the Pacific .................................................... 57
Structure ................................................................................. 57
Characteristics of Financial Markets in the Pacific ................. 59
Interest Rate Issues ................................................................... 61
Expanding Collateral ................................................................ 64
Secured Lending ............................................................................ 64
Overview.................................................................................... 65
Secured Transactions in the Pacific Economies ......................... 68
Problems in Creation .............................................................. 69
Problems in Priority ................................................................ 72
Problems in Registration ........................................................ 74
Regulatory Framework for Publicity ....................................... 75
Problems with Enforcement ................................................... 75
Taxes that Affect Registration and Enforcement .................... 76
Implications of a Defective Secured Transactions
Framework ........................................................................... 76
Need for Intermediation ......................................................... 77
Microcredit ................................................................................. 78
The Role of Funding Agencies in Supplying Capital ................ 79
Attempts to Substitute for the Lack of Financial
Intermediation .................................................................... 79
Making Financial Markets Work ................................................ 83
Reforms that Are Needed ....................................................... 84
Integration with World Capital Markets ................................ 85
vNational Provident Fund Reform and Second-Tier
Institutions ......................................................................... 85
VII. LAND ISSUES ............................................................................. 87
The Importance of Land Rights ............................................... 87
Features of Land Tenure in the Pacific ...................................... 89
Land Reform ............................................................................. 90
The Problem ............................................................................. 91
Recording/Registration ........................................................ 95
Transferability and Use of Land ........................................... 95
Uncertainty of Land Tenure Rights ...................................... 95
The Cost of Disputes ........................................................... 96
Conclusions .............................................................................. 97
VIII. THE STATE AND THE PRIVATE SECTOR ........................... 98
The Role of the State in Private Sector Development .............. 99
The State in Pacific Economies ............................................ 99
The State and Low Private Sector Growth ........................... 99
Targets and Instruments of Private Sector Development
Policy .................................................................................... 102
State-Owned Enterprises ............................................................ 104
Infrastructure Provision: Issues and Approaches ...................... 105
Integrated Project Design ..................................................... 105
Choice of Techniques ............................................................ 106
The Legal Framework ........................................................... 107
Financing .............................................................................. 108
Procurement ......................................................................... 109
Operation and Maintenance ................................................ 110
Decentralization ................................................................... 111
Financing Private Infrastructure with Output-Based
Contracts .......................................................................... 112
Privatization in the Pacific .......................................................... 112
Choice of Regulation ................................................................ 115
Local Regulation ..................................................................... 116
Foreign Regulation ................................................................. 116
Competition ................................................................................ 117
Governance and Public Goods Issues ....................................... 117
Legal Framework ................................................................... 117
Policy Consistency ................................................................ 118
Corruption and Regulation .................................................. 118
vi
A Dysfunctional State and Private Sector Development ............ 120
Trade Policy for the Pacific .......................................................... 121
Tariff Levels ............................................................................. 121
World Trade Organization and Regional Trade
Agreement Issues ................................................................ 123
Free Trade Zones ..................................................................... 125
Foreign Investment Procedures ................................................... 126
Conclusion .................................................................................. 127
IX. SECTORAL ISSUES ...................................................................... 129
Tourism ....................................................................................... 129
Benefits of the Tourism Industry ............................................ 129
Important Elements for a Properly Functioning
Tourism Industry ................................................................ 130
The Tourism Industry: Other Issues ...................................... 135
Agriculture and Forestry ............................................................. 138
Agriculture .............................................................................. 139
Forestry .................................................................................... 145
Challenges for the Rural Economy ......................................... 146
Fishing ......................................................................................... 147
X. SMALL AND MEDIUM ENTERPRISE DEVELOPMENT ...... 156
Providing Special Consideration and Assistance for
Small-Scale Rural Enterprises ................................................. 156
Is There a Need for Generic SME Policies? ................................ 157
XI. TOWARD A STRATEGY FOR PRIVATE SECTOR
DEVELOPMENT IN THE PACIFIC ........................................... 159
Considerations for Pacific Governments ..................................... 160
The Countries and Private Sector Development Policy ......... 160
Need for Interaction Between Government and Business ...... 162
The Need for Analysis ............................................................ 163
Foreign Workers, Foreign Investment, and Incentives ............ 163
A Schematic of Government Policy for Private Sector
Development ...................................................................... 164
An Agenda for Governments ................................................... 165
Funding Agencies and the Private Sector ..................................... 169
Considerations for Funding Agencies ......................................... 170
Funding Agency Involvement in the Pacific ........................... 170
Need for Aid Coordination ..................................................... 171
The Voyage Must Begin ................................................................ 173
BIBLIOGRAPHY ..................................................................................... 175
vii
Figures, Tables, and
Boxes
Figures
Figure 1. Comparative GDP Per Capita, Constant US$, 2001 ........ 29
Figure 2. Sectoral Breakdown of GDP, 2001 .................................... 30
Figure 3. Population of Select Pacific Countries ................................ 31
Figure 4. Population Density, 2001 .................................................. 32
Figure 5. Unit Cost of Air Travel Regionally and between
Sydney and Select Pacific Countries, 2001 ....................... 33
Figure 6. Fuel Prices, Select Countries, 2001 ................................... 34
Figure 7. Shipping Rates, Select Countries, 2001 ............................ 34
Figure 8. Foreign Direct Investment, Net Inflows (% of GDP) ....... 37
Figure 9. Per Capita Official Development Assistance ...................... 38
Figure 10. Government Current Expenditure, 2000 (% of GDP) ..... 43
Figure 11. Comparative Average Credit to the Private Sector
(1996–2000) ..................................................................... 60
Figure 12. Real Interest Rates (%), 1996–2001, Select Countries ...... 61
Figure 13. Interest Rate Spread (%), 1996–2001, Select
Countries ............................................................................ 62
Figure 14. Comparative Average Interest Rate Spreads, 1996–2000 ..... 63
Figure 15. Water Consumption Tariffs, Select Countries, 2001 ......... 101
Figure 16. Trade Balance, 2000 .......................................................... 122
Figure 17. Welfare Gains from Full MFN Liberalization
(% of GDP) ........................................................................ 123
Figure 18. Tourism, % of GDP, 1999 ................................................. 130
Figure 19. Tourism, % of Exports, Select Pacific Countries ............... 131
Figure 20. Travel and Tourism Employment (% of Total 2000
Labor Force) ....................................................................... 133
Figure 21. Agriculture, Value-Added (% of GDP) ............................. 139
Figure 22. Rural Population, 2001 ..................................................... 140
Figure 23. Arable Land, 1999 ............................................................... 141
Figure 24. Forest Area, 2000 ............................................................... 144
Figure 25. Contribution of Fishing to GDP ....................................... 148
Figure 26. Ranges in Annual Per Capita Fisheries
Consumption, 1990s ......................................................... 148
viii
Figure 27. Estimated Annual Fisheries Production by Value,
Late 1990s .......................................................................... 151
Figure 28. Estimated Access Fees from Foreign Fishing
Vessels, 1999 ...................................................................... 152
Figure 29. Estimated Values of Fisheries Exports, Late 1990s ........... 153
Figure 30. Official Development Assistance Per Capita,
Select Pacific Countries ...................................................... 171
Tables
Table 1. The Relationship Between Growth and Poverty ............... 20
Table 2. Human Development Indicators, 1998 ............................ 30
Table 3. Foreign Direct Investment Outflows (US$ Million) ......... 36
Table 4. Correlation Matrix of GDP Growth, 1990–2000 ............ 40
Table 5. Utility Costs ....................................................................... 100
Table 6. Labor Regulation/Conditions ............................................ 118
Table 7. Employment in Fishing ..................................................... 149
Table 8. Land and Exclusive Economic Zone Areas for the
Pacific ................................................................................. 150
Boxes
Box 1. Business Dynamism ........................................................... 25
Box 2. Examples of Transaction Costs ........................................... 26
Box 3. Mauritius: Small, Isolated, Successful ............................... 41
Box 4. Lender/Borrower Transactions in Financial Markets ......... 58
Box 5. The Power of Collateral ...................................................... 65
Box 6. The Inherent Problem of Offshore Ventures ..................... 67
Box 7. Low Nonperforming Loan Rates: Cook Islands,
an Outlier ........................................................................... 72
Box 8. Promoting Microfinance: The Multilateral
Investment Fund ................................................................ 81
Box 9. Lowering the Threshold or Raising the Rates ................... 84
Box 10. Who Owns the Land? Who is Chief? ................................ 94
Box 11. The Impact of Political Instability: The Case of the
Fiji Islands .......................................................................... 132
Box 12. Tourism Development, Cultural Preservation,
and Environmental Protection: The Example of
Cirali, Turkey ..................................................................... 136
Box 13. The Response to Overfishing in Vanuatu .......................... 154
Box 14. The Impact of No Infrastructure ....................................... 155
ix
Abbreviations
ADB Asian Development Bank
AusAID Australian Agency for International Development
BIS Bank for International Settlements
CDC CDC Group Plc. (former Commonwealth Development Corporation)
CIIC Cook Islands Investment Corporation
CTC Cook Islands Tourist Authority
DAC development assistance committee
DBS Development Bank of Samoa
EEZ exclusive economic zone
EPC Electric Power Corporation (Samoa)
ERI Enterprise Research Institute
ESCAP Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific
FDI foreign direct investment
FFA Forum Fisheries Agency
GDP gross domestic product
GNP gross national product
HDI human development index
IFC International Finance Corporation
IFI international financial institution
ILO International Labour Organization
MEC Marshalls Energy Company
MFI microfinance institution
MFN most favored nation
MIVA Marshall Islands Visitors Authority
MOWEPP Ministry of Works, Energy, and Physical Planning (Cook Islands)
NBER National Bureau of Economic Research
NGO nongovernment organization
NHC National Housing Corporation (Vanuatu)
NPF national provident fund
ODA official development assistance
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
O&M operation and maintenance
PDMC Pacific developing member country
PSA private sector assessment
PSCE public sector commercial enterprise
xPSD private sector development
PUB public utilities board
SBEC Small Business Enterprise Center (Samoa)
SME(s) small and medium enterprise(s)
SOE state-owned enterprise
SPBD South Pacific Business Development (Samoa)
SPPF South Pacific Project Facility
TA technical assistance
UN United Nations
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
UNELCO Union Electrique du Vanuatu (Electricity and Water Company in
Vanuatu)
VAT value-added tax
WIBF Women in Business Foundation (Samoa)
WTO World Trade Organization
xi
Foreword
A robust and vibrant private sector is vital to the Pacific region’s long-term
economic growth and improved quality of life, and is a necessary condition for
sustained poverty reduction. When there is sustained economic growth, per
capita incomes rise, employment is created, and government can access
additional resources through taxation to provide bridging opportunities to
disadvantaged and vulnerable groups who do not benefit immediately. But the
private sector can only flourish and create employment opportunities when
the environment in which it operates is welcoming to business.
The Pacific islands’ natural impediments—such as small market sizes, remoteness,
and susceptibility to natural disasters—do constrain business activity in the
region. However, while not a great deal can be done to escape the costs associated
with these factors, it is possible to create an environment that minimizes the
cost of doing business, and encourages both business dynamism and
entrepreneurship.
Yet, the economic performance of the Pacific has been disappointing over the
recent past decades, despite relatively high public investment rates and generous
external funding that are among the highest per capita in the world. The private
sector in the Pacific is handicapped by common problems including a weak
macroeconomic environment, poor governance, often political instability,
extensive state involvement combined with weak regulation, underdeveloped
financial markets, and a poor legal and investment policy environment for
business.
These factors have created high-cost conditions for business. A combined impact
of these barriers appears to be that rates of return on capital are low throughout
the region. On a net basis, there have been outflows of private capital in many
of the Pacific economies and even though real interest rates are below those in
many developing countries in other parts of the world, many in the formal
private sector maintain that they are still too high to yield an adequate reward
for entrepreneurial effort.
These factors exist in one variant or another in most of the Pacific. A successful
strategy to promote private sector development requires the formulation of
policies that will reduce the high cost and disabling business environment that
currently exists almost throughout the region.
xii
The Asian Development Bank (ADB) has recently launched an initiative to
gain sharper insights into the underlying issues inhibiting private sector
development in the Pacific. This publication contributes to the discussion by
taking a hard look at the problems, evaluating them against international
experience and best practices, and raising critical issues. Options and potential
solutions to address these are offered to the governments and their development
partners.
The report was prepared by consultants with the Enterprise Research Institute
of Washington DC, under the direction of Winfried Wicklein, Private Sector
Development Specialist, Pacific Department. The project team and ADB are
grateful to the myriad of businesspeople, government officials, and development
practitioners who contributed through their valuable insights.
While this report does not represent the views of ADB, I am pleased to publish
it under the Pacific Studies Series. I trust it will provide interesting, thought-
provoking reading, and stimulate useful discussions toward progress in
developing the private sector in the Pacific.
Jeremy Hovland
Director General
Pacific Department
DIAGNOSIS AND SYNOPSIS 1
I. Diagnosis and
Synopsis
The countries in the Pacific vary widely with respect to size,topography, geographic isolation, resource endowments, vulnerability,population, and culture. These island countries are scattered over a vast
area that makes up nearly one third of the globe. Many of the countries are the
embodiment of the traditional vision of an island paradise. Yet despite what
some would consider as idyllic circumstances of sun, sand, and sea, the countries
of the region are relatively poor and growth has been disappointing, especially
in relation to the amount of external funds that have been invested.
The usual explanations for the lack of development, however, do not hold in
the Pacific: the low growth is not because of a lack of savings and capital goods.
Countries with high rates of savings and investment—
such as the former Soviet Union—have failed abysmally
and net domestic investment has not been especially low
in many of the Pacific countries. The lack of land does
not explain low growth rates. Economies with small
landmasses, such as Hong Kong, China and Singapore
have achieved growth rates far above the world average,
and other small islands, such as Bermuda, Iceland,
Mauritius, and Norfolk Island, have also been comparatively
successful.
Equally unconvincing is the explanation that low labor skills and poor cultural
attitudes toward work make workers unproductive. The high rate of emigration
to Australia, New Zealand, and the United States—where workers from the
Pacific earn wages many times higher than those earned in their home
countries—attests to their productive ability.
Another unsatisfactory excuse for low productivity and income is lack of access
to technology. There are few or no barriers to technological exchange in the
Pacific, and yet, when technology is installed, it yields disappointing results.
The usual
explanations
for the lack of
development
do not hold in
the Pacific.
2 SWIMMING AGAINST THE TIDE?
Explanations are needed as to why the highest per capita levels of external
funding in the world provided to the Pacific have so far failed to encourage
growth in the region.
The small size, geographic isolation, and vulnerability of the Pacific economies
have been the prime justification for the extensive role of the state in most
Pacific developing member countries (PDMCs) of the Asian Development Bank
(ADB). Research for this publication supports the argument that the prime
cause of poor private sector development (sometimes referred to as PSD) is the
extensive state intervention in areas better left to the
private sector, coupled with the state’s inability to provide
the public goods and institutions—in development
parlance, the enabling environment—that a flourishing
private sector needs. The lack of growth in most countries
is related to a massive failure of the state. Erroneous ideas
regarding what role government should play have resulted
in costly state involvement that exacerbates, rather than
ameliorates, problems of geographical isolation and
distance.
The role of the state in promoting private sector
development is to provide the institutions that underlie
business activity. The institutions, in turn, define the
transactions costs faced by business and, ultimately, the
incentives for individuals to undertake entrepreneurial
activities.1 Currently, incentives in the Pacific are poor, transactions costs are
high, and the institutions as well as the state are both intrusive and exclusionary
for potential and existing businesspeople.
The private sector in the economies of the Pacific is generally characterized by
• a large informal economy, especially in retailing and services;
• widespread subsistence agriculture and fishing;
• cultivation and export of indigenous root crops;
• export of some specialized agricultural products;
• fishing, as well as licensing, servicing, and supplying foreign fishing fleets
within territorial waters;
• widespread but mainly small tourist sectors;
1 Private sector activity, in this paper, includes services paid for by the state but performed by private individuals
or companies that are not public sector employees. However, corporate entities owned by the state are
considered to belong to the public sector. Mixed public-private ownership, which generally occurs in the case
of privatized utilities, is discussed elsewhere.
Erroneous ideas
regarding what role
government should
play have resulted
in costly state
involvement that
exacerbates, rather
than ameliorates,
problems of
geographical
isolation and
distance.
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• small industries manufacturing products that are costly to transport over
large distances; and
• substantial mineral resources—most notably Papua New Guinea and
the Solomon Islands, among a few countries.
The private sector in the Pacific faces several difficult issues. Among the most
important are
• indirect evidence that low rates of return on capital are endemic in the
Pacific;2
• extensive service industries supplying the local economy;
• small domestic markets where purchasing power is low;
• expensive transport and communications services such as telephone and
Internet connections;
• costly and/or unreliable utility services;
• underdeveloped capital markets—with private sector credit to gross
domestic product (GDP) ratios below the average for countries at
equivalent stages of development;
• credit markets dominated by few commercial banks;
• below-average borrowing costs compared with the
average for developing countries;
• land tenure problems;
• high labor costs resulting from the crowding out of
businesses and individual investors by the public
sector; and
• a protective and antiprivate business attitude among
many in the population.
In order not to be left behind, however, the Pacific countries must follow growth-
oriented, private sector-friendly policies to ensure that they can capitalize on
the growth of the world economy. In many ways, the issues raised here represent
the confluence—or conflict—of tradition versus modernization. The countries
of the Pacific wish to secure improved opportunities and incomes for their
people, but the fundamental question they wrestle with is whether they must
modernize—and by implication give up cherished traditions and customs—to
do so. The perspective of this publication is that modernization is a necessary
2 On a net basis, there have been outflows of private capital in many Pacific countries and even though real
lending interest rates are below those in many developing countries in other parts of the world, observers in
the formal private sector maintain that they are still too high to yield an adequate reward for entrepreneurial effort.
There is therefore the paradoxical situation where funding agencies and remittances are financing outflows of
private capital.
Modernization is a
necessary condition
for development
but this does not
necessarily mean
foregoing traditions
and customs.
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condition for development but this does not necessarily mean foregoing traditions
and customs. Incentive structures can evolve to include local cultural practices,
just as they have in other parts of the world.
The countries of the Pacific have already embarked along this journey toward
modernization. The key issue to determine is how far along that road do they
wish to travel and at what speed.
At the outset, analysis of the business environment involves reviewing the
importance of a wide range of factors affecting the private sector, including
• macroeconomic conditions
• trade policy
• the financial sector
• property rights
• regulation
• institutions that underpin a modern market economy
• the role of government in the economy
These factors can profoundly influence the structure and conduct of business
as well as how entrepreneurial activity is channeled. They can differ widely
among countries, but the fact that many PDMCs reveal very similar symptoms
in terms of PSD constraints is striking.3
This publication uses the private sector assessments (PSAs) of four Pacific
countries—the Marshall Islands (ADB 2003b), Papua New Guinea (ADB
2003c), Samoa (ADB 2003d), and Vanuatu (ADB 2003e)—as a foundation
for the themes relevant to the Pacific as a whole. The PSAs reflect a wide variety
of conditions and backgrounds that provide a detailed foundation for discussing
the issues. The common themes that emerged provide guidance for a strategy
that suggests private sector-friendly policies are necessary for both the countries
and their development partners, whether multilateral or bilateral.
Constraints of the Private Sector in the Pacific
This publication identifies many issues facing the private sector in the Pacific.
State Interference in the Economy. The size of government, as measured by
the ratio of government expenditures to GDP, is greater in the Pacific than in
3 This leads to a recommendation that more detailed private sector assessments are necessary in countries that
were not examined as part of this exercise.
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most other developing countries. In many Pacific countries, governments have
imposed burdensome regulatory regimes and own many business enterprises,
the most important of which have been preserved as monopolies. Although the
large and heavy footprint of the state often goes unquestioned, the presumption
of the necessity for a large state presence in small countries should be challenged.
As a general principle, it is most efficient and least distortionary to private
incentives if government intervention in an economy is minimal.
Where public goods require public finance, modern public sector management
practices suggest the separation of financing from the delivery of services and
introducing, where possible, competition-based private sector participation in
services provision even if it is financed by the state. In the Pacific, an improved
regulatory regime that allows for competition and the
rapid adoption of technical change, combined with the
sale of government-owned commercial businesses, would
greatly lower costs and decrease the size of the state.
Better governance, minimal corruption, improved regulation,
and increased competition would boost capital inflows
while reducing the volatility experienced by most Pacific
countries. As a result, the private sector would be a larger
component of the economy, and as such, assist in the
reduction of volatility.
The situation does show evidence of change. Funding
agencies are increasingly supporting PDMCs with the
development of the private sector through policy dialogue
and lending. But such statements are difficult to prove. In spite of some recorded
progress, much remains to be done, and some of the more difficult aspects of
needed reform have been delayed, such as increasing private sector participation
in—and regulation of—state-owned enterprises (SOEs). It will be difficult for
the private sector to perform at its full potential and create jobs at the needed
rate until these issues are resolved.
Poor Provision of Public Goods. The state fails to supply public goods that
support an effective and efficient private sector, which fosters secure property
rights, a regulatory system that allows contracting with confidence, efficient
and low-cost infrastructure, and regulations that are clear and also improve
efficiency. There is therefore the paradoxical situation in the Pacific that often
governments are not doing what they should, and in fact, are doing what they
should not. This reality is a primary contributing factor to the low rates of
return on capital.
There is the
paradoxical
situation in the
Pacific that often
governments are
not doing what
they should,
and in fact,
are doing what
they should not.
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Energy is a primary concern in the islands and it is no surprise that corporations
in charge of the vital infrastructures of electricity generation and distribution
are state monopolies, as are telecommunications and water supply. The state
also owns and operates other critical infrastructure such as ports and airports.
In addition, governments in most island states participate in conventional
commercial activities, such as tourism. Ownership is based on the premise that
without government intervention, such services would not exist. This notion is
incorrect. Private companies can be given subsidies to run services where revenues
do not cover expenditures, and given a competitive choice, the results will
enhance efficiency.
The effect of extensive government ownership is twofold. Not only does it
crowd out the private sector from participating in these activities, but it also
raises the costs and lowers the profitability of businesses to the extent that the
state-operated businesses are poorly run and provide higher-than-necessary
inputs to the business sector. Utility services, telecommunications, and
transportation in the Pacific are among the most costly in the world. Rather
than ameliorating the problems of size and distance, the presence of the state in
the Pacific can be likened to a tax on development.
High-Cost Operating Environment. The state’s poor
provision of public goods, inappropriate involvement in
services, and interference in the economy combine to create
a high-cost operating environment for business. The most
common complaint from business communities in the four
countries assessed was the high cost of conducting business.
Part of the problem arises from the natural characteristics
of the countries, namely the increased unit cost of inputs
due to remoteness; the difficulty in capturing economies of scale due to small
markets; the market power of distribution channel owners; increasing costs;
and long, infrequent, and exorbitantly costly communication lines.
These factors may present problems to businesses in the Pacific, but companies
in other small, isolated economies have managed to overcome these obstacles.
In the Pacific, the effects of isolation and size are compounded by misguided
government intervention that further pushes up costs and reduces competition.
And when the costs of doing business are high, firms are discouraged from
establishing or expanding their business. While little can be done to escape the
costs associated with remoteness or smallness, the regulation of business to
minimize monopolies—carefully regulating monopolistic elements of business
that cannot be made contestable—and having offshore regulators to avoid
The presence of
the state in the
Pacific can be
likened to a tax
on development.
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regulatory capture are all within the control of government. In these areas, the
Pacific countries should strive to introduce international best practices to provide
an environment conducive to private sector development.
Underdeveloped Financial Markets. The financial markets of the Pacific
are underdeveloped and do not provide sufficient support for the private sector.
The days when interest rates were set by regulation and the money supply was
determined through controls on reserve ratios have passed, but the immature
banking industry is probably due, in part, to this legacy. Regional characteristics
include
• banking services seldom reaching beyond main urban areas;
• commercial banks having little outreach to low-income households;
• extremely limited credit extended to indigenous
entrepreneurs (i.e., little lending to agriculture and
fishing);
• large interest rate spreads (with some exceptions);
• informal lending as an important source of finance;
and
• emerging microfinance programs that in most
countries are still in their infancy.
The underdevelopment of the financial sector in the Pacific countries relates to
two important factors: severe shortcomings in the secured transactions framework
and the incompatibility of the customary land system with secured lending. If
banks cannot effectively secure their lending with collateral, lending is costly.
For borrowers to access affordable credit, adequate collateral must be on hand.
But in the Pacific, the system for using property as security is cumbersome,
expensive, and generally unavailable.
The system makes it difficult for land to be used as collateral outside urban areas
and generally, land and leases are not regarded as adequate security because the
underlying ownership rights of lessors are frequently open to challenge. To deepen
financial markets and increase credit availability, these two elements must be
addressed. Though some countries in the region have started implementing
reforms, most of them have not yet begun. The longer-term aim of reforming
property rights is access to developed financial markets that channel funds effectively
from savers to investors to stimulate economic development and poverty reduction.
While international interventions in the supply of loanable funds are substitutes
for financial deepening, they are not long-term solutions and will not assist the
development of the financial sector.
If banks cannot
effectively secure
their lending
with collateral,
lending is costly.
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Natural Resource Issues. Pacific countries are heavily dependent on natural
resources for their livelihood. This dependence includes the agriculture and
fishing industries as well as industries such as tourism. Resource management
is therefore a critical issue for the economic development in the Pacific and
relates intimately with land rights issues. To date, there is little evidence of the
natural resource endowment being carefully managed.
Poor Investment Policies. A good investment climate has sound macroeconomic
management, as well as trade and investment policies that promote openness,
productivity, and growth. It allows for financing new investment at interest
rates that equilibrate the supply and demand for savings. In addition, it includes
good governance, promotion of competition, and prevention of corruption,
with a solid foundation of basic physical and social infrastructure. The case for
creating a good investment climate is simple. Without a predictable environment
for people, ideas, and money to work together productively and efficiently,
investment will not occur. The role of government is to provide an environment
for entrepreneurs to invest in productive activities. From interviews, it is clear
that a good private sector climate and secured transactions framework are missing
in the Pacific. It is often expensive to establish and register
a business. Incorporation is not easy. Sometimes specific
industries are targeted for assistance, while obstacles to
investment (e.g., in terms of controls, the composition of
ownership or board of directors, etc.) are imposed on
others. Targeted industries and subsidies distort decisions
and have long-term harmful effects on efficiency,
profitability, and the growth of the business sector.
Governments of the Pacific have tried to tightly control
foreign investment, but they must recognize that business
is risky and it is inevitable that some foreign investment
will fail, resulting in the bankruptcy or exit of new companies. Moreover, in
practice, there are no documented examples of “fly by night” investors, except
in cases where governments have attempted to give special incentives over and
above the foreign investment regime. In fact, experience shows that the fewer
special incentives offered, the more likely genuine long-term foreign investment
will occur.
Land Rights Issues. Land plays a central cultural as well as productive role in
Pacific societies, and the form of customary ownership introduces considerable
ambiguity regarding land rights and the distribution of rents from land. This
is a major economic issue in the Pacific that remains a source of internal dispute.
A major constraint on private sector development in the Pacific is unclear land
rights and the resulting difficulty in using land as collateral for loans. Over
Experience shows
that the fewer
special incentives
offered, the more
likely genuine
long-term foreign
investment
will occur.
DIAGNOSIS AND SYNOPSIS 9
90% of land remains under customary ownership without formal ownership,
precluding it from being used as collateral for loans. Land can be a central source
of wealth and is particularly important to the rural community whose primary
latent asset is land, but only if there is a system of property rights. In most
developed countries, the bulk of small businesses are established using loans
that are backed by land. The problems in land tenure in the Pacific include
• unclear ownership and boundaries as a result of lack
of recording;
• restrictions on transferability as a result of unclear
ownership;
• unclear definition of different land tenure rights;
• weak (and unrecorded) dispute resolution practices;
and
• problems of enforcement.
A land rights system requires careful analysis to determine
exactly how a chain of rights that serves key economic
ends can be built. Simply imposing conventional western industrial land tenure
patterns cannot solve this problem. The new system must accommodate the
customary system of land rights yet permit more land to serve as collateral.
Land is culturally important in the Pacific, and, in truth, holds a special place
in almost all societies of the world. The difference lies in the nature of tenure.
Consensus-building around a system of land tenure is critical, but it will take
time and it must begin now. Secure ownership and the ability to exchange
land must exist to create a positive investment climate for small entrepreneurs,
in addition to being a precondition for the emergence of financial markets.
Many Pacific countries are cautiously reviewing their land rights systems to adapt
to the changing times. But it is a challenging task made more difficult because
basic institutions have to be in place before those members of society who need
them the most could feel the benefits of changes in property rights. The process
has begun and must continue through a series of small, systematic, and
conclusive steps toward rectifying the identified shortcomings of existing systems.
Conclusions
The private sector can flourish and create employment opportunities only if
the environment in which it operates is conducive to business. Governments
can often create an environment that increases the costs of doing business,
reduces profits, and discourages dynamism and entrepreneurship. For these
A major constraint
on private sector
development in the
Pacific is unclear
land rights and the
resulting difficulty
in using land as
collateral for loans.
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reasons, the chapter introducing a strategy for change suggests that efforts
concentrate on a limited number of issues by focusing on what causes the low
rates of return on capital as well as the constraints to business startup and
development. These issues include
• fostering financial sector development for credit to be
more readily available for business;
• clarifying land rights and modifying them with respect
to cultural preservation and the development of land
markets;
• reducing the role of the state in the economies of the
region;
• revamping the regulatory regimes for the business
environment to be less constrained and monopolies
more prudently regulated;
• focusing on the assistance of small-scale rural enterprises.
With concerted efforts, governments and their development partners can ensure
the resolution of these critical issues. However, doing so requires considerable
time and great effort. Nevertheless, now is a perfect time to start the process.
Strategies for
change should
focus on what
causes the low rates
of return on capital
as well as the
constraints to
business startup and
development.
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II. Introduction
T his publication assesses conditions for private sector developmentin the Pacific developing member countries (PDMCs) of the AsianDevelopment Bank (ADB).4 It aims to provide an overall private sector
assessment (PSA) of the region, which lays out an analytical foundation for
strategies to assist PDMCs in promoting their private sector. As part of the
process, four detailed PSAs were undertaken in the Marshall Islands, Papua
New Guinea , Samoa, and Vanuatu. These PSAs provide the basis for the detailed
analysis in the chapters that follow, supplemented by observations based on a
large number of reports that have been produced on the region’s economies.
The countries in the Pacific vary widely with respect to size, topography,
geographic isolation, resource endowments, vulnerability, population, and
culture. These islands are scattered over an area that makes up nearly one third
of the globe. From the perspective of size and population, the largest country
by far is Papua New Guinea, with a landmass slightly larger than the State of
California in the United States and a population of 5 million. At the other
extreme, Nauru and Tuvalu each have a landmass equivalent to 10% of
Washington DC and a population of approximately only 12,000.
There are similar variations in topography. Some are so low-lying that they are
threatened with inundation if the worst predictions associated with global
warming come to pass. Others have soaring, snow-covered peaks. Resource
endowments also vary widely, with Papua New Guinea and a few island
economies being endowed with substantial mineral resources. Others, such as
Kiribati and Vanuatu, have significant pelagic resources, while others have
virtually no natural resources at all.
The region also encompasses a wide diversity of peoples and languages. Here,
Papua New Guinea is also the outlier with over 800 different languages and
dialects. There are three distinct ethnic groups in the Pacific—Melanesians,
Micronesians, and Polynesians—with unique cultures and characteristics as
4 The countries in the region include Cook Islands, Fiji Islands, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Federated States of
Micronesia, Nauru, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Timor-Leste, Tonga, Tuvalu, and
Vanuatu.
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well as wide differences within each group.
Traditionally, discussions of the Pacific have been divided among the three
island groups of Melanesia, Micronesia, and Polynesia, with Papua New Guinea
regarded as distinct because of its size and resource endowments. For the purpose
of this analysis of the private sector, however, these divisions are less useful.
This publication is based on an analytical approach that focuses on incentives
and institutions. Therefore, it groups countries by themes rather than by
geographical or ethnic classification. Some discussion is confined to Papua New
Guinea alone, as it is an outlier in the region in so many ways.
Low Growth in the Pacific: Critiquing the
Usual Assertions
Some theories regarding why the Pacific economies have not performed to
expectations include the following.
Lack of Savings and Capital Goods. Surprisingly, savings rates in the Pacific
are not low by international standards. Furthermore, other countries with high
rates of savings and investment (e.g., the former Soviet Union) have failed
abysmally. This counterargument is bolstered by the observation that if capital
is really scarce, existing capital in the region should earn extremely high rates
of return. In the Pacific, the opposite is true—rates of return on capital are low
and many residents invest their capital elsewhere.
Lack of Land. A corollary of the concerns on a country’s small size is that
land is scarce. However, limited landmass has not inhibited the development
of such economies as Hong Kong, China; Iceland; Mauritius; and Singapore to
name a few.
Low Labor Skills and Poor Cultural Attitudes Toward Work Make Workers
Unproductive. Closer examination reveals this explanation as baseless. The
high emigration rates in many Pacific countries attest to the attractiveness of
places like Australia, New Zealand, and the United States as destinations with
higher wages. The same person, with a supposed lack of skills or education,
who in his or her country of birth can only earn low wages, can usually find
immediate employment upon emigration at a wage that is a large multiple of
that received in the originating country. The assertion that there are poor cultural
attitudes toward work is contrary to the evidence of prosperity in many Pacific
communities in developed countries. This prosperity is a testament to their skill,
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adaptability, and willingness to work hard, belying the cultural explanation for
low productivity.
Low Levels of Technology. Technological advances developed in industrial
countries are available in developing countries without the expense of research
and development. There are few barriers to technological exchange, and
technology is generally available to promote rapid growth in developing
countries. Yet, it is often unused, or when installed, yields disappointing results.
This research therefore, finds an alternative explanation for the poor growth
performance in the Pacific and concludes that a massive failure of the state lies
at the heart of the problems that most countries in the region face. Misguided
notions regarding the role of the state, sometimes supported by the funding
community, have resulted in costly government intervention in most of the
region’s economies. This only exacerbates the problems of geographic isolation
and distance, while the state neglects its responsibility to provide the institutions
that underpin a modern market economy. These arguments are developed at
greater length in the chapters that follow.
The Private Sector in the Pacific
Identifying precisely what constitutes private sector
activity is not a simple task and various attempts to do so
have engendered considerable controversy. Many issues
have not been resolved, such as
• whether the informal sector should be counted as
belonging to the “private sector”;
• the role of subsistence and cash crop agriculture and fishing;
• how corporatized government entities should be treated; and
• whether private contractors working for the government should be treated
as belonging to either the public or private sector.
An equally difficult and closely related problem is how to measure the size of
the private sector with any degree of accuracy. Simply subtracting the portion
of government expenditure from the measure of GDP in the national accounts
will not provide an accurate estimate of private sector output because transfers
often comprise a significant portion of expenditure. In addition, if the public
sector uses private contractors, depending on how GDP is estimated, their
value may not be included in the national accounts. Much of the output of the
A massive failure
of the state lies at
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problems that
most countries in
the region face.
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informal sector as well as that of rural agriculture and fishing could also be
omitted. Statistics on most of these issues are not readily available in developed
economies and are rarely available in the developing world. Since Pacific
economies are characterized in general by few statistics, data that would provide
accurate estimates of the size of the private sector are not available. Furthermore,
in states where governance is weak, there are strong incentives for the private
sector to operate informally and not provide information on their activities.
Inefficient and poorly functioning government departments, including those
responsible for collecting statistics, also characterize such states. As a result, the
reliability of information from states where governance is weak is especially
suspect.
For the purpose of this analysis, however, lack of accurate statistics on the sizes
of the region’s private sector is not a serious issue. The many commonalities
shared by Pacific economies allow a stylized description to be a sufficient basis
for a discussion of important issues. Since this publication seeks to promote the
private sector in the region, it addresses informal and subsistence issues arising
from the set of incentives existing within the region’s
economies.
This publication considers private sector activity as
including services paid for by the state but performed by
private individuals or companies that are not public sector
employees. Corporate entities owned by the state,
however, are considered public sector.
To date, the economies of the region have been dominated
by the presence of government. In many cases, state
activity—whether in the form of interference in the
economy or through owning resources and undertaking activities that are better
left to private agents—has crowded out private sector development and damaged
growth and prosperity. Funding agencies have often unwittingly contributed
to this phenomenon.
The private sector in the economies of the Pacific is generally characterized by
• widespread subsistence agriculture and fishing;
• a large informal economy, especially in retailing and services;
• cultivation and export of indigenous root crops;
• export of some specialized agricultural products;
• fishing and licensing of foreign fishing fleets within territorial waters;
• widespread but mainly small tourist sectors;
• small industries manufacturing products that are costly to transport over
long distances;
In many cases,
state activity
has crowded out
private sector
development and
damaged growth
and prosperity.
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• substantial mineral resources—most notably Papua New Guinea and
the Solomon Islands among a few countries;
• extensive service industries supplying the local economy;
• small markets where purchasing power is low;
• expensive transport and communications services such as telephone and
Internet connections;
• costly and/or unreliable utility services;
• underdeveloped capital markets—with private sector credit to GDP ratios
below the average for countries at equivalent stages of development;
• credit markets dominated by few commercial banks;
• below-average borrowing costs when compared with the average for
developing countries; and
• problems with respect to land tenure.
These issues, which have profound implications for private sector development
in the region, will be explored in greater detail in the chapters that follow.
Private Sector Development, Growth,
and Poverty Reduction
The connection between private sector development and economic growth is
now widely accepted. There is general recognition that without a dynamic
private sector, countries cannot achieve the increases in prosperity necessary to
reduce the poverty that afflicts many populations in the region. However, the
connection between growth and income distribution is often misunderstood.
Many still believe that growth usually necessitates a worsening of equality,
particularly in the early stages of a takeoff. Such views are based on the work of
Simon Kuznets, a Nobel Prize-winning economist who argued in the 1960s
that the effects of economic growth on income distribution change at different
stages of development. Specifically, he speculated that income inequality widens
in the early phases of economic development, when the transition from the
preindustrial to the industrial phase is most rapid, becomes stabilized for a
while, and then narrows in the later phases as economies mature.5
However, recent studies have largely shown that these concerns are ill founded,
diminishing the support for the Kuznets hypothesis. Several recent studies
5 The Kuznets hypothesis was based on analytical reasoning rather than data—his evidence was slender, at
best. According to Kuznets himself, “the paper is perhaps 5% empirical information and 95% speculation,
some of it possibly tainted by wishful thinking.” However, his hypothesis was widely accepted by many
development economists.
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illustrate that on average, economic growth does not systematically affect income
distribution. In fact, it raises the income of poor people to the same extent as
average incomes. The evidence is sufficiently convincing that the World Bank
concluded that there are no systematic effects of economic growth on income
inequality across countries (World Bank 2000). The differences in inequality
at a given rate of growth could reflect the fact that the combination of policies
and institutions that led to this growth differed across countries, and that
these differences in policies matter for income distribution. Further research
also shows that there is no evidence that income distribution between countries
deteriorates as the global economy expands—the Pacific benefits from the spread
of globalization directly and indirectly (Sala-i-Martin 2002).
In order not to be left behind, however, the Pacific countries must follow growth-
oriented, private sector-friendly policies to ensure that they can capitalize on
the growth of the world economy. In many ways, the issues raised here represent
the confluence—or conflict—of tradition versus modernization. The countries
of the Pacific wish to secure improved opportunities and incomes for their
people, but the fundamental question they wrestle with is whether they must
modernize—and by implication give up cherished traditions and customs—to
do so.
This publication supports the idea that modernization is
necessary for development but not at the cost of foregoing
traditions and customs. Incentive structures can evolve to
encompass culture, just as they have in other parts of the
world. Culture can be defined and formalized to make
contractual obligations enforceable. The countries of the
Pacific have already embarked on this journey. They have
formal (nontraditional) central governments with most
of the trappings of governments everywhere. The issue for
the Pacific countries is how far along that road they wish
to travel and at what speed.
In evaluating the significance of the private sector in
promoting growth, this publication also touches on issues
that have been at the center of policy debates in the region. It discusses issues
such as the role of the state, the effect of size and remoteness, the interaction of
markets for goods and services, capital and factors of production, and the
appropriate role of funding agencies. One important conclusion is that many
disadvantages habitually blamed on distance and smallness are exaggerated.
And that some of these negative effects are greatly compounded by ill-advised
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policies that reduce factor market flexibility and raise the costs of doing business.
In addition, this publication also emphasizes the importance of institutions in
promoting an environment where the private sector can flourish.
Private Sector Assessments in the Pacific:
A Framework
PSAs examine the incentives and constraints to private sector activity. At the
outset, analysis of the business environment involves reviewing the significance
of a wide range of factors related to the private sector. The most important of
these are
• macroeconomic conditions
• trade policy
• the financial sector
• property rights
• regulation
• institutions that underpin a modern market economy
• the role of government in the economy
All these factors can profoundly influence the structure and conduct of business
as well as how entrepreneurial activity is channeled. However, they can differ
widely between countries. In fact, they tend to be country specific and idiosyncratic.
What is important in one country may not be so in another. After an initial
review of the issues that influence private sector development, more detailed
and country-specific analysis is necessary. Undertaking a regional PSA that
encompasses many countries requires compromise. As a result, generalization
is inevitable.
PSAs undertaken by the authors in the four study countries6 serve as the
foundation for the themes relevant to the Pacific as a whole. These countries
reflect various conditions and backgrounds that provide the basis for a discussion
of several issues. The common themes that emerged provide guidance for the
strategy (Chapter XI), which suggests policies toward the private sector for the
governments, as well as international and bilateral development agencies.
6 Marshall Islands, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, and Vanuatu.
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Overview of the Report
This private sector assessment of the Pacific is organized along the following
lines. Chapter III outlines the methodology used to assess the private sector’s
business environment in the Pacific. It draws on empirical research that measures
the impact of factors traditionally thought to generate growth. The evidence
points overwhelmingly to the main determinants of private sector growth as
being the institutions that provide the basis for private sector activity and the
transaction costs imposed upon businesses. Among these are factors such as
governance and political stability, the legal and regulatory system, the viability
of property rights and contracting, and dispute resolving mechanisms. The
chapter illustrates how factors such as mineral endowments, education levels,
macroeconomic stability, and savings rates, have little impact in themselves
when the underlying institutional framework is missing.
Chapter IV describes the characteristics of the Pacific economies, including the
effects of size, distance, and vulnerability on private sector development in the
region. It examines the impact of remittances from overseas workers and
international funding, as well as describes the pervasive presence of the state in
many of these economies.
Chapter V describes the main issues faced by the private sector in the region,
including small market size, the high costs of doing business, and the interaction
as well as the role of public and private sectors. A common feature of most
economies in the region is the high cost of infrastructure and communication
services.
Chapter VI examines the financial markets in the Pacific. While levels of financial
development vary among the countries, overall their systems are underdeveloped
and rely heavily on bank financing. Interest rates are characterized by fairly
large spreads, but interest rate levels are low compared with many developing
countries. This chapter briefly describes some existing regional financing schemes
as well as the pros and cons of their further expansion. The main theme of this
chapter is that property rights issues, both for land and movable property,
combine to exclude the local population from access to finance, particularly
those in agricultural areas.
Chapter VII focuses on land issues and their impact on private sector development.
The issue of land-related property rights is among the most difficult challenges
facing the Pacific. In all four study countries, a major portion of land is held
communally, making the assignment of identifiable property rights difficult.
In most countries, however, there is also a deep spiritual attachment to land
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and most people are rightfully wary of introducing freehold tenure, which
makes the abrogation of the current owners’ claim possible. However, this
publication points out that what harms private sector development—and
therefore prosperity—in the region is the present pervasive uncertainty and
the inability of investors to enter into secure contracts using land. It makes
some modest suggestions regarding the beginnings of a process of reform and
ways in which a system of movable property could be implemented in a manner
that could begin to contribute to transformation.
Chapter VIII looks at the interface between the role of the state in the Pacific
countries and how it affects private sector development. It challenges the notion
that characteristics of the region imply a large and pervasive state presence and
identifies how this attitude has damaged private sector development in the
past. The chapter examines policies toward state-owned enterprises (SOEs)
and issues surrounding privatization, the legal framework, and infrastructure.
It suggests that in many countries, interaction between the state and the private
sector constitutes a “dialogue of the deaf ” and calls for more contact and
cooperation. It also looks at issues of governance and the impact of dysfunctional
states on the private sector.
Chapter IX briefly examines some sectoral issues, although the report and
analysis do not take a sectoral perspective. There are some fundamental issues
related to tourism development, agricultural policies, and management of
fisheries that have a profound impact on private sector development in the
region.
Chapter X briefly discusses some special considerations in relation to targeted
assistance to small-scale rural enterprises, and the need for generic policies
governing small and medium enterprises (SMEs).
Based on the analysis, Chapter XI discusses options for governments and donors
to promote private sector development, and provides an outline for a private
sector development agenda for Pacific governments and funding agencies,
respectively. This chapter is largely based on a short separate report prepared to
suggest a private sector policy framework and strategy for ADB in the Pacific,
making specific recommendations regarding a strategy for interventions toward
the development of the private sector. A new ADB private sector development
strategy is now being considered and will become part of ADB’s Pacific Strategy
for 2005–2009.
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III. Analytic Approach
A dynamic private sector is a feature of all countries that havesustained economic growth. Besides promoting general prosperity, arising GDP is the most effective means of reducing poverty. A flourishing
private sector, therefore, is central to efforts at reducing poverty in the Pacific.
Although consensus exists on the importance of the private sector, how to
ensure that it is able to develop is an issue of contention.
The relationship between economic growth and poverty is clear from Table 1
wherein income growth is strongly correlated with poverty reduction. Private
sector development is the most efficient and durable way of achieving this end.
Private sector development promotes efficient economic growth and development
and is a source of wealth, dynamism, competitiveness, and knowledge. Beyond its
economic merits, however, lie compelling social and political attributes that enhance
the contribution private sector development can make more generally to sustainable
development, the overriding goal of all development assistance efforts (DAC71994).
The question is, what promotes growth? And more importantly, what promotes
private sector growth?
7 Development Assistance Committee.
Table 1. The Relationship Between Growth and Poverty
Economic Response % Change in Average % Change in Poverty
Incomes per Year Rate per Year
Strong Contraction –9.8 23.9
Moderate Contraction –1.9 1.5
Moderate Expansion 1.6 –0.6
Strong Expansion 8.2 –6.1
Source: Easterly, William. 2001. The Elusive Quest for Growth. Cambridge: Massachussetts
Institute of Technology Press.
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What Promotes Growth?
Many have advanced theories as to what promotes growth and many have been
incorrect. So far, these theories have been limited in their ability to provide a
panacea for stimulating growth in the developing world, particularly an
appropriate application of these theories by donors to the developing world.
During the 1940s and 1950s, economic theory focused on “filling the gap” or
using foreign aid to top up savings with the “necessary” investment to promote
a particular level of growth (Easterly 2001). This focus
arose from the Harrod-Domar model, which was based
on the idea that GDP growth is proportional to the share
of investment spending on buildings and machines. But
it is based on the assumptions that production capacity is
proportional to the machinery stock and that labor is in
excess supply. William Easterly has demonstrated that
there is no statistically positive relationship between aid
and investment and that there is not a one-for-one
relationship between increases in aid and investment as a
share of GDP. Evsey Domar later disavowed his theory as
inaccurate and “filling the financing gap” ceased to be
considered important. But the model continues to be used
by some international finance institutions (IFIs) to
determine the required investment rate for a target rate of
growth. In fact, “Domar’s growth model became, and
continues to be today, the most widely applied growth
model in economic history” (Easterly 2001).
Instead of focusing on investment rates and ways to use aid as a means of bridging
the gap, the focus should be on how to create the right incentives for people to
invest in the future and shaping the appropriate institutions to support them.
When capital investment seemed to have little impact on growth and Robert
Solow demonstrated the importance of technology in the production process,
the 1950s and 1960s saw an increasing focus on the importance of boosting
technology inputs to stimulate growth. But technology differences across
countries do not explain income differences among them. Robert Lucas
illustrated that a United States worker would need to have 900 times the number
of machines to explain the income differences between the United States and
India (Lucas 1990). In reality, the difference is more like 20 times the number
of machines.
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The failure of poor countries to grow is evidence against Solow’s view. Poor
countries failed to grow faster than rich.8 Unfortunately, they have not only
grown more slowly, but they are actually losing ground. The reason machines
in developing countries are not as productive has little to do with the machines
and more to do with incentives and the environment in which the people
operate the machines.
The 1960s saw an increasing concentration on the
importance of human capital development (i.e., education).
Investment in education may be socially beneficial, but
studies have found a tenuous relationship between increasing
education and long-run growth (Easterly 2001). In fact,
the decline in growth of developing countries occurred
when there was a huge educational expansion in those
countries.
If the incentive to invest in the future is not there,
education will have little impact on growth and will in
fact create skills where there is neither technology nor the
desire to invest in the technology to be used.
The 1970s introduced the idea that controlled population increases would
positively impact economic growth. In other words, population growth imperils
prosperity by overwhelming the existing productive capacity to generate jobs
and outstripping food production. The thought was that if population could
be controlled, the developing world would grow by increasing its productive
capacity. But this theory is based on the assumption that an additional person
has zero productivity and once again, studies found that there was no significant
impact of population growth on economic growth.
A greater population may harm the environment but an additional person is an
additional taxpayer for governments and the more babies, the greater the chance
of innovative people being born to benefit society. In addition, new ideas will
be more beneficial the more people there are to share the benefits and spread
the costs, a critical point for most of the countries in the Pacific given their
small population size.
The 1980s brought the recognition that IFI loans needed to be linked to
policy reforms and this legacy has shaped much of the focus on the private
sector to date. There were some successes, but there were problems as well. The
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8 Paul Romer demonstrated that poor countries were not growing faster than rich.
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first problem with lending arose from IFIs and other funding agencies not
enforcing the conditions of the loans. The second problem arose from a focus
on import substitution and sectoral targeting behind high trade barriers.
Easterly has cited some successes during this time, where GDP growth was
positive on average over a period. For example, Ghana, the Republic of Korea,
Mauritius, and Thailand experienced positive growth, but these countries are
only limited evidence of success. They are also evidence of countries that
undertook serious reforms as opposed to others who continued to receive aid
but made no reforms. For example, countries with severely negative interest
rates received more aid than those with positive interest rates (Easterly 2001).
Unfortunately, incorrect incentives for both parties pervade the donor-recipient
relationship. A World Bank study suggests that aid does not influence a country’s
choice of policies and that funding agencies do not necessarily consider the
worthiness of a country’s policies when providing aid (World Bank 1998b).
The funding agencies’ strategic interests determine aid, not the recipients’ policy
choices. The reward for better policies is only 0.25% of more aid as a percentage
of GDP (Easterly 2001). And providing aid does not create the incentive for
change. What is most important is a shift from an irresponsible to a responsible
government. (An irresponsible government will create the illusion of change to
avoid real reform, for instance, through creative accounting.)
IFIs have internal incentives to provide loans. Often a department’s budget is
determined by the amount of aid disbursed in the previous year. Therefore,
low disbursements mean a cut in the budget. Loans then, are often disbursed
according to “quota” rather than on project viability. Recipients are aware of
this and so they often simply wait for the aid without making reforms. The
greater their poverty, the more aid they receive—therefore, there is little incentive
to change. And so develops a vicious cycle of lending. Aid should be tied to
past performance, not promises of reform.9 Both ADB and the World Bank are
moving in this direction with performance-based lending.
The second problem from this period arose from a focus on import substitution
and sectoral targeting behind high trade barriers. The shocks experienced by
these countries during the financial crises of the 1980s, exposed the weaknesses
of the inward-looking import substitution approach to development and the
projected dynamism and growth were conspicuously absent.10
9 Easterly suggests developing an index to measure past policy performance and doling out aid depending on
the country’s ranking on that index.
10 In addition, throughout these phases of development, the state had a central role in directing development and
owning key industries in most countries in the developing world.
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Given the failure of these attempts, the policies of those who espoused the
“Washington Consensus” as the key to a strong private sector response and
economic growth—rapid privatization, macroeconomic stability, trade reform,
and “getting the prices right”—came into dominance in the early 1990s. It
was recognized that this simplified approach did not consider many of the
complexities that characterized developing economies. Nevertheless, so many
distortions had been introduced by earlier attempts at targeted intervention
that proponents of this approach believed that the incentives provided by prices
that correctly reflected scarcities would result in rapid private sector growth.
However, the private sector response has been disappointing. Small business
formation has languished, and informality has increased.11 All the various
components that make up the “enabling environment” for private sector activity
were absent.
What Drives Private Sector Growth?
Business Dynamism
Since economic growth and private sector development are closely linked,
identifying factors that encourage the formation of dynamic private sector
companies is central to formulating effective policies or programs that promote
private sector development and thus reduce poverty.
The concept of “creative destruction” developed by Joseph Schumpeter provides
the backdrop for a discussion of private sector development as it is based on the
view that dynamism, and thus growth, depends on private sector firms having
opportunities and incentives to expand in existing markets and to develop new
ones. New firms are created to take advantage of opportunities, which in turn
stimulates more competition among existing firms that must either respond to
the new challenge or go out of business. This cycle in turn creates new demand
that stimulates growth.
In Schumpeter’s view, growth and new firm innovation implies large numbers
of new firms being created and others failing. It is this process of “creative
destruction” that leads to a dynamic private sector. This “dynamic capitalism”
11 “Privatization advocates naively persuaded themselves that these costs could be overlooked because the
textbooks seemed to say that once private property rights were clearly defined, the new owners would ensure
that the assets would be efficiently managed … They failed to realize that without the appropriate legal structure
and market institutions, the new owners might have an incentive to strip assets rather than use them as a basis
for expanding industry. As a result, in Russia, and many other countries, privatization failed to be as effective
a force for growth as it might have been. Indeed, sometimes it was associated with decline and proved to be
a powerful force for undermining confidence in democratic and market institutions” (Stiglitz 2002).
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of firm formation and growth provides some guidance on how to formulate
policies that promote private sector activity. It redirects the focus of private
sector policy away from trying to assist businesses through targeted interventions,
toward promoting an environment that provides incentives for company
formation and growth. The paradox that large numbers of businesses fail in a
high-growth economy results from an economic system that encourages
experimentation and risk.
It is important to remember that reforms, projects, and
other interventions do not create growth, but entrepreneurs
and companies do. Higher productivity, the growth of
new activities, the restructuring of existing companies,
and the formation of new firms must be encouraged in
order for reform to be effective in promoting economic
growth and reducing poverty. These elements constitute
the basic criteria against which any policies or interventions
should be judged.
Transaction Costs
An important theme of this analysis is that how businesses are structured and
take place is strongly influenced by the transaction costs associated with
conducting business. These costs often define how economic activity is organized
or whether it takes place at all. Examining these costs makes it possible to
Box 1. Business Dynamism
An example of the interplay of factors that give rise to business dynamism
is provided from the United States by Donald Hicks, who studied a sample
of small businesses in Texas over a 30-year period. He found that during
this time, the half-life of small businesses had declined by 50%. The average
age of businesses in the Austin area, for example, is currently less than 7
years. At the same time, this region has the fastest growing number of jobs
and the highest wages in Texas. In other words, a dynamic business
environment encourages experimentation and provides strong incentives
for success. Defining dynamism is not easy, however. Anyone witnessing
the taxi bus industries in some Latin American countries would be hard put
not to describe this activity as bustling and apparently dynamic. Yet,
dynamism based on the application of energy alone will not lead to sustained
growth. It is the combination of energy, management skills, and technology
that ultimately results in economic advance.
Source: Hicks, Donald A. 1992. Beneath the Surface and Beyond the Borders: New
Dimensions of Dallas Area Economic Development. In State of the Region 1992. Richardson:
University of Texas at Dallas.
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The relative impact
of high transaction
costs is felt more by
smaller businesses
than by larger ones.
obtain insights into the constraints imposed upon businesses, derive the
implications for public sector policies, and find ways in which ADB and other
funding agencies could assist the governments of the Pacific in promoting
dynamic private sector growth. It is the cost of doing business, or the cost of
transacting, that frequently determine the way economic activity is organized.
Box 2 contains examples of transaction costs.
By examining private sector development issues through
the lens of transaction costs, familiar problems are cast in
a different language. But information on transaction costs
is limited since collecting data on them is in its infancy.
An important feature of transaction costs and the way
they affect the organization of economic activity is that
many have significant fixed cost components.
Consequently, the relative impact of high transaction costs
is felt more by smaller businesses than by larger ones. This result has a powerful
effect on the size structure of firms. High transaction costs contribute to
corruption and cause market failure—when the cost of transacting is high,
Box 2. Examples of Transaction Costs
Transaction costs are the costs of arranging, monitoring, and fulfilling
contracts. They determine the way business is organized and conducted,
and have a strong influence on the time horizons for business planning and
investment. Most importantly, they determine how markets function. Market
failure usually occurs when transaction costs are prohibitive. Examples of
transaction costs include those associated with
• buying and selling goods and services
• raising finance and capital
• obtaining information regarding business opportunities
• obtaining information regarding business associates
• forming and organizing companies
• bankruptcy for creditors
• enforcing shareholders’ rights
• entering into contracts
• enforcing contracts
• hiring and dismissing workers
• transporting goods
• importing and exporting goods
• complying with regional and local government regulations
• dealing with government representatives
• securing the ownership of property
• enforcing property rights
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markets do not function efficiently or even exist at all. Also, it takes considerable
resources to define and protect property rights as well as enforce agreements. It
is a society’s institutions and technology costs, however, that determine the
transaction costs—including the time and related opportunity costs—associated
with these efforts.
Institutions
Ultimately, private sector activity is driven by the environment in which it
operates. This can be an enabling or disabling environment depending on the
incentives provided to the business community by the state and societal
institutions. The private sector assessments undertaken for this publication
focused on the environment where the private sector operates, the institutions
that direct and impact private sector activity, the transaction costs imposed
on businesses, and ultimately, the incentives provided to private sector
businesspeople. Important elements include
• governance and political stability;
• the institutions that provide the basis for private
sector activity (e.g., the legal and regulatory system,
the financial system, and infrastructure provision);
• the viability of property rights, contracting, and
dispute resolving mechanisms within the legal
system; and
• the ability of businesspeople to raise capital within
the financial system.
Ultimately, factors such as mineral endowments, education levels, macroeconomic
stability, and savings rates have little impact in themselves if the underlying
institutional framework is missing.
Institutions reduce uncertainty in life by providing a structure in which
individuals and organizations can operate. They achieve this by defining and
limiting the choices available to individuals. The definitions and limitations
are devised to shape human interaction. They are the framework within which
human interaction takes place: the “rules of the game.”
Institutions interact with the economy through the impact they have on the
costs of exchange and production. Institutions determine the production and
transaction costs for business entities. Especially when it is costly to transact,
institutions are particularly important. They combine with the standard
constraints of economic theory such as supply and demand, to establish the
Institutions
determine the
production and
transaction costs
for business
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economic opportunities available to business entities. Organizations are then
created to take advantage of those opportunities. Depending on how institutions
attempt to modify behavior, however, they can end up creating perverse incentives
for organizations and increasing transaction costs. Examples include requiring
useless inspections, having contradictory and/or complicated rules, or exorbitant
taxes.
In the Pacific, institutions such as those operating both the legal and financial
systems are weak. However, they provide the foundation for private sector activity
and are fundamental to private sector growth. In addition, transaction costs are
high and there are many barriers to entry for small businesses. Accurate information,
however, that identifies precisely the shortcomings and transaction costs facing
businesses is inadequate or unavailable in most countries in the region. This
publication, therefore, suggests that a trial and error approach that analyzes in
detail the conditions facing the private sector on a country-by-country level—
not only for the four study countries—will help reveal appropriate private sector
development strategies for these countries and for the region as a whole. This
approach implies that detailed private sector analysis is a prerequisite for the
successful design and implementation of private sector projects.
Given the importance of the operating environment that exists for firms, this
publication suggests ways in which the state can commence the task of
identifying and removing the most costly barriers to business formation and
growth. It emphasizes that the private sector cannot prosper in an environment
that does not provide easy access to capital and financing for entrepreneurial
activity and it looks at ways in which the state can encourage financial
intermediation including contract enforcement, dispute resolution, and the
growth of capital markets. This publication identifies the public goods necessary
to support business activity, including the provision of infrastructure and the
regulation of enterprises at various levels of government, as well as the rationale
and limits of public initiatives, particularly with regard to market failure,
information asymmetry, and market imperfections.
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IV. Characteristics of
the Pacific Countries
A s far as economic development is concerned, the Pacific countriesmostly fall into the lower middle-income category. The islands areunique, but have inherent similarities given the geographic reality of
being small island nations, relatively isolated from the rest of the world. These
similarities give rise to issues that the small island nations12 of the Pacific must
surmount if they are to provide economic opportunities for their citizens and
encourage economic growth (Charles 1997). The reason these characteristics
are important is that the performance and development of the private sector is
dependent on them. We will now review these issues to provide the context in
which the private sector operates in the Pacific.
12 There is no single accepted definition of a small country because size is relative. For our purposes we shall
use the Commonwealth Secretariat threshold of 1.5 million persons, but will also include Papua New Guinea
as it shares many of the same characteristics of smallness.
Figure 1. Comparative GDP Per Capita, Constant US$, 2001
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Figure 2. Sectoral Breakdown of GDP, 2001
Table 2. Human Development Indicators, 1998
Country Adult Combined Life GDP Per HDI Global
Literacy (%) Gross Expectancy Capita HDI
Enrollment (%)  at Birth  (US$) Rank
Palau 91.4 83.4 69.0 8,027 0.861 46
Cook Islands 93.2 84.8 72.0 4,947 0.822 62
Niue 97.0 83.6 74.0 3,714 0.774 70
Fiji Islands 92.9 81.3 66.5 2,684 0.667 101
Nauru 95.0 79.5 58.2 3,450 0.663 103
Tonga 99.0 83.3 68.0 1,868 0.647 107
Samoa 95.7 85.7 66.6 1,060 0.590 117
Tuvalu 95.0 74.0 67.0 1,157 0.583 118
FSM 71.3 71.4 65.7 2,070 0.569 120
RMI 74.4 71.7 65.0 1,182 0.563 121
Kiribati 92.2 67.8 61.6 702 0.515 129
Vanuatu 33.5 57.4 65.8 1,231 0.425 140
Solomon 30.3 34.7 64.7 926 0.371 147
Islands
PNG 28.2 28.6 54.0 1,196 0.314 164
Tokelau 91.0 88.3 69.0 n.a. n.a. n.a.
FSM = Federated States of Micronesia, RMI = Republic of the Marshall Islands, PNG = Papua New Guinea.
n.a. = not available.
Source: United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). 1999. Pacific Human Development Report
1999: Creating Opportunities. Suva: UNDP.
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Small Size: Issues and Implications
Small Population
Small islands usually also have small populations, which by definition experience
less innovation because there are fewer people to innovate. Further, a cultural
dimension of small size in the Pacific is the dominance of village customs
that seek to impose a conservative/traditional mold on the village community.
Innovators or nontraditionalists can only prosper if they escape this stultifying
environment (i.e., by emigrating). In addition, successful businesspersons are
required by custom to share their rewards with extended family and church,
thus imposing a further “tax” on innovation.
The population of many Pacific countries has been negatively affected by
emigration as people leave to pursue opportunities elsewhere. But as the loss of
human capital is driven by the economic situation, it creates a vicious cycle as
the best people leave and make the situation worse. This phenomenon is
particularly detrimental to the private sector, whose dynamism is largely
dependent on the entrepreneurs of which it is comprised. As those entrepreneurs
leave, so declines the dynamism of the private sector. This departure also impacts
those entrepreneurs who choose to stay, as they have a smaller group from
which to learn skills and with which to compete. In addition, firms in the
private sector are small because they cannot realize economies of scale, are not
Figure 3. Population of Select Pacific Countries
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attractive business partners, cannot spend on market intelligence, and cannot
invest in new skills and technologies. A weak private sector may even limit the
absorptive capacity of small island states for both aid and investment. Because
of its size and isolation, the private sector may also lack the skills to generate
innovative projects and proposals, or to even manage aid projects financed by
donors.
A small population means that the per capita cost to the
state is higher. A small state still needs the same institutions
that larger states do, but there is a small population over
which to spread the cost and a smaller population from
which to draw civil servants. There are economies of scale
in operating public services, formulating policy,
undertaking regulatory, justice, and foreign affairs activities
that small economies cannot capture. Thus, the per capita cost of the apparatus
of the state is higher for small island economies, implying that taxes must be a
higher proportion of income than in countries where economies of scale are
captured. Further, the quality of civil servants (the working population as a
whole) is undermined by the “brain drain” of skilled or educated workers seeking
better opportunities abroad.
Small Local Market
These small populations also have implications for the size of the indigenous
market, which by definition is limited in size. The small per capita GDP of
many islands also limits the purchasing power of an already small population,
Figure 4. Population Density, 2001
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which again negatively affects market size. These size issues all impact producers
who are unable to capture economies of scale since the local market is unable to
support it. This results in only a few importers entering the market, often putting
these companies in a position of monopoly or oligopoly,
as in the case of supermarkets.
These limitations on producers and importers raise prices,
restrict competition, and thus reduce the dynamism of
the economy. Small size also means that the resource base
of many Pacific nations is restricted. As a result, most
Pacific economies have a narrow range of production and
exports, and a high concentration of economic activity in
one or two products. This concentration exposes them to
greater income volatility than larger, more diversified
economies. Unfortunately, lack of diversification is associated
with high-income volatility because fluctuations in world prices of the dominant
product or service impact a larger share of GDP than in the case of a diversified
economy.
Remoteness and Geographic Dispersal
The Pacific countries are isolated from major markets and many are a collection
of small islands scattered over hundred and sometimes thousands of kilometers
of sea.13 This characteristic has significant economic and administrative
implications. The economic impact takes the form of both high transport costs
resulting from the inaccessibility of foreign markets and small cargo volumes.
13 Kiribati, for example, has a landmass around the same size as St. Lucia spread over an area approximately
that of Western Europe. Its nearest market is Hawaii, 4,000 kilometers away.
Figure 5. Unit Cost of Air Travel Regionally and between Sydney and
Select Pacific Countries, 2001
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Figure 6. Fuel Prices, Select Countries, 2001
Figure 7. Shipping Rates, Select Countries, 2001
Service is often infrequent and some locations are not served at all. These high
costs regularly put freight carriers and airlines in a position of monopoly, which
they may try to exploit and thereby further increase costs. High transport costs
are equivalent to a tax on exports and imports, an obstacle that must be overcome
if island economies are to compete effectively with other countries. From an
administrative perspective, the remoteness and geographic dispersal makes
governance and the provision of public goods more difficult and costly. At the
same time, the cost for tax enforcement increases.
Susceptibility to Natural Disasters
Small islands are inherently more susceptible to climatic and natural events,
and most in the Pacific have experienced natural disasters that have affected the
entire population and economy. These events include cyclones, floods,
earthquakes, tsunamis, and droughts. Such events destroy income and
development opportunities, and add an additional element of risk to local
businesspeople, the government, and foreign investors. The United Nations
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Disaster Relief Organization has estimated that the impact of natural disasters
on small island economies has entailed costs in excess of 28% of their GDP.
The 1989 cyclone in Vanuatu, for instance, resulted in economic losses equivalent
to twice its annual GDP, while the 1997–1998 El Niño drought in PNG
affected every inhabitant, left 40% of the rural population in a state of “extreme
food shortage,” and reduced per capita GDP from $1,150 to $950 in 1997
(World Bank 1998a). In the Fiji Islands, it is thought that natural disasters
halved GDP growth between 1982 and 1994—an assessment made prior to
the drought in 1997/98, which was the worst calamity it
experienced within the given years (ADB 2000a).
Limited Access to Capital
The increased risk of natural and climatic events negatively
impacts the private sector by increasing the cost of capital
and limiting access to capital and foreign investment.
While most Pacific economies are open and stand to
benefit from foreign investment, private capital markets
perceive small island states to be riskier than larger states,
resulting in higher spreads and more difficult access to capital. Some have high
levels of public and private indebtedness, which virtually precludes commercial
borrowing, and even those with low levels of external debt find commercial
borrowing difficult. For a financial institution, lending has many fixed costs—
to gather information on creditworthiness, monitor disbursements and
repayments, and enforce payments—making the unit cost of a large loan
considerably lower than that of a small one. The higher cost of small loans to
small economies must then be recouped through interest rate spreads.
Foreign direct investment (FDI) is critical in linking more isolated economies
to state-of-the-art technology. Moreover, foreign firms are a source of know-how
for upgrading the private sector. While some small states receive significant
inflows of FDI, most Pacific economies receive less per capita than average. In
addition, net private capital flows are either approximately balanced or negative
(Table 3). This situation implies that rates of return on capital are not high
enough to maintain capital within the region. Small states are especially at a
disadvantage in attracting FDI. This disadvantage exists for the same reasons
that commercial lenders reject lending to small states even when those states
have open economies and sound investment policies—the risks are higher and the
returns not commensurate (Collier and Dollar 1999).14 Better alternatives can
14 Collier and Dollar have estimated that small states are 28% more risky than the average of all developing
countries.
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15 World Bank database.
16 In Samoa and Tuvalu, remittances average around 19% of their respective GDPs.
be found in larger, more robust, less-isolated countries. This implies the
obligation for Pacific island governments to do everything possible to reduce
the risks perceived by foreign investors. Likewise, international financial institutions
have the responsibility to ensure that market information is made available to
potential investors. This could be done directly by publishing the information
themselves, or preferably, by helping strengthen the statistical gathering and
analytical ability of local institutions.
Reliance on ODA and Remittances
Many Pacific states are heavily dependent on flows of official development assistance
(ODA) to finance their development program, recover from shocks, or even to
finance recurrent government expenditures. This heavy dependence on ODA
has implications for the real exchange rate. While Pacific states have received a
larger amount of ODA per capita than other developing countries, the flow of
ODA to small states has fallen by 30% in recent years (1997–2001) compared
with a 24% decline of ODA overall.15 The effect of the decline in ODA on rates
of growth and development has not been estimated, but is expected to be
significant. These countries’ balance of payments is also impacted by an often-
heavy reliance on remittances from expatriates sending money home from abroad.16
Large Presence of the State
It is often assumed that given the small size of these nations, the state has a large
role to play in many Pacific economies. But state involvement in the economy as
well as service provision has failed in the Pacific for the same reason it is has failed
elsewhere—government ownership and management provides weak incentives
for efficiency and good customer service. Many islands have undertaken a
Table 3. Foreign Direct Investment Outflows (US$, Million)
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Fiji Islands –97 567 569 –131 –100
Marshall Islands (Net private capital flows) –31.2 –6.0 –1.2 –16.8 –14.7
Papua New Guinea –76 –74 285 170 –56
Samoa 33 n.a. –25 –33 –56
Vanuatu n.a. 50 –33 19 n.a.
n.a. = not available.
Source: Asian Development Bank.
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privatization program and have reduced state involvement in the economy (e.g.,
in the Cook Islands, public enterprises in terms of its share of GDP decreased
from around 13% to less than 6%). However, further
progress remains to be made. The degree of government
involvement in Pacific economies creates inefficiencies by
increasing costs to the private sector and hampering growth.
Furthermore, it is also widely recognized that competing
requirements for infrastructure investment on the one hand,
and the need for budgetary probity on the other, can
frequently lead to insufficient investment when the state
both owns and operates infrastructure providers.
The state does have a role to play in the economy in providing
public goods and correcting market failures. But in terms of
its relationship with the private sector, it must play a relatively
hands-off role other than providing the enabling
environment. It does this through enabling legislation such
as limiting taxation, developing favorable land policy,
ensuring the consistency of government decisions, reducing
transaction costs for business, and ensuring the security and
enforceability of private contracts. Beyond this role, the state begins to negatively
impact the private sector and thereby reduce economic growth.
A related issue is the quality of governance. Governance in the region varies but
is generally weak. Democratic procedures, citizen consultation, and transparency
in decision making are fragile. Political and country risks in the region are
Figure 8. Foreign Direct Investment, Net Inflows (% of GDP)
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either very high (e.g., Papua New Guinea and Solomon Islands), high (e.g., Fiji
Islands and Vanuatu), or moderate (e.g., Samoa). Political scandals and uprisings
are common, and often go unpunished or unresolved.
In addition to the many other disadvantages mentioned,
the effect of weak governance is that the Pacific region is
often seen as both an unsafe and uninviting area for foreign
investment. Poor governance is further manifested in
inefficient or misallocated public investment, which has
long-term detrimental effects on private sector
development. Insufficient allocation of public funds to
human resource development, starting with primary
education, leads to high levels of illiteracy and poor general skills levels, thus
limiting the potential for development of the private sector.
Myths Concerning Small States
It is often thought that small island nations present a unique case for both
governments and the development community because of the inherent qualities
of being an island. But many problems appear exaggerated and their adverse
economic consequences arise not from the natural features of islands, but rather,
from ill-advised policies that purport to address them.17 In fact, many islands
Figure 9. Per Capita Official Development Assistance
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17 There remains a palpable tension between traditional and modern choices. The PDMCs are like an elderly
person stuck straddling a barbed-wire fence, with one foot on the modern side and the other foot on the
traditional side. Whichever way the fall, it will surely hurt.
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in the Pacific have unique agro-ecological features and climatic conditions that
provide them with competitive advantages over other nations. Despite having
a limited landmass, its natural resource base includes fisheries and other marine
resources, forests, arable land, and preserved areas suitable for ecotourism (World
Bank 1998c). However, this land is poorly developed. Nevertheless, many small
countries from a wide variety of cultural, economic, political, and geographic
settings (e.g., Bermuda, Iceland, Mauritius, and Norfolk Island) have recorded
success at overcoming these disadvantages.
Reporting on small developing economies worldwide,18
Easterly and Kraay find that island states with populations
of less than 1 million are better off than larger states for
the following reasons.
• Their GDP per capita is higher than other states.
• They have higher productivity growth rates despite the
common misconception that their size limits their ability to exploit
increasing returns to scale. In fact, small population size does not decrease
growth overall. It only increases population cohesion, which aids in
adaptation to change.
• They rely more on trade and generate more rapid growth than other
states despite experiencing more volatile growth rates (Easterly et al 1999).
Furthermore, Armstrong and Read found that advances in transport and
communications technology have helped offset the “smallness” and “remoteness”
issues that many small states face (Armstrong et al 1998), which reinforces the
importance of ensuring the availability of low-cost transport and communications
infrastructure in the Pacific countries.
Small states do experience greater growth volatility. Easterly and Kraay attribute
this volatility to increased openness to trade and a higher-than-average trade
to GDP ratio, concluding that the benefits of openness outweigh the negative
impacts of the higher volatility on growth. Concentration in fewer goods/
products and markets also increases volatility, thus the need for policies that
encourage diversification. However, the volatility in growth does not correlate
with the growth rates experienced by the world as a whole. As can been seen
from Table 4, the Pacific countries failed to witness the same positive growth
experienced across the globe in the last 10 years.19
18 They included four states from the Pacific: Fiji Islands, Samoa, Solomon Islands, and Vanuatu for which 10
years of GDP data were available.
19 Note that this observation does not mean that if world growth declines, growth in the Pacific will increase.
“We have no other
option than to try
to be smarter than
the others.”
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Table 4. Correlation Matrix of GDP Growth, 1990–2000
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sdnalsIijiF 000.1 890.0 972.0- 333.0 870.0- 304.0 912.0- 845.0- 041.0-
sdnalsIllahsraM 890.0- 000.1 085.0 320.0 823.0- 304.0 413.0 921.0 973.0-
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sdnalsInomoloS 304.0- 340.0 122.0 954.0 705.0- 000.1 662.0- 581.0 722.0-
agnoT 912.0- 413.0 993.0 502.0 511.0 662.0- 000.1 503.0 821.0-
utaunaV 845.0- 921.0 816.0 942.0 704.0- 581.0 503.0 000.1 831.0-
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Sources: Enterprise Research Institute and World Development Indicators online database.
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Box 3. Mauritius: Small, Isolated, Successful
Mauritius is a small island nation in the Indian Ocean, east of Madagascar. It has
approximately 2,040 km2 of land and 1.2 million people. At independence in 1968,
its economic prospects looked weak with a per capita GDP of US$260, high
unemployment, and heavy dependence on sugar exports (34% of GNP, more than
95% of total export earnings, and over 50% of total employment). It now enjoys a per
capita GDP of $3,800 and a GDP growth that has averaged over 6% for the last
decade. Much focus has been placed on its trade regime (the export processing
zone) as an engine of growth. However, the World Bank recently noted:
Mauritius’ success over the past 20 years can be attributed to the social cohesion
it has achieved in favor of growth, the strength of its institutions, the effectiveness
of its implementation and governance, [as well as] a reliable and independent
judiciary. This has enabled it to adapt fully to and take advantage of export
opportunities in sugar and textiles … the country is also proof of what can be
achieved in Africa given strong political commitment and investment in people
and the economy.
Mauritius has also made an effort to diversify, and the economy now has three main
pillars: manufacturing, agriculture (sugar now accounts for 7% of employment, 7%
of GDP, and 14% of total exports), and tourism. The Government is looking to further
expand the services sector by building up the financial services sector.
Tourism in Mauritius has developed gradually over the years, since the early 1970s,
to become one of the main growth sectors of the economy. The natural advantages
of the country, the friendly people, the high standards of hotels, and political stability
are among the factors that have made Mauritius a quality destination for tourism.
The Government has made a concerted effort to balance economic development
with environmental preservation for the tourism industry. The country’s development
strategy includes more investment in the tourism industry (e.g., training, development
of the airline, continued environmental sustainability, and inland and ecotourism
development).
In a 2001 interview, the Mauritius’ Minister of Economic Development said: “Tiny
Mauritius has got a very forward approach to regionalism. We want to be the most
enthusiastic reformer around, the most enthusiastic liberalizer, and the most
enthusiastic regionalizer. That is because we have no other option than to try to be
smarter than the others.”
Source: World Bank Press Release and the Mauritius Chamber of Commerce.
Small states tend to be financially closed and therefore do not take advantage of
the risk diversification afforded by international capital markets. The suggestion
is not that financial openness is the answer to growth volatility, but that it
helps in insuring against shocks.
Though small states differ from large ones, they should receive the same policy
advice as large states. This means that island nations must create an enabling
environment for the private sector and be treated by IFIs in the same way as
larger developing countries. In other words, the growth lessons from all countries
are equally applicable to small states.
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V. Main Issues Faced
by the Private Sector
in the Pacific
T he private sector can only flourish and create employment opportunitiesif the environment in which it operates is conducive to business.Frequently, governments—deliberately or inadvertently, directly or
indirectly—create an environment that adds to the costs of doing business,
reduces profits, and discourages dynamism and entrepreneurship. One of this
publication’s main themes is that state intervention, under the guise of promoting
growth, has introduced constraints and distortions that in fact make private
sector development more difficult, having the opposite effect than what was
intended. Furthermore, state intervention has resulted in rates of return on
capital that are below what would be acceptable in most
growing economies. Interest rates of return relative to the
high interest rates that prevail make relatively few projects
profitable in the Pacific economies. The result is that
private capital is exported, seeking higher rates of return
elsewhere; and the development banks end up subsidizing
projects in the countries themselves. The answer to this
conundrum is not to lower or subsidize interest rates,
but to raise the rates of return on capital.
State Interference
The size of government, as measured by the ratio of government expenditures
to GDP, is greater in the Pacific than others in the developing world. In
some countries, the ratio of government expenditure to GDP is close to one.
(The average for the region is nearly 30% versus less than 14% for other
developing countries.) To some degree, this percentage may reflect the higher
average cost of producing public goods in small economies, but despite allowing
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for this, the presence of government in the Pacific island economies is unusually
large.
While Pacific countries exhibit a strong government presence, they also have
burdensome regulatory regimes in place as well as a large number of business
enterprises owned by government. Neither of these characteristics is captured
in expenditure numbers and so the level of state intervention is even higher
than what is measured.20 At the same time, the large and heavy “footprint” of
the state often goes unquestioned. However, in view of the state’s propensity to
crowd out private sector activity, along with the corresponding adverse effects
on growth, the presumption of the necessity for a large state presence in small
countries should be challenged.
As a general principle, it is most efficient and least distortionary to private
incentives when government intervention in an economy is minimal. For
instance, the public finance practices of today look for every opportunity to
reduce state involvement in commercial and public goods activities. Where
public goods require public finance, the current approach to public sector
management suggests separating financing from the delivery of service, and
introducing—where possible—competition-based private sector participation
in service provision, even if it is financed by the state.
20 Unless state-owned enterprises are provided with direct budgetary support, in which case it will be included
in the measurement.
Figure 10. Government Current Expenditure, 2000 (% of GDP)a
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While the unit cost of producing public goods on a small scale is high, a large
body of research on the Pacific shows that government and private monopolies
that are inadequately regulated and whose markets are closed to contestability
produce services at unnecessarily high costs. An improved regulatory regime
that allows for competition and the rapid adoption of technical change,
combined with the sale or liquidation of government-owned commercial
businesses, would greatly lower costs, and decrease the size of the state.
As for the argument that economic volatility requires a larger state presence to
cushion shocks, sound macroeconomic and sectoral frameworks would provide
policymakers with more room to maneuver when the shocks hit. Better
governance, minimal corruption, better (lighter) regulation, and increased
competition would boost capital inflows while reducing economic volatility.
The private sector would be a larger component of the economy and as such,
assist in the reduction of volatility.
Relationship with the Public Sector
The private sector in most Pacific countries is partially crowded out by the
dominant presence of the state. Frequently, a public commercial bank and a
public development bank dominate the banking sector. And a large public
department of civil works or a roads department comprises the construction
sector. In their absence, the private sector would be larger. Substantial evidence
on the inefficiencies of the latter is provided in the Marshall Islands where the
Department of Public Works was disbanded with ADB support. Public works
programs were then financed by the public sector, but performed by the private
sector. However, for political reasons, the department was reestablished and
efficiencies again declined.
Electricity generation and distribution are mostly state monopolies, as are
telecommunications and water supply. The state also owns and operates critical
infrastructure such as ports and airports. In addition, governments in most
island states participate in conventional commercial activities. For instance, in
Samoa, even after significant divestiture, the State owns, among others, the
power company, the water utility, the airline, a shipping line, an insurance
company, and an agricultural supply business, and is a shareholder in the
brewery, two computer companies, and a logging company. In Tuvalu, the
Government owns both the national bank and the Development Bank of Tuvalu,
the Fishing Corporation, the electric and telecommunications companies as
well as the media corporation (ADB 2003f ). In the Marshall Islands, the state
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controls interisland shipping, owns the energy company, the telecommunications
authority, the water and sewerage company, an interisland airline, a hotel, a
dry dock, the postal service, a development bank, the airport authority, and so
on. The same pattern holds throughout the Pacific. Ownership is based on the
notion that without government intervention, such basic services would not
exist.
The effect of such extensive government ownership is
twofold. Not only is the private sector crowded out from
participating in these activities, it also raises the cost and
lowers the profitability of businesses to the extent that
the state-operated businesses are poorly run and provide
higher-than-necessary inputs to the business sector. The
presence of the state can be likened to a tax on development.
Business opportunities and jobs are not created at the rate they
would be in the presence of a smaller state. Furthermore,
even a smaller state can retain ownership of resources while
contracting out to the private sector through competitive
bidding, thereby increasing efficiency.
There appears to be a poor appreciation of this dynamic by policymakers in
the Pacific countries. Rather, the common conception seems to be that the
state is simply substituting for the private sector where the private sector has
been slow to show interest. The chamber of commerce surely has a role in
advising government on private sector interest in certain economic ventures.
It must also be said that the generous per capita development assistance to the
Pacific over many years (Figure 9) has provided policymakers with a financial
cushion allowing them to forego examining and making decisions on difficult
issues such as the role of the state in a modern economy. In some sense, funding
agencies have aided and abetted the large presence of the state and inhibited
the development of the private sector.
The situation does show evidence of change, however. Funding agencies are
increasingly supporting governments in the development of their private sectors
through both policy dialogue and lending—and some governments are
responding. In Samoa, for instance, the 1996 Statement of Economic Strategy
laid the foundation for a partnership between the Government and the private
sector, and there continues to be commitment to this agreement. The Samoan
Government sees its role as establishing the enabling environment for the private
sector. But even with progress, much still remains to be done, and some of the
more difficult aspects—such as the sale and regulation of SOEs and land
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reform—have been delayed. It will be difficult for the private sector to perform
at its full potential and create jobs at the needed rate until these aspects are
resolved.
Public Goods
The state is failing to supply public goods that underlie effective and efficient
private sectors, such as secure property rights, a legal system that allows
contracting with confidence, efficient and low-cost infrastructure, as well as
clear and efficient regulations. Therefore, there exists a Pacific paradox where
states are often not doing what they should do, and are doing what they should
not. The behavior of the state is a primary contributing factor to the low rates
of return on capital.
High Costs
All of these factors combine to create a high-cost operating environment for
business. This issue is echoed by the PSAs conducted in the four study countries,
where the most common complaint from businesspeople was the high cost of
conducting business. Part of the problem arises from the natural characteristics
of the countries:
• remoteness from foreign suppliers adding to the unit cost of inputs;
• small markets that mean enterprises cannot capture economies of scale;
• corresponding high costs of distribution channels and wholesale operations
that use market power; and
• long communication lines with infrequent air and shipping services.
It is undoubtedly true that these factors present problems to businesses in the
Pacific. Nevertheless, companies in small economies elsewhere have managed
to overcome these obstacles. In the Pacific, however, the effects of isolation and
size are often compounded by misguided government intervention that further
pushes up costs and reduces competition, the most important of which are
• high and variable import tariffs with numerous, often nontransparent,
exemptions;
• inefficient and poorly regulated government monopolies; and
• a pervasive state presence in business that results in the crowding out of
the private sector.
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When the costs of doing business are high, firms are discouraged from
establishing or expanding. Businesses that can pass on costs, such as those
producing nontraded goods or protected import-replacement goods, predominate.
However, export-focused businesses, which must compete globally, tend to be
fewer, smaller, and be extractive industries based on natural resource endowments
such as fish or minerals.
Little can be done to escape the costs associated with
remoteness or smallness, but the regulation of business to
minimize monopolies, the careful regulation of the
monopolistic elements of businesses that cannot be made
contestable, and having offshore regulators to avoid
regulatory capture, are all within government’s control.
In these areas, the Pacific should strive to introduce
international best practices, providing an environment
conducive to private sector development.
Transport Issues
One of the consequences of smallness and remoteness experienced by all Pacific
countries is the cost of air and surface transportation. Unit costs are high because
of distance from international markets, and small volumes often put freight
carriers and airlines in a position of monopoly. In addition, low volumes of
interisland traffic within a country make road transportation and coastal shipping
costly. High transport costs are equivalent to a tax on all products. They raise
the costs of doing business—costs that must be overcome if island economies
are to compete effectively with others.
Because of these disadvantages, Pacific economies must do all they can to keep
transport costs low. Currently, several states own and operate airlines, a business
that is often high cost/low margin, provides unreliable service, and drains the
country’s treasury. If an airline is required for strategic reasons, a more efficient
way to provide the service might be to auction off the rights for the provision of
a specified level of service to existing private airlines.21 Likewise, regulations
that restrict coastal shipping to domestic companies raise the cost of shipping
goods between the remote islands of the region’s countries, harm development
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21 The value of the rights to provide the service may be positive or negative. If negative, the system of auctioning
sets the minimum subsidy needed to provide the service. A similar approach can be used for intercoastal
shipping where minimum service requirements are needed for noneconomic reasons.
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in the rural areas, and encourage migration to already crowded towns. The
public policy issue is how to provide the least cost shipping services to outer
islands, not how to protect local shipping interests. Poorly run ports and airports
with monopoly rights further contribute to transport costs. Finding ways to
lower these costs will assist the private sector and
ultimately the economy.
The few examples here illustrate what is possible in terms
of reducing the disadvantages from the long distances
faced by remote and small island economies. A continual
crusade to search out sources of savings in the transportation
sector should be one of government’s main objectives.
Finance
The financial sectors in the Pacific are underdeveloped and provide a minimal
range of banking services such as demand and savings deposits as well as limited
commercial and personal loans. Often a government-owned bank dominates,
being the only one providing services to nonurban areas. The days when interest
rates were set by regulation, and the money supply was determined through
controls on reserve ratios have now passed, but the immature banking industry
is probably due, in part, to this legacy.
While there are dangers in generalizing, the following characteristics appear
common to the banking system of the region.
• Banking services seldom reach beyond main urban areas.
• Commercial banks have little outreach to low-income households.
• Credit to indigenous entrepreneurs is extremely limited. There is little
lending to agriculture and fishing.
• Interest rate spreads are large (with some exceptions).
• Microfinance programs are beginning to emerge but are still in their
infancy in most countries.
The underdevelopment of the financial sector in the Pacific is connected to two
important and related elements.
The secured transactions framework. Lending only occurs where it is possible
for the banks to obtain collateral on loans. However, the system for using property
as security—particularly chattels—is cumbersome, expensive, and often not
available.
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The customary land system. The system of customary land ownership presents
particular challenges to lenders hoping to secure loans against property. It is
possible in urban areas with freehold land, but beyond that, with few exceptions,
land and leases on land are not regarded as adequate security.22
To deepen financial markets and make credit available
to more borrowers, the two missing elements noted above
need to be addressed. Some countries in the region have
started implementing reforms, but most have not yet
begun. With respect to secured transactions, the essential
feature is granting priority23 to a lender in collecting
against some property of the borrower. This feature goes
hand in hand with a legal system that permits the
secured party to recover and sell the property in a timely
fashion. Critical aspects to support this feature are
• the law providing for the creation of an enforceable security interest against
all economically important property—both tangible and intangible;
• the application of the law to all important transactions in which security
interests are created;
• the cost of creating such a security interest being low relative to the value
of the property;
• the enforcement of the security interest being inexpensive relative to the
value of the property;
• the law and the institutions that implement the law allowing the lender
to determine before the loan is made, at little cost relative to the value of
the property, whether any other lender has a superior claim to the
collateral; and
• the secured lender being protected from hidden claims of third parties,
such as other creditors, a trustee in bankruptcy, or purchasers of the
collateral.
In addition to legal reforms for strengthening the secured transactions framework,
credit information is a useful adjunct for lowering the borrowing costs by
providing records of payment history. It is also important that governments
commit to maintaining recent reforms that freed up financial markets in some
PDMCs. The long-term aim should be financial markets that effectively channel
22 Either because leases are often in shorter terms than private firms need for investment decisions or banks
require a secured loan.
23 Priority is the process by which the lender establishes the priority of the security interest.
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funds from savers to investors to promote economic development and poverty
reduction. While externally funded interventions in the supply of loanable
funds are substitutes for financial deepening (i.e., extending the outreach of
financial institutions to new groups of customers), they are not long-term
solutions and will not help develop the financial sector. The ultimate goal is to
develop a self-sustaining, viable, and accessible financial sector.
The importance of microfinance and the institutions that support it is a popular
subject in current development literature. Microfinance institutions are
emerging in most countries in the Pacific, but with few—if any—exceptions,
existing microfinance schemes do not conform to international best practices,
making their long-term viability suspect. Samoa is one country where
microfinance has so far been successful and continues to grow, but whether it
will become self-sustaining is still uncertain. Yet, in Samoa at least, microfinance
is steadily becoming part of the commercial culture. In addition, other financial
institutions have emerged to provide lending to those who have “graduated”
from microfinance schemes. The nascent nature of the business means that few
“graduates” have yet to emerge. Nevertheless, the development of microfinance
should be encouraged and piloted in other countries in the region, following
international best practices.
Natural Resource Issues
Pacific countries are heavily dependent on natural resources for their livelihood
and are likely to remain so for some time. This reality makes resource
management a critical issue for their economic development. Some island
nations are rich in minerals and many have forest and fishery resources. The
richest tuna fishery in the world is found in the South Pacific and is partly
managed regionally. Most countries face issues concerning the distribution of
rents from those resources, especially those related to property rights such as
common property and customary ownership.
The issue of rights to use and collect rents from land is discussed in greater
detail in a later section. Largely, the property rights issues on forestry and
fisheries are also discussed.
Land has a spiritual value as well as productive use in Melanesian, Micronesian,
and Polynesian societies and the form of customary ownership introduces
considerable ambiguity regarding land rights, the distribution of rents from
land, and the productivity of the land. This is a major economic issue in the
Pacific that remains a source of internal conflict.
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Fisheries. The Pacific countries have control of large sea resources—some
countries have exclusive economic zones that are in the region of 3 million
km2. Many have chosen to use these resources by leasing out fishing rights to
foreign fishing companies. Important progress has been made recently in
developing regional approaches to managing the pelagic tuna resources.
Transshipment at sea has been prohibited, significantly reducing the
opportunities for underreporting while at the same time increasing domestic
returns. A cap has been placed on the future number of vessels from distant
water fishing nations, and some member countries of the Forum Fisheries Agency
(FFA) have agreed to allow access to each other’s exclusion zones for domestically
registered vessels. Future management of fisheries stocks and maximization of
returns will depend on regional cooperation and agreements that allow the
pursuit and apprehension across national waters, of illegal fishing boats. The
creation of the Tuna Commission in the Federated States of Micronesia should
contribute to this regional management effort. Fisheries offer considerable
potential for developing domestic fishing industries, but there are many
constraints to be addressed and sustainable fishing management systems need
to be put in place.
Management of coastal fisheries by state and local regulation is less developed
and many government-sponsored development projects in the Pacific have failed.
This is evidenced by the reduction in reef fish catches and the overexploitation
of high-value species such as sea cucumber, trochus24 and live reef fish.
Forestry. The two key characteristics of forestry in the Pacific are poor
management, resulting in unsustainable harvesting rates, and poorly structured
financial returns for resource owners. Some smaller island nations have been
overlogged within a few years (Solomon Islands) while others are in danger of a
similar fate if they do not act promptly (Vanuatu). It is not the felling of trees
for local use that is the issue, but large-scale commercial harvesting, often by
foreign companies. Attention must be focused on establishing a sustainable
harvesting plan, the regulatory capacity to enforce it, and a framework for the
equitable distribution of royalties. Part of the plan would require long-term
agreements with landowners to enforce the regeneration of forests.
All the larger island countries in the region have now developed their own code
of logging practices and are in various stages of implementing or enforcing
them. Fiji Islands, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, and Vanuatu have
undertaken forestry reviews and introduced legislation. Cook Islands, Niue,
24 Marine snail of shallow tropical reefs harvested for its thick inner layer of mother-of-pearl used for jewelry and
buttons.
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and Samoa are currently revising their legislation. There is a regional forest and
tree program where the heads of forestry from member countries discuss policies
and priorities at bi-annual meetings. In the past, individual countries have
acted on some priorities, and the technical and administrative cooperation
derived from the meetings is valuable. As with offshore fishing, there remains
an issue concerning non-transparent practices in providing licenses and quotas.
Minerals. While some islands have valuable mineral
deposits, the richest deposits are found in Papua New
Guinea. The major mining issues include the division of
royalties between landowners and government at various
levels and the social issues emerging from enclave mining
projects closing down, leaving many individuals jobless.
The difficult environment for long-term investment that
currently exists in Papua New Guinea is also an issue.
Papua New Guinea is the only producer of oil and gas,
and derives some royalties from that. Its adverse
investment climate means that this source of revenue is
also declining.
The lessons on the management of natural resources for
the long-term development of the Pacific nations are that
property rights must be clarified in a way that ensures
that competition results in the benefits of resource
extraction being shared fairly between the island states
and those doing the extraction. Lack of clear property
rights will hinder the fulfillment of this necessary condition. Second, the rents
from extraction, which represent a payment for the depletion of capital, need
to be invested in an alternative form of capital so that the aggregate capital
stock of the community or country is maintained. Mining in Papua New Guinea,
forestry in both Papua New Guinea and the Solomon Islands, and phosphate
mining in Nauru, are examples where resource rents have been consumed and/
or squandered. Despite the existing large policy and institutional gaps, willing
and dedicated governments can meet the conditions. Development partners
should encourage such reforms.
Investment Policy
Countries reduce poverty when they undertake two fundamental actions: first,
building an inviting investment climate in which private entrepreneurs will
invest and generate jobs; and second, investing in the education of people so
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they can participate in the economic growth generated by private entrepreneurs,
and as they learn business practices, become entrepreneurs themselves.
An enabling investment climate is one with sound macroeconomic management,
political stability, and trade and investment policies that promote openness,
productivity, and growth. It allows for the financing of new investment at
interest rates that equilibrate the supply and demand for savings. In addition,
it includes good governance, promotion of competition, prevention of corruption
as well as a solid foundation of basic physical and social infrastructure.
The case for creating a good investment climate is simple: without a predictable
environment for people, ideas, and money to work together productively and
efficiently, private investment, on which rests the hope for long-term growth
and productivity, will not occur. The role of government is to provide
entrepreneurs with an environment to invest in productive activities. Private
firms—small and large, domestic and foreign—operating in competitive markets,
are the engine of growth and job creation, and in turn, create wealth and
provide opportunities to escape poverty.
From interviews with many businesspersons in several
Pacific countries, it is clear that many elements of a positive
private sector climate are missing. Not only are the
regulations and institutions to support secure financial
transactions—the lifeblood of business—missing, but
also, many other regulations appear to be cumbersome,
unnecessary, and serve no readily identifiable public policy
purpose. Often it is expensive to establish and register a
business. Incorporation is difficult. Sometimes, specific
industries are targeted for assistance, while obstacles to
investment, in terms of controls on the composition of
ownership or the board of directors, for example, are
imposed on others. Targeted industries and subsidies
distort decisions and have long-term deleterious effects on the efficiency,
profitability, and growth of the business sector.
Why Foreign Investment Is Good
In many developing countries, including those of the Pacific, foreign investment
is a controversial subject. Foreign investors have been accused of exploiting
workers and damaging the environment, of corrupting officials and making
exorbitant profits. In some cases, these have occurred. Yet as international
experience shows, foreign direct investment (FDI)—with its transfer of technical
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and organizational skills, best practices, and market access—stimulates rapid
growth in incomes for all members of society. And when international flows of
capital abate, it is usually the poor in developing countries that suffer the
most.
Why do we observe these differing views on FDI? Because the extent to which
foreign investment can help or harm the poor depends very much on the
business environment provided by governments. Developing country
governments maximize the beneficial impacts of FDI when they have a sound
operating framework for businesses. In particular, we maintain that a government
that wishes to ensure that FDI reaches the poor should
• allow free entry and exit in its markets to create
competition in product and labor markets and give
incentives to upgrade productivity;
• promote worker training, and finance infrastructure
to increase domestic capacity as well as absorb new
and appropriate practices introduced by foreign investors;
and
• create a policy framework that encourages the adoption
of appropriate social and environmental standards in
corporate practices.
Foreign Investment Regulation
Most countries in the Pacific understand the importance of foreign investment
but control it quite closely to avoid repeating unfortunate experiences with
foreign investors. Controls are based on the understandable desire to limit the
number of dubious—and at times fraudulent—projects that have occurred in
the Pacific. There is the common phenomenon of the so-dubbed “two dollar
investor,” a small foreign investor who comes to a country in the Pacific with
limited capital and attempts to raise most capital locally for a project of dubious
viability. To combat this problem, many countries have established complex,
costly, and time-consuming vetting and approval systems, which discourage
both legitimate investors as well as the less credible investors among them.
In practice, however, governments of the Pacific must realize that business is
risky and it is inevitable that some foreign investment will fail, resulting in the
bankruptcy or exit of new companies. Moreover, in practice, there are no
convincing documented examples of “fly-by-night” investors, except in cases
where governments have attempted to give special incentives over and above
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the foreign investment regime. In fact, experience shows that the fewer special
incentives that are offered, the more likely that genuine long-term foreign
investment will occur. There is a risk that offering incentives will result in a
“race to the bottom” and a zero or negative sum outcome. That is, if countries
compete by offering incentives to foreign investments, it is unlikely that net
investment in the region will rise, but rather that one country will divert
investment away from another, where potential investors play one country off
the other to extract the maximum concessions. In the end, the countries do not
benefit. Rather, countries could race to the top by ensuring that their foreign
investment environment is simple and transparent so foreign investors can
quickly surmount the regulatory and administrative barriers to new investment.
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VI. Financial Markets
in the Pacific
There is increasing awareness of the importance of financial markets forpromoting economic development. If the financial system does notintermediate between savers and investors, the private sector has no means
of financing projects (except for retained earnings and savings, which are
generally limited, particularly for small businesses). Furthermore, the financial
sector is a vital means of allowing wealth (assets) to be
mobilized to provide liquidity for financial capital. Without
intermediation, private sector development is hampered
in its ability to take advantage of opportunities to invest
in profitable projects, which in turn leads to reduced
economic growth and poverty reduction. Therefore, the
economic development of the Pacific depends largely on
financial markets.
Financial Markets and Economic Development
Since the early 1970s, revolutionary work in information economics has shown
that inefficiencies can arise when one of the transacting parties has superior
information concerning the value of any transaction. In such circumstances,
intermediaries play an important role. Akerlof (1970), Stiglitz and Weiss (1981),
and Bernanke (1983) developed the foundation of the modern theory of financial
intermediation, based on the ability of banks and other financial institutions
to resolve the problems arising from the asymmetries in information between
transacting parties.
The absence of financial intermediation makes evaluating the quality and
performance of firms costly for investors. Because many firms and entrepreneurs
solicit capital, banks and other financial intermediaries can realize scale
economies in obtaining detailed information regarding firms’ profitability and
investment prospects, thereby greatly reducing verification and monitoring
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costs. With the most promising firms and managers getting funds, improved
capital allocation fosters growth.
The increasingly detailed theoretical analysis of the close relationship between
financial development and economic growth has been confirmed by numerous
empirical studies. See for example, Goldsmith (1969) or King and Levine
(1993). Findings confirm that financial development and economic growth
are closely linked and that the former may actually predict the latter. King and
Levine (1993) also found that in 1960, the level of financial development in
80 different countries was correlated with the subsequent average rate of
economic growth across these countries over the next 29 years. Their findings
provided positive empirical evidence for the argument that financial development
predicts economic growth.25
Financial Markets in the Pacific
Structure
Commercial banks predominate in the financial sectors of the Pacific. In many
countries, they are foreign-owned. Australian banks are especially active in the
region. Banks in general only lend to larger, well-established firms. The effect
of this approach on a small firm’s flow of funds is worth spelling out. Since all
sources of funds—except equity, retained earnings, and trade credit—are
unavailable to a small business that wishes to expand, it cannot grow as fast as
it would if financial markets were better developed. Moreover, it may have to
economize on inventory of all kinds and on investment in capital equipment.
Therefore, decisions such as which technology to adopt in production, how
much inventory to hold, and whether to expand or not, are determined by
personal circumstances and not by the track record of the person running the
business and his or her ability to convince lenders of sound ideas.
Compounding the problem for entrepreneurs in the Pacific is that the owner’s
real estate holdings usually cannot be used as collateral because of uncertainties
25 There are, however, two possible sources of error that prevent researchers from using evidence that finance
predicts economic growth to conclude that it determines economic growth. First, a common omitted practice
could drive both financial development and economic growth variables (e.g., the propensity of households to
save). Second, financial markets may anticipate future economic growth and simply be a leading indicator
rather than a casual factor. See Rajan and Zingales (1998a) and Rajan and Zingales (1998b).
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regarding land tenure. The limited alternatives available to entrepreneurs with
modest personal asset holdings have profound consequences on the efficiency
of their businesses and for resource allocation.
The general perception of financial markets in the Pacific is that they do not
function effectively. This was confirmed by the research undertaken as part of
the four PSAs examined for this publication. However, observations on the
banks’ manner of intermediation and the companies’ financing requirements
present a paradox. Several apparently contradictory factors appear to be present.
• Various reports on countries in the region as well as background documents
prepared as part of external funding indicate there is a shortage of financing,
especially for smaller businesses.
• The financial institutions interviewed for the PSAs stated that they had
excess liquidity and that there is a severe shortage of bankable projects.
• The business communities in the countries visited complained about
the high levels of real interest rates, which average around 12% per year.
Box 4. Lender/Borrower Transactions in Financial Markets
Several key concepts underlie the financial market structure and determine
lender and borrower behavior. Relationships between borrowers and
unsecured lenders are fraught with moral hazard issues, arising in situations
when the parties in a contract have conflicting interests, and circumstances
make monitoring difficult or costly. Self-interest then increases the likelihood
that one of the parties will distort information or engage in expedient behavior.
For moral hazard to be present, three conditions must be met. First, the
parties undertaking the transaction must have divergent interests (e.g., a
lender to be repaid and a borrower not to repay). Second, there must be
opportunities for transacting that lead to a situation where the divergent
interests come into play (e.g., a loan contract). Third, there must be
asymmetric information—one of the parties must have better access to the
facts of the situation than the other. Borrowers and lenders have asymmetric
information about loans—it is impossible for a lender to know the business
as well as the borrower. The borrower, therefore, has a much better idea
than the lender regarding whether the loan can actually be repaid. In
circumstances where the borrower bears no cost of defaulting, the likelihood
of default rises. Although lenders could charge higher interest rates to
compensate for the risk, problems of adverse selection then occur. That is,
since higher interest rates require a higher rate of return—which is in turn
associated with greater risk—there would be a tendency for people who
are risk takers to predominate among the borrowers. The risk structure of
the banks’ loan portfolio would be biased towards high-risk borrowers. Under
such circumstances, banks generally do not lend to businesses whose owners
do not have clear title to large real estate holdings.
FINANCIAL MARKETS IN THE PACIFIC 59
• Most of the larger countries in the Pacific have had net outflows of FDI
in several of the past few years (Table 3), implying that the rates of
return on investment are modest at best, perhaps supporting the claims
of the commercial banks regarding bankable projects.
These observations are consistent with a private sector
environment that has a low rate of return on financial
capital. It is not necessarily true that all potential
investments have low rates of return because government
may be crowding out potentially profitable projects or
there are profitable projects that cannot be financed.
However, the rates of return within the current private
sector environment are incapable of attracting or retaining
significant private capital, a situation that creates policy
implications for private financial markets.
Characteristics of Financial Markets in the Pacific
The financial markets of the Pacific countries are dominated by commercial
banks, which tend to lend to established businesses. With the exception of
Tonga and Vanuatu, the credit to GDP ratios in the region are below the
average for developing countries with similar per capita GDP levels. However,
in most countries (with the exception of Samoa) the bankers interviewed
indicated that they have excess liquidity and could lend significantly more if
there were more bankable projects.
In most cases, banks in the Pacific countries are governed by risk criteria
established primarily in Australia, since commercial banking operations are
dominated by ANZ26 and Westpac, both Australian banks. As a result, banking
practices tend to emulate those in Australia. In line with risk averse banks in
the developed world, there is little lending without collateral. Since neither
land nor chattel mortgages provide reliable security, the banks do not lend to
any but the larger businesses and tend not to lend to locals since the bulk of
their assets are in the form of communally owned land. Therefore, commercial
banks in the Pacific prefer to lend against collateral, and confine the bulk of
their lending to urban areas because this is where most land leases and freehold
Observations on
the banks’ manner
of intermediation
and the companies’
financing
requirements
present a paradox.
26 Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Limited.
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land are concentrated, and most businesses, as well as most private households,
are located.
In general, the foreign-owned banks characterize the Pacific as an area where
debt recovery is not easy. For example, one of the commercial banks characterized
Samoa as its most difficult lending environment because of repayment issues.
For the most part, banks are interested in longer term business financing.
Nevertheless, those interviewed indicated that such loans are risky given the
combination of a culture where debt repayment is not accorded high priority
and securing loans against assets is costly.
Credit information is another problem identified by commercial banks in
the Pacific. With some exceptions (e.g., Marshall Islands), competition among
the banks have resulted in little sharing of credit histories, with the result that
borrowers of dubious quality can often get loans from a succession of financial
institutions.
A combination of difficult lending environments combined with the inability
to use collateral as security for loans has resulted in conditions in which
indigenous people find it especially difficult to obtain finance from commercial
banks in the region. Typically, development banks and national provident funds
(NPFs) have been the main suppliers of loans to the local population. However,
Figure 11. Comparative Average Credit to the Private Sector (1996–2000)
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this situation carries substantial risks for the lending institutions and the viability
of pension funds, in the case of NPFs. Arrears at both types of institutions are
far higher than at commercial banks, confirming that concerns regarding lending
without collateral are warranted. Secured lending is the only means of dealing
with the moral hazard issues. Intentions to repay must be backed up with
incentives to repay.
Interest Rate Issues
Interest rates in the Pacific are not high by the standards
of many developing countries. In most countries in the
Pacific, real interest rates charged by commercial banks
to their borrowers are in the region of 10–12% per year.
In some countries in the region, development banks and
NPFs charge interest rates that are two or three percentage
points lower than commercial bank rates. These interest rates are misleading,
however. The theme of this chapter is that many people in Pacific countries are
excluded from access to finance because of the inadequate institutions underlying
financial markets in the region. The interest rates charged are not indicative of
the available borrowing opportunities, as they are the rates charged to prime
borrowers.
Figure 12. Real Interest Rates (%), 1996–2001, Select Countries
Intentions to
repay must be
backed up with
incentives to
repay.
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In general, nominal interest rates embody different factors that reflect the
incentives and risks faced by lenders. Commercial banks accept deposits and
invest these in alternative assets. The first factor, therefore, is the cost of funds,
or the rate that banks pay depositors for their funds. The second reflects the
alternative investment channels open to banks. Most banks in the region invest
some of their funds in foreign securities, primarily
denominated in either US or Australian dollars. Since the
alternative is to invest locally, local interest rates must reflect
exchange risk—except in cases where the US dollar is their
currency (e.g., Marshall Islands and the Federated States
of Micronesia). A further alternative is to invest in a
country’s government securities—usually the most secure
of the alternatives available locally. Finally, the bank can
also invest in local loans. The spreads between each type of
investment embody the risk of lending. An additional factor in the Pacific is
that lending and deposit rates embody some element of oligopolistic pricing
because of the limited number of banks.
As noted earlier, banks are highly risk averse, which is quite understandable
and probably reflects sound business practices. All the financial institutions
visited indicated that in the event of default, recovery of debt presented major
problems. In some countries, such as the Marshall Islands, there are no
bankruptcy provisions in the commercial code, and legal proceedings can last
Figure 13. Interest Rate Spread (%), 1996–2001, Select Countries
Interest rates in
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the standards of
many developing
countries.
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Figure 14. Comparative Average Interest Rate Spreads, 1996–2000
for many years in the event of a company’s inability to discharge its debt
obligations. In all the other countries visited, bankers reported lengthy
proceedings to recover debt.
The result is that most banks require real estate as security. A further idiosyncrasy
in the institutional structure that underlies lending in the Pacific is that most
countries have a constitutional prohibition of foreigners owning land.
Interest rate spreads in the Pacific are high but less than the average for countries
at similar stages of development. In most countries, the difference between
borrowing and lending rates average about seven percentage points. While
spreads in developed countries averaged less than four percentage points at the
end of 2000, it was above 15 percentage points for the group of low income
countries, which is about double that of the Pacific countries’ (Figure 14).
Furthermore, the data reflect lending to the most secure borrowers, as lending
rates are usually much higher for smaller enterprises. This substantial interest
rate spread reflects a combination of inefficiencies in intermediation and risks
on loans. Overall, financial systems in many developing countries appear to be
inefficient.
In the absence of detailed research, any explanations as to why Pacific countries
have lower spreads can only be speculative. But as competition is not intense
among the financial institutions in these countries, there must be some element
of oligopolistic market power built into interest rates. The combination of
lower overall lending rates and lower spreads, in contrast to other developing
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countries, probably reflects the risk aversion of financial institutions in the
Pacific, and shows that significant portions of the population are excluded
from access to the lending aspect of the financial system.
Expanding Collateral
Under the current institutional framework for lending, there is no credit available
to farmers or fishermen. For agriculture, there is no legal framework in which
to pledge future crop harvests, because farmers have no standing under the law
to make such a pledge. Confusion over customary law and its interface with
formal sector law excludes the land owned by farmers from serving as collateral.
For rural enterprises, inventories and accounts receivable
cannot serve as collateral unless the borrower is a
corporation. This lack of access to credit prevents the
growth of an important sector. It also prevents rural
businesses from refinancing their unsecured sales through
credit, thereby constraining potentially important
financial intermediaries from providing unsecured credit in rural areas. It also
biases the system against those whose primary asset is land, which is the majority
of the Pacific population. The incentives therefore increase the tendency of
rural populations to move to towns, adding to the strain on already stretched
infrastructure and social services in the urban areas.
Secured Lending
The economic impact of collateral is powerful (Fleisig 1996 and Fleisig et al
2000). The more and better the collateral offered by the borrower, the lower the
interest rate, the longer the time to repay, and the larger the loan relative to
income. While detailed legal assessments of the secured transactions framework
were not provided by the private sectors of the four Pacific countries analyzed
here,27 their conclusions show that major problems exist. Most importantly that
in urban centers
• rural property—whether movable or fixed—cannot serve as collateral for
loans; and
• large and economically costly gaps exist in what can be offered as collateral
and who can offer it.
27 ADB 1999. Table 8.1, sets out a convenient assessment of the economic usefulness of land as collateral in
different South Pacific countries and recognizes the importance of problems in the legal framework for collateral
in limiting access to credit.
The economic
impact of collateral
is powerful.
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Overview
For secured lending, the four Pacific countries that were the subject of the PSAs
share a British common law tradition inherited through Australia, New Zealand,
or the United States. In addition, Vanuatu also has some French civil code
heritage. In all cases, the commercial codes are outdated. Typically, Pacific laws
reflect the state of these laws in their parent country at about the time of
independence.
The main instruments for providing security on a loan in these countries include
the following.
Statutory and Equitable Mortgages in Real Estate. A statutory mortgage is
filed in the real estate registry. An equitable mortgage is a contract known to
both borrower and lender in which the borrower turns over ownership papers
to the lender but does not transfer them or register the transaction in a real
estate registry. Usually, equitable mortgages have been upheld in case law.28
Box 5. The Power of Collateral
The lending terms of credit unions illustrate the effect of a secured
transactions framework. In the United States, credit unions offer different
loans at different terms depending on the collateral the borrower offers. For
instance, they would offer a borrower without collateral a loan with an
annual interest rate of about 12.5%, repayable in about 33 months, amounting
to as much as 50% of the borrower’s income. For a borrower offering movable
property as collateral, these lenders would charge lower interest rates and
offer longer repayment periods and larger loans relative to the borrower’s
income. For a borrower offering real estate as collateral, interest rates would
drop even more, while repayment terms become longer and loans even
larger relative to the borrower’s income. Broadly, the more and better the
collateral offered by the borrower, the lower the interest rate, the longer the
time to repay, and the larger the loan relative to income. Overall, when
borrowers offer better collateral to lenders, borrowers pay interest rates
about 50% lower, have as much as 11 times more months to repay, and
receive loans as much as 9 times greater relative to income. These changes
in terms illustrate, unambiguously, the power of collateral. For exactly the
same borrower—with the same income, the same credit record, the same
loan committee, and often, the same credit officer—these institutions will
lend more at lower interest rates for a longer period of time, if collateral is
offered, than if it is not.
28 In Vanuatu, liens on property appear to be covered by the French Civil Code, which appears to still apply by
virtue of section 93 (2) of the Constitution.
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Company Charge,29 including the Bill of Sale. This device applies to movable
property owned by corporate entities.
Hire Purchase. This device applies mainly to new identifiable equipment.
Leasing. This device applies mainly to new identifiable equipment.
In the Pacific countries examined for this publication, lenders in urban areas
sometimes used the company charge, but would not take collateral located
outside town limits. Similarly, land could serve as collateral within large cities,
but seldom outside.
It appears that the Pacific economies lack systems for effectively using important
classes of property as collateral for loans. In particular, bankers and other lenders
do not accept most real estate and any agricultural products (e.g., beef, cocoa,
coffee, copra, fish, kava, and timber) as security. The legal framework for secured
transactions does not seem to address the key stages for securing loans. In other
words, no adequate system exists for allowing lenders to determine the priority
of a pledge of assets nor to publicize and enforce security interests in property
as collateral for loans.
The lack of such a system presents a major obstacle to
linking savers and investors in these economies. Even when
countries received substantial inflows from activities like
offshore financing (e.g., in Vanuatu), or foreign remittances
(e.g., in the Marshall Islands and Samoa), these possible
sources of financing cannot reach most small enterprises
or rural borrowers. To permit such credit delivery, the
legal system must offer an efficient domestic legal
framework for debtor-creditor relations in general, and
for secured transactions in particular. Even if foreign
investment laws or international conventions appear to cover secured lending,
these international business transactions must still use the enforcement system
within the country to collect against funds or properties located there.
This section relates a preliminary analysis of the secured lending systems in the
Pacific. Broadly, Pacific country legislation does not support an effective
framework for secured transactions, and in fact, the secured transactions
framework seems incomplete and expensive to use. Further studies should
The Pacific
economies lack
systems for
effectively using
important classes
of property as
collateral for loans.
29 The company charge is the use of a claim against a company’s equipment or movable property as security
for a loan. The company pledges those items as a “charge” to collateralize the loan.
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examine this problem in detail. For instance, in Papua New Guinea, Samoa,
and Vanuatu, it appears that collateral outside the main cities was unacceptable
for loans. In the Marshall Islands, collateral is generally unacceptable to secure
credit. Pinpointing the actual deficiencies is a specialized task for experts in
security interests and, surely, more research on the details is needed. Interviews
should go beyond determining permissible legal transactions and more deeply
examine the economic aspects of secured financing.
The preliminary findings in the study countries show that problems in the
legal framework for secured lending in Pacific economies result in the exclusion
of most equipment, future crops, and much real estate as collateral because
they have no economic value to lenders. This has serious
implications for private sector borrowers. They typically
cannot purchase such property assets on credit, and once
they save to buy it, they cannot pledge it to get loans for
other property or working capital. The result is that the
financing of investment in either fixed or working capital
is unavailable to those without substantial liquid resources.
And it implies that those who have capital can choose to
either continue to accumulate capital, or invest in other
countries to spread their risk.
When borrowers cannot offer collateral to private lenders, Pacific lenders will
react the same way as lenders elsewhere, charging higher interest rates, offering
smaller loans, and lending for short periods. As a consequence, when the legal
system inhibits borrowers from offering collateral, operators get much less credit
than they need. In fact, operators of small farms and businesses may get no
credit at all. The refusal of Pacific lenders to alter loan terms when borrowers
Box 6. The Inherent Problem of Offshore Ventures
The smaller the economy, the more likely is it that large domestic investors
will spread their risk by investing in offshore ventures. If the rate of return
on capital is low, as it appears to be in the Pacific, this trend will be
accelerated. Both explanations are consistent with the observed export of
private capital that has occurred in most Pacific economies over the past
decade.
A corollary of this phenomenon is that indigenous people with the bulk of
wealth that cannot be used as collateral will neither be able to finance
investment projects nor diversify their risk. They are unable to raise capital
using land as collateral because the land has no value to a financial
institution in a customary tenure system where collecting a debt through
foreclosure is impossible.
When the legal
system inhibits
borrowers from
offering collateral,
operators get
much less credit
than they need.
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offer local collateral is not proof of collateral’s ineffectiveness. Rather, this situation
arises from problems in laws and legal institutions that govern the use of collateral
in these countries.
Secured Transactions in the Pacific Economies
The fundamental distinguishing trait of a secured lending system lies in its
ability to grant priority to a particular lender or credit seller by collecting
against some property of the debtor. Without such a security interest, a creditor
is unsecured. An unsecured creditor has only a general
claim against a debtor’s property—a claim that gives that
creditor no better right to payment than any other
unsecured creditor. A legal system that supports only
unsecured lending will lead creditors to lend less to any
given borrower, for shorter periods, and at higher interest
rates. For a system of secured lending to work, it is
insufficient for property to just have value. In place must
be a legal system that permits the secured party (the
lender) to recover and sell the property in a way that
realizes as much of the property’s market value as possible.
In theory, in all Pacific countries, a creditor can create
such a secured loan by creating a security interest against a debtor’s property. If
the debtor defaults, the collateral can be sold or exchanged, and the security
interest of the secured creditor will be satisfied (paid) ahead of the general
claims of unsecured creditors. But the mere possibility of such a security interest
cannot alone secure the benefits of the system. Rather, the economic usefulness
of a legal system for security interests will depend on how well that system
fulfills certain key criteria. In particular, the law must provide for the following
(Spanogle 1992).
The creation of enforceable security interests. This interest should be
enforceable against all economically important property—tangible and
intangible—by all economic agents and for all significant transactions. The
cost of creation must be low, relative to the value of the property.
Priority that is easily ascertained. There must be an unambiguous assignment
of the order in which secured parties satisfy their claims against the property.
The law must protect the secured lender against hidden claims, including
those of other secured and unsecured lenders, the government, and the
bankruptcy procedure.
In place must be a
legal system that
permits the lender
to recover and sell
the property in a
way that realizes
as much of the
property’s market
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The availability of information on the prior property pledging. A simple
and inexpensive system must make available to the public, information about
the priority of any secured party in any security interest against any property.
Enforcement that is rapid and inexpensive. Repossession and sale of the
collateral must be fast, cheap, and preserve as much of the value of the collateral
as possible.
A preliminary analysis of the legal framework for secured transactions in the
Pacific indicates that their legal framework does not meet these conditions.
Often the features that cause problems have no obvious justification in public
policy. Even when they do have a public policy objective, the means of achieving
the objective (e.g., tax collection and the protection of workers, debtors, and
tenants) can impose a high interest and other fixed fees and reduce the borrower’s
potential access to credit. Other policy measures could achieve these worthy
objectives without compromising credit access.
Each of these stages poses legal problems that limit the system’s economic
usefulness in the Pacific countries. We discuss these in turn for the main security
devices for movable and immovable property.
Problems in Creation
Movable Property
Movable property accounts for about 40% of the nonresidential capital stock
in industrial countries. Changing the legal framework to permit this type of
property to serve as collateral can provide a quick basis for secured lending as
well as sales on credit to various credit-starved areas. Leasing, warehousing, the
company charge, and mortgages are all examples of security devices—agreements
whereby a borrower offers collateral to a lender.
For the Pacific countries, the company charge provisions comprise the main
statute on security interests for movable property. This framework has several
important limitations. The provisions only deal with registration rules and
some narrow priority rules. The law does not address the other stages of a
security interest (creation, priority with other security devices, and enforcement).
These problems are common to unreformed common law jurisdictions in the
industrial countries as well as in the developing world. For instance, Canada,
before its reform, had a secured transactions framework based on the company
charge filling some of the gaps with case law.
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The company charge, moreover, cannot be used by microenterprises or most
small- and medium-scale enterprises. The company charge covers only the
collateral offered by corporations. It does not apply to using the property of
individuals and unincorporated debtors, such as most farmers or informal
enterprises, as collateral for loans.
From a preliminary assessment of these laws, the following are typical.
• Businesses can only secure loans with one lender.
• Unincorporated businesses or individuals that make up the large portion
of the private sector in the Pacific countries cannot use their inventory as
collateral for loans.
• No lender can safely take a business’ accounts receivable as collateral.
• Large companies can secure loans with inventory that limits their
financing with other lenders.
What is left for secured lending? Large and small companies can use hire purchase
provisions to buy new identified equipment on credit, either under a bill of sale
or a lease.30 Because problems arise in determining whether prior encumbrances
on equipment exist, equipment financing is largely limited to new equipment.
It is possible to undertake international business transactions with borrowers,
collateral, or guarantors, abroad, so long as a legal framework governs the transaction.
Property located in Australia or New Zealand, for instance, could be used as
collateral for operations in Pacific countries. This possibility, however, does
little to help locally owned farms and businesses. In many of the Pacific countries,
even lease financing is not available because there are no vehicle registries.
Real Estate
Basic issues in the borrower’s rights to the underlying property. The basic
premise of the following discussion is that customary-owned property cannot
be freely transferred outside the indigenous community and in some cases
within the indigenous community despite secure knowledge that the transaction
will not be challenged. In most Pacific countries, it is against constitutional
provisions for foreigners to buy land. Since land is also “inalienable,” security
interests or liens cannot be enforced against it.
These restrictions can make real estate useless as collateral. The concerns
regarding clear identification of private property underlies much donor support
30 The hire purchase system lacks the conceptual structure that will provide for modern features such as
automatic attachment of security interests in future property and security interests in proceeds.
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for land and real estate registration in the Pacific. However, focusing on
identification of property treats only part of the problem. To serve as collateral
with economic value, the right to land must be alienable (i.e., transferable to
another’s ownership). The typical project, therefore, focuses on titling and its
rights of alienability. In many customary settings, however, fee simple titles do
considerable harm to traditional practices. Conventional approaches to land
rights ignore the fact that many land rights have value besides title. In the
United States, for example, grazing, mining, and drilling rights to federally
owned offshore land, have value as collateral. Similarly,
lease rights have value: much of the land31 in Hawaii,
London, and New York is leased by those developers
wishing to build buildings, striking down the common
claim that buildings and the land under them must be
transferable together (ADB 2001a32 and ADB 199933)
Moreover, title alone will usually not permit the use of
land as collateral. Without a clear system of priorities
under the law, an eviction system, and a system of publicizing priorities, owners
may have clear title to well-identified land that will never serve as collateral.
Local citizens. Most Pacific nations give local citizens superior status to
foreigners in land ownership as a form of land tenure. Under circumstances
where land is “homestead” and cannot be taken away from the occupant, a
mortgage cannot be enforced. Many previous reports on land tenure issues in
Pacific countries have stated that land held under customary tenure cannot
normally be used as collateral for securing a loan. This inhibits investment and
the development of a capital market.
Foreigners. For foreign investors, the lack of tenure security, either through
leases—the only form of tenure permitted to foreigners—or through corporate
shares, is a major constraint to investment, especially large-scale investment.
Secure tenure requires that rights be clearly specified and enforced. There are
numerous examples of threats and some forms of sabotage on tourist resorts
that highlight the problem (World Bank 1998d).
Nevertheless, even with security of tenure for foreigners, the secured transactions
framework needs to permit land tenure rights other than ownership to serve as
31 Lack of clear title as an impediment to credit is emphasized in ADB 1999. However, as noted here, addressing
title problems without fixing the underlying legal framework for using real estate as collateral for loans will not
substantially change access to credit.
32 Calls for a mortgage system for lease rights. Such a system is set out in modern systems of secured
transactions, such as those used in Canada and the United States.
33 Calls for reforming and clarifying customary treatment of leases in South Pacific countries.
For foreign investors,
the lack of tenure
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collateral for loans. However, the primitive stage of development of the secured
transactions framework in the four examined countries does not provide that.
For instance, it is unclear how mortgages on leases may be possible, when case
law does not seem to have addressed this yet. In countries like Vanuatu that
have a hybrid common law/civil code heritage, there is considerable potential
for conflicting interpretation of issues related to the integration of mortgagee
rights under equity mortgages, versus lien rights under the French civil code.
In many instances, the claims of the landlord with a lien for rents due demote
the claim of a mortgagee to a second position. In other words, the rights of the
lender are subsumed by the landlord’s lien.
Problems in Priority
Priority plays a key role in a secured transactions system. It establishes the
order in which claims against the goods serving as collateral will be satisfied in
the enforcement procedure. For instance, the creditor with the first priority
will have its claim satisfied on sale of the collateral, before a creditor with
second priority. Unsecured systems have no system of priority. For lenders,
however, establishing their priority against the collateral is crucial. Even valuable
property cannot serve as collateral if a lender cannot determine the value of
claims secured by the property that have a higher priority than the claim that
the lender contemplates.34 In other words, if there is no registry that records
claims on property and the relative priority of those claims, property cannot
serve as an effective collateral for loans.
Box 7. Low Nonperforming Loan Rates:
Cook Islands, an Outlier
The Cook Islands stands out as an example where banks have few
nonperforming loans—less than 1%. Land can be, and is, foreclosed by
banks. The legal system is perceived as providing protection to banks against
default. There is, however, a growing local concern that too much land has
been transferred through foreclosure. The potential for pressure from the
local population to reduce the banks’ ability to foreclose exists—a pressure
that must be resisted to avoid negative impacts on private sector
development.
Source: ADB 2003. Cook Islands 2001 Economic Report: Policies for Progress. Manila.
34 For example, a future kava crop with a minimum value of $10,000 may be excellent collateral for a $6,000 loan
if no prior claims exist. However, the same crop will be inadequate collateral for a loan of $3,000 if a prior claim
for $9,000 exists.
FINANCIAL MARKETS IN THE PACIFIC 73
How “Priority” Affects Credit Systems
Priority—the process by which the lender establishes the priority of the security
interest—lies at the center of a legal system for secured transaction. It represents
a crucial element in determining a property’s value as collateral. Where conflicts
of priority exist, as they do in many Pacific countries, secured financing will not
take place at all. In default, loans without priority will become portfolios of
uncollectible loans. Many development banks in the region
take security in the form of collateral when making loans.
Their large portfolios of uncollected debts are a testimony
to the inadequacy of the collateral framework in the region.
By contrast, commercial banks only secure loans with
movable collateral when they have substantial additional
security amounting to a multiple of the loan’s value.
A secured loan by definition cannot have a conflict of
priority. In most Pacific countries, a series of key priorities
are not spelled out in the law. A preliminary investigation
indicates several possible conflicts, as noted below.
All the alternative security devices that exist—mortgages in law and equity,
installment sales, trusts, and leases—have different rules governing the manner
in which they operate. This fragmented approach to security interests with
various laws covering priority and publicity in different ways for diverse security
devices, both increases risk and reduces the value of collateral. Even for company
debtors, priority rules are troublesome. The company regulations seem to permit
only one charge at a time and do not resolve ranking of priority issues vis-à-vis
other security devices, such as legal and equitable mortgages.35
Other priority conflicts affecting important economic transactions also remain
unaddressed (e.g., priority for loans secured by inventory versus priority given
to loans secured by accounts receivable and priority in future crop versus priority
of the holder of a warehouse receipt). Some countries such as the Marshall
Islands have no bankruptcy laws at all.
35 See, for example, the Vanuatu Company Law section 100 (1), which provides that, “Subject to the provisions
of this Part of this Act, every charge created by a company and being a charge to which this section applies
shall, so far as any security on the company’s property or undertaking is conferred thereby, be void against
the liquidator and any creditor of the company, unless the prescribed particulars of the charge together with the
instrument, if any, by which the charge is created or evidenced, are delivered to or received by the registrar
of companies for registration in the manner required by this Act within 21 days after the date of its creation, but
without prejudice to any contract or obligation for repayment of the money thereby secured and when a charge
becomes void under this section the money secured thereby shall immediately become payable.”
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Such confusion about priority creates uncertainty and ultimately enormous
risk for secured lenders. Any reforms to the system should consider development
of a comprehensive secured transactions framework rather than attempt to repair
the present system.
Problems in Registration
The law specifies how priority is established. Two basic legal systems have
evolved regarding priority. One establishes priority by possession, the other by
publicity. Priority by publicity is the most important system as it allows the
debtor to retain possession and use the collateral during the loan’s term. The
principal system of publicity is that of registration in a public registry.
A first-to-file registration system requires that the law designate the place for
filing the security interest. This allows any potential lender to determine
quickly whether the collateral offered by the borrower has prior security
interests. Knowing these prior security interests permits the lender to assess
the collateral value of the property. The typical practice in Pacific countries is
to rely on two main registries for security interests, the company registry,
and the land registry.
The Rules for Registering
The typical pattern under versions of the British company law in these
countries provides for various types of charges to be registered. The registration
list leaves many gaps in information about registration. For instance, it is
unclear whether account receivables financing, in the form of small loans, are
covered with priority by registration rules, and whether any assignment of
accounts receivable must be filed and where. Therefore, setting a ranking of
priority against a loan secured with portfolios of accounts receivable collateral
appears to require transferring of each individual loan to the lender. It is
unclear whether a security interest can have its priority set by registration or
whether such registration positions a lender vis-à-vis any other encumbrance.
In tourism, for example, where credit card payments commonly comprise
the businesses’ account receivables, it will be costly to use accounts receivable
as collateral for loans.
As a second example, the company registry includes the mortgage, which is
also filed at the land registry. Further assessment of the registry system should
look into this potential conflict and determine which registration gives priority.
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The Functioning of the System
There appear to be no recent studies of the registry system in the Pacific
economies.36 Whatever the findings, it will be difficult to build technically
efficient systems under the requirements of the existing law. An alternative
model on which to base reform is provided by examples of viable and sustainable
privately operated filing archives such as those in Colombia or Romania. The
models from Australia, New Zealand, or the United States should not be blindly
adopted, because state-operated solutions that work acceptably in those countries
will not necessarily operate as well in Pacific countries. The Romania reform,
for instance, used an Internet-based filing system run by nongovernment
organizations under the supervision of the Ministry of Justice. Filing is cheap,
fast, and efficient.
Regulatory Framework for Publicity
Some key issues must be settled with regard to the registry regulatory framework
in any successful reform of publicity. These include decisions regarding
• private versus public or mixed operation;
• limits on the total fees charged;
• expanded Internet-based inscription and search;
• expanded private supply of filing services; and
• the regulation and expansion of filing real estate security interests in the
corresponding registry.
Problems with Enforcement
Essential to any system of secured lending is the ability of the creditor, in the
event of debtor default, to repossess and sell the property the debtor gave as
collateral. A lender will focus on the value of collateral after the costs of sale and
seizure. Lenders who face slow and expensive enforcement processes will simply
adjust the size of the loan downward relative to the value of collateral.
In developed countries, a borrower could expect to borrow 95% of the value of
a new car, 80% of the value of any other type of machinery, and 80–95% of
the value of real estate. Similarly, a credit buyer would expect to purchase a car
with a down payment 5% of the market value, and a house with a down
36 Although a legal review of the secured transactions framework has begun in Samoa.
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payment of 5–20%. In such a system, the lender or credit seller expects
enforcement of the loan at a cost ranging between 1% and 5% the value of
collateral, and in a period ranging between 5 days and 2 months. Such a lender
expects to have the full value of the loan covered by the collateral at the end of
the enforcement process. There is little systematic analysis of the duration of
debt collection in the Pacific. Anecdotal evidence indicates that repossession of
movables could take from several months to 2 years. In rural areas, neither
movable nor fixed property was acceptable as collateral because it was not possible
to repossess and dispose of it.
Previous studies do not appear to have analyzed the applicable collection rules
and their costs in terms of the time it takes and fees involved (e.g., notaries,
lawyers, court fees, etc.). This information is crucial to determining whether
the collection time and costs support the value and the depreciation time of
much property. Eviction costs need to be known when real estate is used as
collateral, whether fee simple (i.e., the owner has maximum control over the
sale, financing, or use of the property), or leases.
Taxes that Affect Registration and Enforcement
The framework for secured transactions is also heavily taxed either at the security
interest’s time of creation and registration, or at the time of enforcement (i.e.,
with the sale of collateral). For instance, in Vanuatu, documents that require
stamping include bills of sale (0.6%), declarations of trust (0.25% or 0.5%), and
transfers of movable property, such as shares (0.6%) and immovable property (5%).
Since modern financing techniques may involve such transactions on a monthly
basis, these charges at annual rates can become quite substantial. Taxes set to
cover only the system’s cost of operation would be preferable and recommended.
Implications of a Defective Secured Transactions Framework
The problems in the framework for secured lending affect every important part
of the private sector in these countries. Commercial enterprises, whose assets
are nearly entirely inventory and accounts receivable, cannot use these assets as
collateral to obtain secured credit and thus have no formal provision for secured
credit. Unfortunately, most microenterprise and noncorporate SMEs are
particularly impacted by this situation, one that limits development of the
banking system in the Pacific.
The sound and prudent expansion of banking is limited if collateral cannot be
used. This legal situation forces banks to issue more risky unsecured loans, or
more frequently, to lend only to a small fraction of the population. Alternatives
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such as development banks and other public sector lenders function poorly
and usually result in large losses—for example, NPFs that lend to individuals
and companies in the Pacific. These lenders frequently have numerous
nonperforming loans in their portfolios, which threaten the foundation of the
region’s pension systems.
Many foreign banks often complain of excess liquidity and
shortage of bankable projects. The result is that they
frequently invest significant amounts offshore. A major
cause of this problem is the inability of businesses and
individuals to pledge assets effectively as collateral for
borrowing. Unsecured loans are risky because it is difficult
or impossible to liquidate the borrower’s assets in the event
of default. Collection of an unsecured loan requires that a
court action result in the seizure of the property of the unsecured debtor.
Many problems that obstruct the collection of the property providing collateral
for a secured loan also block the seizure and sale of property of unsecured
lenders. Banks are under constant political pressure to make loans to politically
important groups like farmers or operators of microenterprises. In a well
functioning financial sector, nonbank financial intermediaries—dealers,
cooperatives, and finance companies—would finance such borrowers and banks
would refinance these intermediaries. Such loans have considerably less risk
than loans made directly to small clients of such organizations.
Need for Intermediation
While specific structures of reformed financial systems vary from country to
country, clearly they would be significantly different from the current structure.
In most countries, few commercial banks collect deposits and lend to well-
established businesses. Riskier projects obtain funds from development banks
and NPFs that both have significant portions of their loan portfolios overdue.
A reformed system would encourage additional intermediaries such as those
described in the previous section to lend to equipment dealers, wholesalers,
cooperatives, and microfinance institutions, using the accounts receivable and
inventories as security. Since equipment dealers would be in a position to provide
capital equipment on leases repayable over several years, the need for longer
term financing would be partly satisfied. In addition, microfinance lenders
would be able to replenish liquidity through pledging their portfolios as security
for loans. The efficiency of intermediation would be greatly enhanced. While
these reforms require several years to have their full effect, they do hold the
promise of access to finance for the local populations in the Pacific.
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Microcredit
One of the most remarkable developments in financial markets in developing
countries over the past 15 years has been the rapid growth in the number of
microcredit institutions. They first appeared, almost spontaneously, in several
different countries—especially in Bangladesh, Bolivia, and Indonesia in the
1980s and their numbers have since expanded rapidly. Although reliable statistics
are unavailable, it appears that there are by now in excess of 10,000 micro-
lending institutions around the world.37 They vary widely in size, from serving
a few hundred borrowers to having millions of customers, and there is a wide
divergence in operating practices. Microfinance institutions (MFIs) appear to
be most developed in Indonesia and Latin America. In the Pacific, microcredit
is in its infancy, with few examples so far. Samoa is one country where micro-
lending is developing well, but the volume of loans is still small.
MFIs provide a wide range of services. The best-known
activity of MFIs is providing credit to poorer households
and small enterprises, although many also take deposits
from households and small enterprises. In addition, some
MFIs provide other services, such as insurance or advice
and training for their clients. This training is often closely
linked to the MFIs’ lending activities (e.g., training in
business management, which might make a loan more valuable to the borrower
and enhance the chances of repayment). Sometimes MFIs are used as a vehicle
to provide nonfinancial services and education (e.g., in health awareness). Samoa
has taken the lead in this area, having in place the structure to address one of
the critical problems associated with the microfinance movement, namely the
failure to develop ways in which borrowers can “graduate” to the next level of
funding.
MFIs have attracted widespread support from various funding agencies, including
multilateral development institutions, national aid agencies, and private
foundations. There is, however, a wide divergence in how they assist MFIs.
Some attempt to ensure that the recipients of their assistance achieve
“sustainability,” which usually means that the institutions gain the prospect of
eventually graduating from donor assistance. Others attempt to ensure MFIs
lend at rates that are comparable to, or even below those of commercial banks
in the country where the MFI is located. The justification is that the poor
should not be forced to borrow at “usurious” rates.
37 Lack of systematic data is one of the features of the microcredit movement.
In the Pacific,
microcredit is in its
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The latter approach virtually ensures that MFIs will not become self-sustaining.
There is substantial evidence that MFIs that charge less than 30% in real terms
per annum will not be successful without continued support. Furthermore, if
funding agencies support institutions that lend at rates that are lower than
those that are required to ensure sustainability, they “crowd out” the development
of financially sustainable microcredit lenders.
Well-designed microfinance schemes that are developed
as an integral part of a country’s financial system are an
instrument that holds promise in the Pacific where
distances are not large, yet sufficiently large population
clusters allow transaction costs to become low. The
smallness of the Pacific nations and the fact that
individuals are known in communities is a point in favor
of successful MFIs. On the other hand, family and church
obligations that could potentially undermine the prudent
use of loaned funds must be considered a risk. The frequent
group counseling, peer pressure, and the clear expectation
of repayment that is practiced in Samoa are elements of a
successful scheme, and to some extent, mitigate the risk of family and church
obligations. Given certain conditions, microfinance in PDMCs has the potential
to help develop small enterprises and communities move beyond subsistence
production and to promote entrepreneurship in urban areas where rural people
have migrated. The conditions for success include secured transactions reform,
which would allow well run MFIs to replenish their capital base, and integrate
into the financial system, so that microbusinesses can graduate to other forms
of borrowing. It is for these reasons that a case can be made for encouraging the
existence of MFIs within the constellation of financial institutions in the Pacific.
The Role of Funding Agencies in
Supplying Capital
Attempts to Substitute for the Lack of Financial Intermediation
Frustrated by the inability of Pacific financial markets to finance private sector
activity, funding agencies have intervened in an attempt to set up institutions
that fund business. Various efforts are under way to supply investment capital
to companies in the region. For example, the Kula Fund provides equity
financing to medium and larger companies in the region. The South Pacific
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Project Facility invests in small businesses throughout the region and provides
technical assistance. In addition, individual countries, such as Samoa, have
externally funded initiatives that supply capital, loans, or loan guarantees.
Loan Guarantees
Given that reform cannot be accomplished overnight, are government-backed
loan guarantees an alternative to a well-functioning secured transactions framework?
The answer to this question rests on how guarantees differ from loans in
promoting access to credit and how these guarantees change the behavior of
borrowers and lenders. If banks refuse to lend because risks are too high, then
any guarantor will be assuming risks that banks were unwilling to take. If loans
are guaranteed fully and cannot be secured against collateral, then banks lose
their incentive to vet loans carefully and borrowers lack a strong incentive to
repay. All the problems of moral hazard and adverse selection discussed earlier
would still apply.
Guarantees shift the risk from primary lenders (i.e., banks),
to guarantors. In addition, if banks do not bear some
portion of any possible loss, their incentives to carefully
process loan applications are greatly weakened. If banks
bear a portion of the risk, they will insist on evaluating
the loan, thereby raising the transaction costs of loan
processing. Processing costs are doubled, unless the
institutional guarantor is prepared to pass the
responsibility of processing to the institution that stands
to lose a smaller portion of the loss in the event of default. In other words, none
of the problems that exist with financial systems in the Pacific are solved by
guarantees. There is simply no substitute for reform of secured transactions
systems if financial markets are to adequately fund small- and medium-sized
businesses. The efforts of reformers and the international financial institutions
should strongly support financial reform.
Promoting Microfinance
Initial efforts have begun to assist in establishing microfinance in the Pacific.
Two interesting microfinance schemes have developed in Samoa: the South
Pacific Business Development (SPBD) and the Women in Business Foundation
(WIBF). Both lend primarily to women,38 the former using group guarantees
None of the
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38 However, cultural and equality considerations notwithstanding, restricting lending to a particular group is
always distortionary and damages financial market development.
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modeled along the lines of the Grameen Bank.39 Lending has grown rapidly
and there are now many success stories. What is especially interesting about
the WIBF scheme is that it has been structured in partnership with another
initiative, the small business guarantee fund, run by the Small Business
Enterprise Center (SBEC), which allows it to avoid the pitfalls of most such
efforts, namely the inability to assist participants in graduating from MFIs.
When participants in the microfinance program reach a stage where they require
more funding than the program can provide, they may become eligible for
assistance from SBEC, which provides loan guarantees and training for small
business entrepreneurs. SBEC works with commercial banks to obtain funding
for its participants by providing an 80% guarantee against loans. In addition,
it has a very “hands-on” approach toward working with participants, regularly
visiting their business premises and insisting on their successfully completing
courses in all aspects of business management.
Regional Development Funds
Because of the problems outlined in the earlier sections of this chapter and
because of the small size of capital markets in individual countries, longer-term
finance is rarely available in the Pacific. To fill this gap, a private equity fund
and two regional funds sponsored by international financial institutions (IFIs)
Box 8. Promoting Microfinance: The Multilateral
Investment Fund
The Multilateral Investment Fund (MIF), a fund attached to the Inter-
American Development Bank, has directly supported microfinance
institutions in Latin America and the Caribbean, the process having had a
profound impact on the development of microfinance. It has been involved
in over 50 projects to promote sound and efficient microfinancing practices.
This microcredit program has been innovative and successful. The MIF has
had a history of identifying microcredit institutions that have the potential
for success, providing them with support to ensure that their potential is
fulfilled. So good has the MIF been at the activity that it can justly claim to
have shaped microfinance in the region and beyond. In several countries,
commercial for-profit financial institutions have begun lending to informal
entrepreneurs, implying that the mandate for MIF projects to attain
sustainability has been achieved.
39 In Latin America, where microfinance is mostly highly developed and where there is the largest number of self-
sustaining microfinance institutions, group guarantees are rarely used because of the high transaction costs for
borrowers and because they are increasingly seen as ineffective. The high losses experienced by Grameen
itself are an illustration of this (Wall Street Journal 2001).
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have been established. The private equity fund, the Kontiki Fund, is based in
the Fiji Islands. Its capitalization is below that of the larger, IFI-sponsored
institutions, but it has been successful, having roughly a 9–10% annual positive
rate of return over the past 4 years.
The funds supported by IFIs and other funding agencies are aimed at providing
longer-term finance to companies in need of capital. The two most prominent
of these are the South Pacific Project Facility (SPPF) located in Australia, and
the Kula Fund in Papua New Guinea. Although evaluation of these externally-
supported funds is beyond the scope of this publication, from the financial
statements of both facilities, it appears that neither is close to achieving
sustainability. In fairness, it must be pointed out that operating costs in the
Pacific are extremely high and are especially burdensome on organizations that
for political reasons are required to engage in ventures over a wide range of
countries. Nevertheless, the business model on which these funds are based
should be examined to determine whether this is the best way to operate.
There are several options for increasing the flow of investment funds to the
region. One is to establish venture funds in individual countries. For example,
there is currently a proposal to establish a venture fund in Samoa to address a
pressing need for longer term financing, in a country where most businesses
appear to be undercapitalized, and therefore, vulnerable to even small downturns
in business conditions. In the case of the Samoa venture capital fund, two main
challenges must be overcome.
• There is currently no exit mechanism whereby the fund could liquidate
its investment for a substantial multiple of its original contribution,
although the International Finance Corporation (lead sponsor) expects
to develop a self-liquidating instrument.
• The skills necessary for the management of a successful fund are scarce
and command rates of remuneration that are much higher than the highest
salaries in Samoa. Successful operation of such a fund will probably require
employing an expatriate manager at a correspondingly high salary, which
will substantially raise the overhead of such a fund.
In other countries, the involvement of IFIs, bilateral funding agencies, and the
public sector, in similar types of investment funds has usually been a recipe for
failure (Holden 1999a).
In the absence of exit mechanisms and strong management systems, investments
of such venture funds are essentially equivalent to subordinated long-term loans
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and are usually subject to the same problems as loans from development banks.
In general, the loss rates are high, and there have been no cases where such
funds have been self-sustaining. One promising mechanism, however, is the
establishment of a unit trust vehicle to hold the fund’s investments and from
which investors could exit through sale of the unit trust shares. At this point,
however, there are no such vehicles in the region, apart from the Fiji Islands.
But there may be mitigating factors within the Samoan context. If the envisaged
fund is a substitute for the Development Bank of Samoa (DBS)’s involvement,
loss risks could be reduced through the increased oversight and expertise of the
manager as well as the involvement of the board of directors. Even so, losses are
likely to be high. There are also significant moral hazard and asymmetrical
information issues inherent in the structure of such a fund. Even if it were to
go ahead, the longer-term issues regarding financial and capital market
development in each Pacific country should be investigated more fully to identify
how to address the issues related to financial deepening and intermediation.
Making Financial Markets Work
The conclusion of the preceding discussion indicates that financial markets in
the Pacific are not effective in supplying capital to enterprises, and in particular,
are biased against smaller enterprises, rural businesses, and the indigenous
people’s ability to finance their investments and businesses.
The discussion also emphasized, however, that this situation was not the result
of most financial institutions’ unwillingness to engage in business financing.
On the contrary, most senior personnel interviewed indicated that they are
anxious to lend to businesses, but that risks are too high. There are many
anecdotes of failed investments and unsettled loans.
The experience of the many state-owned development banks supports these
observations. Loan loss rates in development institutions (which often lend at
subsidized interest rates) are well in excess of what fiscal soundness would
dictate. Furthermore, there are some worrying trends in several NPFs that have
lent to businesses in the region. In many cases, they carry a significant quantity
of overdue loans in their portfolios. Simply making more loanable funds available
will not result in previously unfunded projects being implemented. Since loans
are often at interest rates that are below market rates, it is clear that interest
rate subsidies are not the answer. Furthermore, rates of return on capital appear
to be low, as evidenced by the outflow of private capital and the failure to
attract FDI.
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The earlier discussions on secured transactions and land
issues lead into the direction of improving the security of
lending. Other recommendations on reducing the cost
of infrastructure services and other factors that currently
add to the effects of distance and isolation will reduce the
costs of doing business and raise the rates of return on
capital. Making the Pacific countries more flexible,
allowing them to take advantage of opportunities, will
also raise the rates of return. Attracting foreign investment
depends not on more subsidies, but rather, on reform
that improves the investment climate.
Reforms that Are Needed
The above analysis shows that several improvements in the operation of financial
markets are needed to deepen financial intermediation:
• legally defining rights in both fixed and movable property;
• clarifying aspects of land rights, particularly leasehold arrangements, so
land can be used in credit transactions;
• simplifying procedures for registering movable property;
• streamlining the courts and developing the system of summary judgment
outside the court;
Box 9. Lowering the Threshold or Raising the Rates
A recent paper by the Commonwealth Secretariat, Lowering the Threshold,
suggests that remoteness and high transaction costs imply that funding
agencies should develop interest rate subsidies for foreign investors using
subsidies provided by commercial banks, but funded by the donors through
a new financial instrument. However, the suggestion is based on several
questionable assumptions and perceptions. First, the problems in attracting
foreign investment to the region appear to result from a number of factors
associated with low rates of return on capital, not an unreasonably high
“threshold.” Second, the threshold is greatly raised by the various
administrative problems associated with regulation of foreign investment
that make it difficult and expensive to invest in the region. Third, subsidizing
interest rates will not reduce risks to lenders but merely transfer them.
Without changing incentives to repay, such a scheme will be little more
than a development bank under another guise, with the attendant potential
for defaults and bad debts. Shortage of liquidity is not the issue in the
region—rather, it is the risks of lending, the costs of investing as well as the
limited opportunity within the existing set of constraints. Donor efforts need
to be directed at these problems, not supplying more subsidized credit.
Attracting foreign
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• improving enforcement;
• developing an effective system of credit bureau information; and
• improving or, in some cases, providing bankruptcy procedures.
Analysis of these problems, apart from land, is still in its infancy in the Pacific.
Furthermore, implementing them and having patience as the reforms take
hold require fortitude and determination, for the process is time consuming.
Integration with World Capital Markets
The Fiji Islands and Papua New Guinea stock markets are among the few
sources of liquidity for companies outside the banking systems of the Pacific
countries. One option for reform is to integrate the markets of other Pacific
countries with these two financial centers. Whether it is realistic to expect
other Pacific countries to put aside regional rivalries and cooperate in forming
a regional stock exchange is open to question and can only be answered by
consultation and discussion.
An alternative technical solution would be to integrate
the region through an electronic trading system that
would combine the region’s embryonic capital markets
to form a much more powerful entity. Currently, there
are barriers to merging, the most important of which include
exchange controls, extremely high telecommunications
costs, and problems related to cooperation among Pacific
countries. Even so, given the potential for such operations,
this possibility is worth exploring further.
National Provident Fund Reform and Second-Tier Institutions
An issue that was raised earlier in this chapter is the dangerous exposure of
many national provident funds to loan losses from imprudent investments.
With the exception of the Fiji Islands, most provident funds in the region face
future losses. For example, the Vanuatu National Provident Fund has a large
exposure to the domestic air carrier that is now effectively bankrupt. The Samoa
National Provident Fund has arrears in excess of 20% of its portfolio. Similarly,
the Marshall Islands Provident Fund carries large potential losses.
The behavior of the funds typifies principal-agent problems. The agent—the
manager of the fund—is unable to withstand political pressures from politicians
anxious to win the approval of constituents, especially since there is certainty
that the principal—the state—will recapitalize the fund. There are extreme
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moral hazard issues at work. The interests of the National Provident Fund
managers are to make loans using the fund capital, while the interests in favor
of the country’s long-term benefit is to have a viable pension pool.
A promising alternative mechanism is the privatization of pensions as in Chile,
where the national pension fund was divided into numerous competing private
funds investing in certain proscribed securities on behalf of members. Each
contributor to pensions in general, holds some portion of the contribution in
several pension funds, to minimize risks. An appropriate regulatory regime
must be in place, but the model holds promise. Further benefits could
materialize if this reform were combined with securitization and secured
transactions reform. The pension funds could then become second-tier
institutions supplying liquidity to direct lenders such as commercial banks,
equipment dealers, and microcredit institutions. Such a model has the potential
to increase the supply of long-term capital while at the same time reducing
systemic risks. Another suggestion is to pool capital to a single regional provident
fund that is professionally managed, possibly offshore, and is independent of
political influence from any one country.
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VII. Land Issues
L and is a key component of any nation’s wealth. Since the beginning ofhumanity, civilizations have spent considerable time and energydefining land rights and establishing institutions to administer such
rights. Records to document land ownership, assign rights, and indicate transfers
of land, were among history’s first written documents. Thus, from the beginning
of human history, society has had a critical role in securing property rights,
facilitating access to land, resolving conflicts, and setting the parameters of
land use.
The Importance of Land Rights
In merely physical terms, most land is used as an input to agricultural production,
that in many developing countries, including those of the Pacific, continues to
be a key sector that provides the backbone of economic sustenance for the
majority of the people. The rights enjoyed by those using
land will have an impact on the welfare of the rural
population, the amount of output obtained, the level of
investment undertaken, the scope of rural-urban migration,
and the emergence of a vibrant off-farm economy.
The impact of giving people property rights to the land
they cultivate is demonstrated most clearly by the People’s Republic of China.
Introduction of more secure property rights has led to impressive output gains
as property rights are successively strengthened to facilitate investment and
greater transactions in markets. In other words, rural households are less inclined
to invest in land they do not securely own. In addition, the ability to use land
as collateral in credit markets is usually a precondition for obtaining credit that
can then be invested in the rural nonfarm economy. Secure land rights are also
critical for the ability to exchange land, and in a broader context, property
rights to land and the associated ability to trade land, provides a pre-condition
for the emergence of financial markets. In all developed economies, mortgages,
and other sources of credit that depend on land as collateral, are the paramount
sources of credit. This situation would not be possible without well-defined,
secure, and transferable rights to land.
Land is a key
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Secure ownership and the ability to exchange land are critical for the investment
climate for small entrepreneurs, in addition to being a precondition for the
emergence of financial markets. It is for this reason that
countries where property rights to land are not secure
have much lower rates of investment, and eventually,
growth, than they might otherwise have. In most
developed countries, most small businesses have started
using loans backed by land. Property rights are no less
important for the welfare of the poor. Indeed, the lack of
formal property rights prevents poor people from turning
their latent assets into live capital—one reason why the
entrepreneurial spirit that is so visible in virtually the
entire developing world is not translated into a more
inclusive pattern of growth (De Soto 2000). Several empirical studies have
related land registration to improved productivity through access to capital
(Byamugisha 1998).
Land is important in the lives of the Pacific peoples and plays a role somewhat
different from that found in other cultures (Boydell 2001). In addition to its
function as the basis for subsistence, it has functions of power and status,
spirituality, and cultural identity. Land is inalienable—it cannot be transferred.
In truth, land holds a special place in almost all societies of the world.40 What
differs is the nature of tenure. The Pacific countries have encountered difficulties
with land because traditional systems have run headlong into modern ones.
Land conflicts are often an expression of political nationhood versus tribal
organization. Nationhood implies delegating certain responsibilities to the state
over communal and individual preferences. Achieving development justifies
government primacy in social and economic infrastructure, and part of that is
land management and land reform.
Efficient land tenure systems are a necessary foundation for a growing private
sector in the Pacific.41 Some countries in the Pacific are cautiously reexamining
their land institutions and laws to see how they can be revamped to meet
current needs. They are searching for ways to integrate communal/traditional
land tenure systems into national economies in ways compatible with both
tradition and a modern (liberal) economy. It is a challenging task made more
difficult by the fact that basic institutions have to be in place, before those
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40 Even in developed market economies, one does not have to question commercial farmers much to discover
deeply held spiritual views of stewardship and farmer as caretaker of the land.
41 Land tenure is defined as the rules of possession, use, and conveyance of land.
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members of society who need them the most, feel the benefits of changes in
property rights. It is hard enough to draft a good property law, but it is even
more difficult to create local official land registries and local court systems that
serve all citizens. In addition, there is the difficulty of
finding the professional skills needed for mortgages,
property deeds, land surveys, property valuation, and other
institutional services that form part of a land management
system. All these factors must be in place before a land
market can be expected to play a full role in the
development of the private sector and the economy.
The clear assumption from the analysis is that what
governments do, and what funding agencies advise and
support, really matters to the outcome of land tenure, because these organizations
influence the nature of solutions to the problem of land in the Pacific.
Features of Land Tenure in the Pacific
The vast majority—averaging over 90%—of land in the Pacific is customary
land, meaning owned by persons entitled to hold it under their respective
customs. Most customs allow land to be held jointly by all members of a
kinship group who are descendants of the original occupant or who have
acquired, under custom, the rights to the ownership of the land. Some customs
allow only ownership by male descendancy, others only female, and still others
allow both. All living descendants, regardless of generation, usually have equal
ownership rights in the land, and by custom, may participate in decisions on
land use. In addition, customary rules of decision making in the Pacific usually
require agreement of all persons present—a considerably time-consuming
process. Moreover, by law, virtually no land can be alienated from its customary
owners.
Often, people other than the custom owners may have secondary rights to the
land, such as rights of occupation or passage. Thus, wives, sisters, and daughters
of male landowners are permitted to occupy land belonging to husbands,
fathers, and uncles. Neighbors are normally allowed passage. Finally, in many
Pacific societies, tribal or clan chiefs, big men, and other leaders, by virtue of
their status, may assert the right to participate in decisions on the management
and use of land in which they have no ownership rights.
Another feature of land tenure is the enormous variation in practice across and
even within the countries of the Pacific. There are enormous variations on the
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themes, which have arisen from the historical separation of countries and tribes/
clans.
The customary tenures in the Pacific were designed in precolonial times for
self-sufficient communities with limited mobility and trade that produce most
of their own needs. They worked well at that time, but these conditions no
longer exist, and customary forms of ownership are no longer serving these
societies well. The forms of tenure, which are sustainable for subsistence
agriculture, are not ideal for commercial farming in a modern economy. While
land conflicts within and between kinship groups were common in earlier times,
increasing “Westernization” has raised disputes over customary practices, which
appear to be less useful to Pacific society as it transforms. In fact, land disputes
appear to be a constant feature of land ownership in the Pacific.
There are many reasons for disputes and conflicts in a customary system where
rules are not written and customs evolve:
• identification of customary land owners;
• identification of persons with secondary customary land rights;
• identification of the location, boundaries, and areas of customary land;
• inability to reach a decision on the management or use of land (often
because some landowners cannot be found or refuse to participate);
• unauthorized persons making decisions on land (e.g., when male relatives
make decisions in a matrilineal system or when decisions are made in the
absence of some owners);
• decisions that are misunderstood and later give rise to disputes;
• decision makers later changing their mind, for any reason, in a customary
society where agreements have no permanence or finality; and
• distribution of the benefits from land use.
Land Reform
The process of land reform is a complicated technical and political subject that
boasts a huge literature and best left to experts. Yet, efforts to reform land
ownership throughout the world have failed more often than they have
succeeded. Since customary land tenure does represent a severe constraint on
the development of both the private sector and financial markets in the Pacific,
it will be discussed here from a secured transactions framework perspective.
The issue is how to design a system that unlocks the value of land while preserving
its associated traditional values. These possibilities in general, are covered in
the following section, while acknowledging the vast variations in the customary
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land ownership throughout the region. The discussion below couches arguments
in generalities or principle without being country-specific.
The Problem
The most valuable, and sometimes, the only asset owned by individuals in the
Pacific is their customary share of clan, tribal, or family land. Since the vast
majority of land remains under customary ownership (i.e., without formal
ownership), this situation precludes using land as collateral for credit as lenders
cannot take possession of the asset in the event of a loan default. In addition,
lack of clarity in the definition of land use rights presents problems for many
investors, particularly foreign investors who wish to exercise clear control over
land use for the lifetime of their investment. Governments are, therefore, faced
with the task of reconciling the conflict between social norms and formal,
market-based law, if development is to occur in rural areas.
The mismatch between customary land tenure and imported institutions for
dealing with land creates high costs and ties up large amounts of land. As a
recent World Bank report notes
The current land law specifies that customary land should be
used only for customary purposes, mainly agriculture and
communally held housing facilities rather than individually
owned homes. While customary law does not recognize the
principle of permanent land ownership passing to an individual
interest, urban growth is taking place on customary land where
customary owners and developers have reached direct
agreements. Such agreements should be acceptable and
recognized. . . (World Bank 1995b).
The impact of these problems on private sector development is considerable
and immediate, amounting to large costs in time and money.
While land tenure is widely recognized as an issue for most Pacific nations,
much criticism is misdirected toward individual freehold ownership.42 However,
the impossibility of freehold land ownership is not critical for private sector
development in the Pacific. In fact, much land in industrial countries is held
outside freehold ownership and managed by leasing.43 Leasing, cooperative
The issue is how
to design a system
that unlocks the
value of land
while preserving
its associated
traditional values.
42 The Heads of Government of the Pacific Islands Forum have discussed the issue at every annual meeting
from 1995 to 2002.
43 Large portions of many Western states of the US are owned by the Government, which leases different rights
to those lands to different users. Much of the state of Hawaii cannot be alienated and is leased to the present
users and developers.
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ownership, and condominium tenure are alternatives to outright ownership.
Rather, the problems in land tenure throughout the Pacific lie in the following
key areas:
• unclear ownership and unclear boundaries, mostly
from lack of official recording;
• overly restrictive rules on the transferability of land,
mandated because of unclear ownership;
• unclear definition of different land tenure rights;
• weak and unrecorded dispute resolution practices; and
• problems of enforcement.
Questions of land tenure and possible reforms are highly contentious in the
Pacific. As noted, much of the controversy lies in the traditional elites’ potential
loss of power to a national sovereign. Often, land issues appear to be intractable,
to the point that politicians and funding agencies are unwilling to tackle them.
But land tenure issues will eventually be largely resolved because the desire to
raise income by mobilizing the inherent value of land will become an
overwhelming imperative that overrides the vested interests of chiefs and other
local elites.
Land tenure systems, whether customary or western, are social constructs
modified over time to accommodate society’s particular needs. When they are
no longer useful, they are modified or replaced. Indeed, most countries in the
Pacific have modified their land laws over time, but have yet to find a structure
that satisfies both the traditional and modern aspects. Given these precedents,
a process can be started that takes a series of small, systematic, and conclusive
steps toward solving the identified shortcomings of the existing system.44 The
objective is to put in place a mechanism that will gradually lead to a robust
land tenure system providing very similar economic incentives and legal backing
as those found in the western ownership model, yet will preserve the feature of
joint ownership and inalienability.
In designing solutions to land issues, several principles need to be observed to
gain the confidence and acceptance of customary landowners.
• Governments need to specify the fundamental problems to be addressed
and articulate the goals/outcomes of each step as well as the ultimate
objective.
Leasing, cooperative
ownership, and
condominium tenure
are alternatives to
outright ownership.
44 Land disputes have the potential to explode into tribal or ethnic violence. A slow, step-wise process, where
each step is resolved, prior to taking the next step, would minimize the probability of aggression.
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• A policy framework for reform must be designed and agreed upon.
• The process should be logically progressive and deliberate.
• The process should be participatory and inclusive, based on the
community (clan, family, tribe, or village), and will require extensive
discussion through a political awareness campaign.
• Existing accepted community organizations, such as councils of chiefs,
should play a central role.
• National political institutions should only provide a framework, as well
as facilitation, and recording.
• Robust dispute resolution and appeal mechanisms based on local practice,
such as the customary reconciliation council, should be put in place.
• Steps should follow a defined process, and agreements reached should be
recorded and considered final.45
• The Government should announce at the outset that constitutional
protections on land would not be altered.
• Ultimately, the choice on whether to opt into the system or stay out
should be optional for individual landholding groups.
Under customary ownership, there is neither one landlord/owner, nor often a
well-defined set of owners. There are frequently ill-defined boundaries between
communal holdings, and there are various traditional ways to manage
community land, many of which are disputed within the family of owners. To
deal with these problems, the steps in the land restructuring process might be
undertaken in the following order.
• Identify rightful claimants to a roughly defined piece of land and record
those claimants as common owners in a defined and agreed process.
• Define and record the boundaries to each plot of kinship land with local
and adjacent landowners.
• Put in place a formal family/clan governance structure agreed to and
operated by the owners to manage that piece of land.
The steps are simple; the process is not. As Box 10 indicates, complications are
manifold.
There are many constructive systems and design specifications being developed
for land reform within the region, as well as considerable international experience
on aspects of tenure that can be combined and tailored for each country to
45 In Vanuatu, people do not necessarily accept decisions as final, but expect to be able to renegotiate signed
agreements. Publicity campaigns can assist in modifying this attitude and clarifying Government’s intent on
land restructuring.
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form a workable land system.46 Critical issues that need to be addressed are
identified here. The important point is that governments need to start a
systematic, transparent, and participatory land identification and recording
system that will be embraced by the large majority of landowners, thereby
leading to increased income opportunities for the owners. It may take many
years to complete the process, especially with the considerable preparatory
work needed, but the point is that a process must begin if countries in the
region are to grow. And once success is demonstrated in one area of one country,
it will spread over the whole country, and from there, to other countries. The
following issues need to be addressed in developing a good land tenure system.
46 A recent symposium on South Pacific land tenure provided some suggestions (see www.usp.ac.fj/landmgmt/
symposium). Also see Holden 1999b for complementary approaches in Peru, and Paterson 2002, which has
also proposed innovative mechanisms for formalizing land tenure.
Box 10. Who Owns the Land? Who is Chief?
The process of clarifying a piece of land’s customary owners is fraught with
difficulties that must be resolved before recording can begin. In Vanuatu,
for instance, ownership is usually defined by kinship and often, the chief
manages individual land use. In many areas, coastal landowners provided
inland families with land when they were attracted to coastal missionary
settlements in the 19th century. In the intervening years, other occupants
moved onto land vacated by the migrant inland families. In resolving
ownership, what time frame should be observed? The migrant coastal families
may claim that they only “loaned” land to the incoming inland families.
On the other hand, “new” inland families claim they have been both in
possession and use of inland areas for over 100 years and should not have to
surrender ownership to claims of former inland families. Adverse possession
is not part of the legal code, so a method of reconciliation must be found to
resolve such issues fairly.
Chiefs play a prominent role in decisions concerning the use and disposition
of land and in settling disputes within and between families or clans. Chiefly
status is established in different ways, including both heredity and popularity.
The role of chiefs will be central in the success of land restructuring. There
is therefore considerable value in chieftainship. In the past, some chiefs
were deposed by missionaries and replaced by others more receptive to
missionary views. The legitimacy of such actions may be subject to
challenge as the value of being a chief is realized. It must be remembered
that statutes of limitation hold little value as a means of settlement in a
society where reconciliation, rather than legal recourse, is the customary
solution.
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Recording/Registration
While it is possible to record and register land under limited conditions, in
most Pacific countries, it is cumbersome, difficult, and largely restricted to
urban land. Land leases are frequently arranged and sanctioned by a government
ministry, but these are neither registered nor transferable.
Registries as well as registration laws and regulations need to be established for
they set the foundation for secured transactions. Owners and renters may be
given the option to register land and leases, and the market would then determine
who did and who did not find it valuable to register. Modern notice-filing
registry laws provide for inexpensive and more secured registration systems.
Notice-filing registry laws guarantee the filing of information as provided by
the parties, and enter it into a secured database. Thus, the registry becomes
more secure and less expensive to operate. Such an approach narrows the duties
and responsibilities of the registry, so that the system costs less, yet still provides
a better secured filing system. The possibility that the registry be administered
competitively by the private sector (instead of the present public monopoly)
should also be examined.
Transferability and Use of Land
Another factor that provides market value is the ability to freely transfer a land
right. In the Pacific countries, there are restrictions on the transferability of land
and land use. Complex and nondurable negotiations to obtain access to land are
the norm outside urban areas and land held by custom owners cannot be
mortgaged. Some law restrictions, such as limiting people from holding land
they do not use may bring benefits to a country, but arrangements that are more
flexible need to be designed. Separating ownership rights from use rights as well
as defining different use rights, would greatly facilitate a market in landuse.
Uncertainty of Land Tenure Rights
Property rights can only be granted by public law or by the community at large.
Therefore, to know the qualities of a land right, people will turn to the law,
either statutory or customary. In the Pacific, land rights are based on custom.
This gives rise to uncertainty about land use rights. Custom principles are
often not publicly known to all interested parties because they are not written
and recorded. This lack of publicity is a key difference between statutory law
and custom—statutory law is forced to be consistent by the act of publication.
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But customs are not written and, therefore, are flexible depending on the
circumstances. A party to an agreement cannot know
• when actions of a community’s representative become binding on the
community;
• when a leader can sign a valid lease; and
• whether the person claiming to represent the community is the authorized
community representative.
Customs differ among various groups, but in most cases, customs do not seem
to address legal issues (e.g., mortgaging land as security for loans to purchase
agricultural inputs). In the Pacific, customs deal primarily with subsistence
agriculture issues (Crocombe 1997a) that are a context for uncertainty. Many
reports argue that bringing customary law into a statute makes that framework
rigid and not adaptable to changes (Crocombe 1995).47 These concerns, however,
are really about the poor operation of a parliamentary system that allows laws
to become obsolete, whether reflecting customs or endorsing international
conventions. Options for improving how the legislative body operates, rather
than excluding customary laws from statutes, may produce a preferable outcome.
The Cost of Disputes
Finally, land market value will be influenced by the costs of resolving land
disputes including
• actual process fees
• processing time
• the uncertainty in predicting the outcome of a land dispute
• the uncertainty of a legal resolution being enforced
Ironically, land has become a vehicle for undermining the traditional system.
This paradox arises because land disputes in many Pacific countries can be
appealed outside the customary jurisdiction of customary authorities
(Government of Vanuatu 2001). Often, custom defines land ownership and
use. But custom is generally undefined, it changes over time and from island to
island. Also, it is not defined and “static” like a legal system.
A land dispute procedure established by law needs to be clear and inexpensive.
It must be comprehensive so that it covers all cases. Considerable thought and
work by experts in this field is needed to create a fully satisfactory procedure.
47 It might also be possible to use the technology of computers and connectivity to post and update customs.
Such a “registry” would add some certainty but would not have the force of law.
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Conclusions
Two major constraints on private sector development are unclear land rights
and the difficulty in using land as collateral for loans. The land right system
requires careful analysis to determine exactly how to build a chain of rights
that serves key economic ends. Simply imposing conventional western industrial
land tenure patterns cannot solve this problem. Existing studies of land rights,
although often thoughtful, have not focused clearly on these two objectives.
Diagnostic and prescriptive studies are needed for each country in the region
where the government appears willing to address the issue. Part of the prescription
would be a step-by-step action plan for the government to follow.
In addition, the legal framework for secured lending needs to be clarified and
updated.48 The new system must incorporate the customary system of land
rights, yet permit more land to serve as collateral. This arrangement requires a
diagnostic study and the preparation of a draft law to focus discussion on the
issues. Developing a consensus is necessary for the process, but will take time.49
The process must begin now.
48 The desiderata for such systems are set out in several publications available, for instance, at www.ceal.org.
49 An important caveat in undertaking such work is to build a drafting team that includes economists, technical
experts, and lawyers, to ensure that the draft meets its economic objectives and is consistent with best
technical practice. Similarly, local attorneys should be paired with foreign experts so that the complexities of
modern laws governing security in industrial countries can be incorporated.
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VIII. The State and
the Private Sector
T here is a symbiotic relationship between the state and the private sectoreverywhere. Any government that hopes to promote prosperity for itscitizens must encourage private sector activity. Similarly, the private
sector looks to the government to provide the appropriate enabling environment
for its development. The overarching theme of this report is that a private
sector strategy for government is not about fostering specific companies or
sectors. Rather, it is about ensuring that the environment and conditions that
affect business and entrepreneurship promote productivity and growth. As a
result, private sector issues encompass almost every area of every economy.
Policies that encourage and promote private sector development cannot be
imposed—the government and the private sector must play a central role in
identifying and agreeing on the problems and priorities
for the effective formulation and implementation of private
sector policy. Moreover, in this process, both the
government and the private sector have obligations: the
government neither to erect barriers to business and
commercial activities nor to give preferences to individual
sectors; and the private sector not to expect preferences,
handouts, and special support from the government.
The mutual understanding and cooperation necessary for effective implementation
of private sector-friendly policies can only come about through contact,
discussion, and feedback. Currently, there appears to be little of this in the
Pacific. Often there appears to be an attitude of misunderstanding and mistrust
between government and the private sector. On the part of the government,
private businesses are viewed with suspicion, while on the part of the private
sector, government is viewed as unresponsive and unwilling to listen. On a
positive note, however, there is an increasing awareness by governments of the
importance of private sector activity and a desire to reverse the neglect and
suspicion that many officials acknowledge. Furthermore, most private businesses
maintain a strong willingness to cooperate with government to improve the
Both the
government
and the private
sector have
obligations.
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environment for private sector activity. An example of efforts to improve private
sector-government relations is Vanuatu where the Chamber of Commerce
organized a weeklong forum in 2002 wherein the business community and the
Government held open discussions on issues that were of concern and prepared
follow-up briefs aimed at keeping the contacts open.
The Role of the State in
Private Sector Development
The State in Pacific Economies
The state still has a prominent role in most Pacific economies—in some, such
as Tuvalu, government expenditure as a percentage of GDP exceeds 100%. In
others, such as Kiribati, this expenditure is close to 80% (Figure 10). Although
the share of the state in GDP is lower in some other countries, there is widespread
state ownership of resources. For example, in Samoa, the State is currently the
direct provider of all infrastructure services. In addition, it has either majority or
minority ownership in a wide range of businesses ranging from an agricultural
supply store to an Internet provider—the State is omnipresent in the productive
sector even though it has already gone through significant divestiture.
Furthermore, the negative effects of its ownership of enterprises have been felt
beyond the inefficiencies of operation—when the state-owned airline ran up
crippling losses in the mid-1990s, its costs were covered by cutting government
expenditures by up to 25% in areas such as health care and education.
Such examples abound throughout the Pacific. Furthermore, structural problems
with public sector budgets arise from the state’s pervasive presence. Public
expenditure is heavily biased in favor of current outlays reflecting the large
share of wages in the total. As a result, infrastructure expenditure is neglected
in many countries, even though state monopolies exist and private sector activity
is forbidden.
The State and Low Private Sector Growth
If the state is not supportive of private sector development, no amount of
potential can compensate. There is growing evidence that the most plausible
explanation for the disappointing failure of most developing countries to grow
and prosper is the inadequate institutions that underpin private sector
development. Most of these institutions are supplied either directly or indirectly
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by the state. Public capital, primarily infrastructure, that firms need to
complement their capital, such as electric power, water, telecommunications,
and the road transport network in Pacific island countries has not been organized
in a way that provides these services at the lowest possible cost to the private
sector (Table 5).
Some aspects of high costs can perhaps be explained by the remoteness of the
countries in the region. But a large part appears to result from state interventions.
In most cases, entities supplying infrastructure services are either a department
of the state or corporatized entities that are owned by the state. In virtually all
cases, these entities are legal monopolies that prohibit any form of private
sector competition. The following are a few examples.
• In the Marshall Islands, the state-owned telephone monopoly also has a
government-granted monopoly on the provision of Internet services.
Although it only offers 48.8k-dialup services, it refuses to allow the TV
cable provider to introduce high-speed cable Internet access.
• In the Chuuk state of Micronesia, the corporatized power company was
subject to such extreme political interference and mismanagement that
services were suspended across the island for 3 months (ADB 1997b).
Table 5. Utility Costs
Country Electricitya Telephone Call to the USb
(US$/kWh) (US$/minute)
Fiji Islands 0.16 1.10
Kiribati 0.24 2.10
Marshall Islands 0.16 2.00
Micronesia, Federated States of 0.10–0.16 2.00
Palau 0.10 1.50
Samoa 0.18 1.35
Solomon Islands 0.16 1.10
Tonga 0.31 1.20
Tuvalu 0.37c 4.00d
Vanuatu 0.26 1.50
Australia 0.06 0.17
a Average commercial tariff, 1999 (World Bank 2002a).
b Representative, converted to US$ using the average exchange rate for 2001 (World Bank 2002a).
c ADB 1998d.
d Rate is for the rest of the world. It is US$2.50/minute to Australia (ADB 2003f).
Sources: ADB and World Bank.
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• In Samoa, the corporatized power company does not allow owners of
private generators (who install them because of the unreliability of the
power supply) to operate them except during power failures, unless they
are granted approval from the company. No such permission has been
given. Similar restrictions on power generation exist in other Pacific
countries.
• In Kiribati, the government-owned public utilities and energy company
provide all utilities to the country, but service is poor because of frequent
power supply, water, and sewerage problems (ADB 1998b).
• In Vanuatu, the power and water companies are owned by the
Government, which has a minority interest, and by a foreign state-owned
power company, which delivers a reliable supply of power, but at rates
that are among the highest in the world.
• In Port Vila, Vanuatu, port-handling charges are among the highest in
the world as one company has the monopoly rights to handle freight.
• Air transport is costly in most Pacific countries because many governments
insist on owning and operating their own airlines.
In the Pacific, the state crowds out private sector activity and distorts the market
for labor. Often, public sector wages are higher than the equivalent job in the
private sector. Since public sector employment also carries with it greater job
security, the better workers are attracted to state jobs where productivity is
lower. In addition, state employment creates a large constituency with a strong
stake in maintaining the status quo, making downsizing and enterprise reforms
politically difficult.
Figure 15. Water Consumption Tariffs, Select Countries, 2001
Source: ADB. 2002. Vanuatu: Economic Performance and Challenges Ahead. Manila.
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States in the Pacific also fail to provide the public goods and institutions that
support private sector activity. Broadly, those public goods and institutions
minimize transaction costs and promote investment and specialization. Such
institutions constitute the foundation of a modern market economy. In most
Pacific countries they are weak and do not effectively support private sector
activity. Examples are physical infrastructure such as roads, and social
infrastructure such as health care and education.
Therefore, the problems observed in the Pacific arise not from inadequate private
sector activity per se. Rather, they result from incentives provided by a
combination of low-quality and high-cost public infrastructure that not only
fails to mitigate the effects of isolation and distance that member countries
face, but even exacerbates them.
Moreover, the pervasive presence of the state in the economies of the region is
based on an antiquated perception of its role. If the state wants to promote
private sector development, it must provide the services required at the lowest
possible cost, and neither provide protected employment
nor maintain government monopolies at the expense of
efficiency. There are many ways of achieving this goal,
but they all involve a search for efficiency and a willingness
to use incentives and market mechanisms to achieve it. It
does not necessarily mean wholesale privatization, although
privatization does yield substantial efficiency gains. It does,
however, mean that the state should, wherever possible,
introduce competition through competitive bidding when
providing services to its constituents.
Targets and Instruments of Private Sector
Development Policy
Developing and implementing a coherent policy toward the private sector is
difficult. There are many competing interest groups, some of which will be
affected by virtually any policy change. The problem is compounded by the
fact that private sector development is difficult to measure and indicators only
give indirect information on how the private sector is evolving. In addition,
there is a chronic shortage of information on many of the constraints outlined
in earlier sections. Nevertheless, the analytical framework developed in this
paper indicates that as a minimum, the state has a central role in identifying
and reducing barriers to private sector development.
The state should,
wherever possible,
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More ambitiously, the state has a role in ensuring that services essential to the
private sector function adequately. The limitations of private sector development
policy, however, must be recognized. For example, poverty reduction cannot
be a direct target of private sector development policy. Rather its impact on
poverty reduction will stem indirectly from reducing the number of poor
through higher employment and economic growth resulting from an expanding
private sector. A pro-poor, private sector policy is one that puts in place the
conditions for employment-rich economic growth.
In formulating policy, a careful identification of the targets
and instruments of private sector development policy is
essential for determining what the state can achieve in this
area. It involves promoting private sector development by
undertaking reform that strengthens the foundations of
business formation, operation, growth, and closure. Earlier
discussion highlighted the effects of high transaction
costs, burdensome regulation, market failure, inadequate
public goods, and poor incentives on the dynamism of
the private sector. It indicated that in some areas, such as
transport and other public services, inefficient provision
amounts to a tax on private sector activity. These areas can
be influenced by interventions from the public sector.
A premise of this analysis is that private agents operating
in properly functioning markets generally provide superior
economic outcomes that maximize the community’s welfare. Another is that
most goods and services are more efficiently provided by private enterprise.
These premises lead one to ask what role can governments play? Overall, in
promoting a dynamic private sector and discouraging informality, governments
can ensure the stability of the institutional environment in which businesses
and markets operate, and address market failure when it occurs.
More specific instruments that are available include
• provision of macroeconomic stability;
• speedy privatization of unwarranted public enterprises and introduction of
competition into areas where the state continues to provide services (a competitive
solution is desired either through having the private and public sector compete
or by ensuring that privatization results in genuine competition);50
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discouraging
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50 Privatization in its purest form refers to the shifting of the production and ownership of a good or the provision
of a service from the government to the private sector by selling government-owned assets. Most definitions
of privatization are more expansive, covering virtually any action that involves exposing the operations of
government to the pressures of the commercial marketplace.
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• adoption of a broad-based and efficient tax system that neither overly
burdens economic activity, nor singles out successful firms as targets for
tax collection;
• introduction of prudential regulation in areas that are warranted;
• deregulation in areas where governments have no role;
• simplification of regulations;
• provision of well-defined property rights that can be secured at reasonable
expense (in virtually every Pacific country, rights for both movable and
fixed property are poorly defined, which raises transaction costs and
discourages investment);
• enforcement, promptly and efficiently, of a fair and impartial legal system,
in particular, to delineate clearly the rules that govern contracting;
• provision of quality infrastructure delivered efficiently;
• ensuring that the costs and time necessary to establish new businesses
are kept minimal to reduce the barriers to entry;
• addressing information asymmetries that hamper the development of
markets, especially financial and export markets; and
• regulation of “natural” monopolies.
Unfortunately, governments often avoid a framework of this type in favor of
direct interventions such as promoting specific sectors of their economies,
maintaining government ownership of resources or industries, or directing
lending to favored types of economic activity. These activities distort resource
allocation, weaken incentives, create instability and uncertainty, weaken property
rights, and raise the cost of transacting to the point where much economic
activity is either discouraged altogether or directed into areas where gains are
severely suboptimal. For these reasons, such activities are minimized in well-
run, modern economies.
State-Owned Enterprises
Discussions of infrastructure issues in the Pacific that appear in various
government and funding agency reports exhibit some striking differences in
viewpoints and no clear consensus about the scope and nature of the SOE
question. Many official reports are critical about past SOE performance but, at
least in the case of some countries, sanguine about the future, especially the prospects
for improved performance and efficiency through the corporatization of SOEs.
The apparent complacency about the efficacy of future reform efforts, however,
is hard to understand. Government provision of public services in most of the
Pacific has failed for the same reason it has failed in much of the developing
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world—government ownership and management provides weak incentives for
efficiency, strong incentives to make political accommodation at the expense of
customer service, and political pressures to overstaff and undermaintain. Where
the incentives are weak and the difficulties of monitoring high, efficiencies
will not be achieved. The prospects for substantial
improvements in efficiencies through corporatization are
not strong and have proven disappointing elsewhere.
A successful solution to the Pacific’s infrastructure
problems must navigate the constraints and challenges
that each country presents. A common thread, however,
is that in most cases, the solution must deal with a small
and relatively undereducated population and a small local
market for infrastructure services.
The next section sets out some general principles regarding
infrastructure provision.
Infrastructure Provision: Issues
and Approaches
The current, highly centralized model of infrastructure
provision, in terms of which the state is the sole financier and provider of
services, provides weak incentives for efficiency, diminishes local control, and
denies private participation in infrastructure projects. But before any change
can take place, numerous issues must be addressed.
Integrated Project Design
Traditional analysis of infrastructure projects includes the evaluation of an array
of technical designs, an estimate of rates of return from different designs, and a
discussion of project choice. This approach is less appropriate in the Pacific
context because it ignores the key features of problems in most of the region.
Central issues include:
• What will motivate the provider (the agent) to achieve proper pricing,
cost recovery, and maintenance?
• What regulatory framework (monitoring arrangement) determines that
benefits actually reach the public?
A well-designed “public service” project must go beyond the traditional approach
of analyzing designs at best practice costs. Project design must consider how to
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align the incentives. How can the operators be motivated to deliver the optimum
engineering practices that are assumed in the design phase? The project must
consider the nature of the regulatory system and whether competitive market
forces can replace regulation. To ensure achievement of project goals, it is
necessary to evaluate the overall efficiency of the system—not just technical
efficiency—from the perspective of the users of the service. For example, it is
incorrect to establish that a centralized water supply is technically more
efficient if that arrangement delivers those services at monopolistic prices. Neither
is it satisfactory to rely on corporatized entities that have weak incentives
for efficiency.
Choice of Techniques
A large number of technically feasible processes can meet infrastructure needs.
There are many techniques for generating electricity, disposing of solid waste,
or building and repairing highways. There is no unique best practice because
wages and interest rates differ among countries.
The key to choosing the best infrastructure practice for a country lies in
understanding how the technique relates to both the costs under the “best
operation” and the regulatory structure of the particular country. Typically,
smaller scale technologies permit more diffused supply, and even though they
may not be the lowest cost method of delivering the product, they may result
in lower prices and better service because they allow for increased competition.
A large-scale electricity generating plant might have a lower delivery price at
the generator than a grid supplied by diverse small generating facilities. The
single large supplier, however, will not face competitive pressures and will need
to be regulated. Unless the regulation is of high quality, monopoly profits and
the attendant inefficiencies that monopolies bring will result, even if the
monopoly is state-owned.
The alternative, many competing smaller providers with small generating
facilities, may produce a more efficient economic outcome even if the underlying
minimum technical cost of production is higher. The overall project evaluation,
therefore, must assess the feasible regulatory frameworks, including competitive
supply, as well as the incentives for adequate maintenance.
Such alternatives need to be explored within the context of small Pacific countries.
Technologies in power provision, sewage disposal, and telecoms provision are
changing rapidly toward efficient small-scale supply. These are well suited for
the countries of the Pacific. Before implementing any large-scale plans for power
provision, water supply, telecom provision, or sewage disposal, the feasibility
of small-scale supply should be thoroughly explored.
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While measures to improve the accountability and efficiency of SOEs are
necessary first steps, their impact is unlikely to be sufficiently far reaching in
addressing the core problems. These must be tackled by a combination of
contracting out, increased competition, regulation, and divestiture.
Contracting Out. In virtually every country in the Pacific,
there is potential for private operators to be contracted to
provide many services that are currently supplied by the
state. The government would call for tenders from private
companies to provide services on its behalf. Tenders can
be either on a positive bid basis, or on a minimum subsidy
basis, where the winning bid is awarded to the operator
that requires the lowest subsidy. This could be a
mechanism for operating an airline if the government
wishes to retain ownership.
Increasing Competition. Improving competition usually involves increasing
the number of providers. In the power sector, allowing the many private
generators that exist across the Pacific to be run without restriction is an urgent
first step. This action could then be extended by compelling state power
providers to purchase power from private generators at their marginal cost of
producing power. Encouraging alternative energy sources on a decentralized
basis is a further option.
Similar considerations apply to water and telecommunications services.
Currently, arrangements in many countries have led to high prices, which
exacerbate the effects of distance and isolation.
Regulation. In implementing a satisfactory and effective regulatory regime,
any solution must deal with the issues of regulatory capture and the provision
of scarce regulatory skills. One solution is the use of an independent, offshore
regulator, an issue that is discussed at greater length later in this chapter.
Divestiture. Many governments in the region own shares in businesses. Most
governments now realize that there is no justification for such ownership and
this report recommends that such shares be divested with minimum delay.
The Legal Framework
Many problems in the legal framework of the Pacific countries affect the provision
of infrastructure, especially with respect to debt collection. Major issues are
rights to land and collateral.
Rights to Land. Determining land rights and the transfer of such rights is
problematic in every country in the region. This problem affects the private
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provision of all types of infrastructure that are installed in or on the ground.
Uncertainties with land raise the risk for the private provider of infrastructure
and the use of property or leases as collateral for loans. (The use of property as
collateral is unacceptable to virtually every bank in the region for land located
outside urban centers.)
Collateral. The essence of private project financing lies in breaking up projects
into different pieces that can be funded by different lenders, which reduces
risk for any individual financier. In industrial countries, this arrangement means
finding different lenders who can take different elements of the project as
collateral, such as the land, the equipment, and the accounts receivable. Nowhere
in the region is this arrangement acceptable as collateral for loans. Moreover,
the legal framework for movable property as collateral has other defects that
make such property useless as collateral.
Combined, these two problems mean that infrastructure projects throughout
the region require government funding or a government guarantee with the
attendant principal-agent problems. However, such government involvement
diminishes the potential gain from private provision. In private provision, quality
control on the financial and management side arises mainly from the inspection
of firms by private lenders and financiers. When the state provides the funds,
this control disappears.
Financing
Competition is difficult without private participation. And private participation
is difficult without private financing. Adequate private financing, however,
cannot be obtained within the legal framework of the Pacific countries. Private
lenders will not lend to private companies for infrastructure projects unless
they have recourse to the underlying collateral. Even if they are willing to lend,
the banking regulator, who will seek compliance with both Bank for
International Settlements (BIS) norms and standards of bank supervision, will
penalize them. Under such a system, banks will lend without collateral only to
companies with a strong balance sheet. In the Pacific, that means foreign
companies and some existing SOEs.
Such a financing system places strong limitations on any competitive solution
that could work for infrastructure in the region. It excludes most domestic
firms, as their assets cannot be used as collateral, and therefore puts
infrastructure into the hands of foreigners and monopolies. This outcome is
undesirable from the economic, political, and public policy points of view.
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Procurement
The provisions of IFIs and funding agencies regarding infrastructure projects
favor awarding contracts to large companies. This preference can be explicit—
by requiring minimum size and experience to do business—or implicit—by
requiring conformity to the same audit, performance, and record-keeping
requirements for contracts of all sizes. In many cases, however, such requirements
are not consistent with the broader development objectives advocated by the
very institutions awarding the contracts. Such objectives include the
development of domestic capabilities and skills, the promotion of smaller
businesses, the involvement of local communities in projects, and the support
of stakeholders. IFIs are implementing programs to achieve these goals in many
Pacific countries, yet through procurement requirements, are foregoing
opportunities to deepen these goals when infrastructure projects are being
implemented.
In all Pacific countries, it is important that infrastructure projects be open to
procurement by local companies. This change will require modification of the
implementation procedures that ensure principals and agents are faced with
incentives that promote efficiency and effectiveness as well as discourage corrupt
behavior.
For example, rather than enabling a government road
agency to do business with small-scale contractors through
reforms of agency operating procedures—a process that
takes substantial time and has proven to have uncertain
prospects for success—program designers can set up an
independent contract management agency outside the
government. Such an agency can handle the burden of
administering and monitoring many small contracts. In this model, the
government (the principal) hires an agent on a cost-plus-fee basis to manage
small contracts and train small-scale contractors. The agent would then contract
directly with small-scale contractors to execute civil works. They can also contract
with local consultants—to prepare designs and bidding documents as well as
supervise works. Such an agent can also contract with international and local
firms to provide training for the tasks for which the local small contractors will
compete. These procedures obviously apply to both construction and
maintenance tasks. An agent should be chosen based on tenders to ensure
competitive and transparent processes, and may be a nonprofit or for-profit
firm. Using this methodology aligns the incentives between efficiency and local
participation.
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The private agency model has several important features for the private provision
of small-scale infrastructure in contrast to the usual supply-driven approaches.
Most supply-driven assistance programs seeking to develop small-scale
contracting provide technical assistance and perhaps financing to small
contractors without any guarantee to the firm that future business will result.
In contrast, the agency model has a demand-driven approach that creates a
market for small firms by making procurement accessible to them. It does so
by dividing works into many small contracts and providing prompt payments
for works completed. Once firms win a contract, they become eligible for
training, which is provided by the contract management agency.
This private agency model permits two important efficiencies.
• Private agents can pay employees decent salaries and therefore attract
well-motivated, high-caliber staff and streamline procedures for payment
and procurement, unlike a government agency.
• International funding agencies and IFIs, not well equipped to audit many
small contractors, can monitor private agencies quarterly or even
bimonthly, while the agents monitor the small contractors.
Operation and Maintenance
Access to basic public services remains limited in the Pacific and service provision
is low. Like many developing counties with access to external funding for new
projects, existing public assets are not properly maintained, and allocations for
operation and maintenance (O&M) are inadequate. Rational governments will
not spend tax revenue on O&M especially while funding agencies are prepared
to build for nothing. Interestingly, the practice of undermaintaining infrastructure
and letting funding agencies and IFIs rebuild has been subject to little hard
analysis. The practice is less than optimal for funding agencies and recipients
together, as it results in the excessively rapid destruction of the capital stock. The
analysis of the participating decision makers, however, is less clear.
Funding agencies, especially bilateral agencies, support these projects because
there is substantial domestic interest in projects that generate business for
their firms. But these firms do not benefit from external funding of operating
budgets of recipient countries. This practice helps a few taxpayers in industrial
countries a great deal at a small cost to many taxpayers. For obvious reasons,
the small group (contractors) lobby strenuously for these programs. At the
same time, the recipient country has the choice of spending scarce public revenue
on O&M or simply letting funding agencies rebuild deteriorated facilities for
nothing—a not unreasonable practice. The “build and deteriorate” model of
infrastructure provision is endemic throughout the region.
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In earlier years, large IFIs placed conditions on a certain minimum size of
O&M. After many years of nonenforcement, however, these conditions are
now only rarely placed. It is difficult for smaller IFIs, such as ADB, to act alone
on such a matter. But privatizing O&M is a small step forward in remedying
the problem of undermaintenance because it creates a domestic pressure group
with a strong interest in ensuring that infrastructure is maintained.
Decentralization
If handled carefully, decentralizing infrastructure provision in many Pacific
countries is possible. Local provision of infrastructure is still government handled
and subject to the same general problems of incentives and efficiency, so planners
must bear this in mind when designing projects. Accordingly, planners face a
choice between local or central, and private or public
provision of infrastructure and infrastructure services.
In terms of the source for delivering hard and soft
infrastructure services, local provision differs from central
provision in that local provision often focuses more on
local costs and benefits rather than national costs and
benefits, thus tending to be more sensitive to the
breakdown of locally provided services. For these reasons,
local provision of road repair, water supply, and power
generation holds promise as an alternative to current
practices. On the other hand, local provision of public health services, sewage
treatment, and general hygiene may be more problematic because the benefits
spread out over groups outside the locality, reducing the incentive for local
communities to participate.
In addition, financing locally provided services presents some serious difficulties
with incentives. Block grants to localities present the possibility of free funding
for projects in a certain area. This arrangement leads localities to demand
considerably more of such projects than economic benefit would warrant. Cost-
sharing only partly mitigates these incentive problems and raises the new
problem—that localities have few administrative resources to raise tax revenues
in their localities and often very little to tax.
Nonetheless, a combination of decentralization and privatization presents an
opportunity for moving forward on infrastructure problems. One simple plan
would set standards for infrastructure supply—say quality of roads—and make
block payments contingent on meeting such standards. Localities could choose
government, customary, or private provision. The central government could
then disburse funds based on meeting the quality standards. The central
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government could then privatize the process for monitoring these standards.
This arrangement would provide a stream of block payments that could be
used to guarantee local government payments to local private contractors. Such
a guarantee would have value to a formal sector lender because of the ability to
take a security interest against the stream of block payments.
Financing Private Infrastructure with
Output-Based Contracts
Recently, the use of output-based contracts for infrastructure
has attracted attention. Such contracts make the payment
for infrastructure service a function of the output
produced. For example, payments might be linked to
measures of water supply quality, the number of electrical
connections, or the number of kilometers of resurfaced
roads. Such a system focuses the project on the outputs,
not the inputs to the process. Moreover, it presents a simple method of
supervising and regulating the provision of infrastructure.
This approach also provides a partial substitute for the defects in the region’s
secured transactions framework. The service payment from the central
government becomes a future asset, which can serve as collateral. That
arrangement would permit private providers to get loans for equipment secured
by the future flows and thereby enjoy the benefits of collateral—lower interest
rates and longer repayment time.51
Privatization in the Pacific52
State ownership is widespread in most Pacific countries. It goes beyond the
entities that were (and in some cases, still are) owned by the state in many
other countries—airlines, telecoms, and utilities. State ownership in Pacific
51 In principle, any government contract, including input-based contracts, could be used as security. The
essence of the recommendation is that the combination of output-based contracts together with collateral reform
will enhance not only the quality of infrastructure, but also local access to contracts.
52 The pros and cons of privatization have been long debated and there is now enormous global experience on
privatization. More than 10,000 state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in over 80 countries have been privatized in
the past 20 years. It is hard to find a country that has not privatized something. Malaysia has sold its National
Lottery; Buenos Aires, its zoo; and Czechoslovakia, the guest house of the Communist Party. Countries
privatize because it is difficult to bring about (and sustain) enterprise performance in SOEs. Ownership
matters, and private owners drive performance in a way that governments cannot. See World Bank 1992 and
www.privatization.org for discussions on privatization.
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countries extends to businesses that are generally operated by private agents in
a nonsocialist world. Examples include companies such as Internet providers,
agricultural supply stores, shipping companies, port-handling facilities, oil
processing plants, and hotels—the list is long and varied. The rationale for
such involvement is that because of size and distance, the state has a central
role in the Pacific economies and needs to assert ownership of many productive
resources.
Unfortunately, the effect of state intervention is the same
as in most other countries. It has resulted in inefficient
and high-priced services, which have raised private sector
costs, damaged the ability of the Pacific economies to
compete, and harmed the development of the private sector.
Wholesale privatization and divestment may be the best
strategy, but may not be feasible in the immediate future.
First, countries in the Pacific have observed the controversy
over privatization in industrial countries and wonder
whether it would benefit them. Second, they have been
bombarded with policy advice from a wide spectrum of
funding agencies and consultants, some of which has been
contradictory or not always of the best quality. Third, there
is a strong feeling among Pacific citizens that the government
should indeed play a key role. For these (noneconomic)
reasons, intermediate steps may be necessary.
The primary aim in any action toward SOEs in the Pacific must be to reduce
the very high costs and poor performance associated with government-run
enterprises. A first step is to introduce competition and efficiency into the
sectors where costs are high and quality is low—particularly infrastructure services.
For that, cost-related information needs to be collected and analyzed to identify
inefficiencies and provide a benchmark.
There is no justification, however, for the state owning such entities as retail
outlets, Internet services, and copra oil processing plants. Where these exist,
they should be sold or closed as soon as possible. In other areas, alternative
organizational structures can be tested. For instance, while the state maintains
ownership, operation of such services as power, water, telecommunications,
electricity, air transportation services, and shipping could be bid out to private
sector operators for fixed periods. In this way, the state (the principal) can
monitor the winning bidder (the agent) both through the knowledge of other
bids and through the agent’s knowledge that the contract will be rebid within
a defined time.
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One argument that is often advanced against such contracts is that the businesses
are unprofitable. Since the services are required for social reasons (e.g., outer
island shipping), some argue that the businesses, therefore, need to be run by
the state. A better alternative is to have private operators bid on subsidy
payments, with the winner chosen based on the lowest subsidy bid. Evidence
confirms the effectiveness of such arrangements in solving many principal-
agent problems that such arrangements entail. In the case of management
contracts, able performance occurs when:
• Rewards are linked to performance.
• Governments do not interfere in the running of the
entity.
• Contracts are rebid periodically.
• The firms running the entities have a proven track
record.
• Governments, not donors, pay contract preparation
costs to signal commitment to the contract.
• Markets are competitive or contestable (World Bank
1995a).53
Initial privatization should involve rapid divestiture of
peripheral businesses that the state has acquired and the
introduction of greater efficiency by improving incentives.
At the very least, governments should allow the private sector to run SOEs
through competitively won management contracts.
Subsequent steps toward full privatization can be taken as confidence in the
system increases and costs decline. Privatization is the unambiguously preferred
final solution over partial ownership or contracting out. Governments do not
have to own assets to be able to control them through appropriate regulation,
and government capital tied up in those assets can be better invested in social
infrastructure or in paying debts. Further, global experience has shown that
when governments retain a financial interest in a business, it is difficult to keep
the business free from political interference.
Yet experience elsewhere, as well as in the Pacific, has also shown that privatization
is not a panacea. Vanuatu has reliable electricity and telephone service following
privatization but the costs are extremely high and monopolies have been entrenched
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53 A “contestable” market is one where there are no statutory impediments to the entry of new suppliers into that
market.
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for an extended period. Where markets are very small, regulation may need to
accompany privatization where competition is not possible. Regulatory issues
and how competition can be increased are set out in the next section.
Choice of Regulation
Infrastructure provision often involves monopolistic elements. Which elements are
monopolistic, however, depends on the technology and contractual techniques
used. In most industrial countries, electricity was typically viewed as a “natural
monopoly” until it became clear as a technical issue that
while the distribution grid required O&M by a sole
provider, an improved design could separate the grid from
other services such as generation and connection to the
grid. That separation permits competitive generation of
electricity even though single companies have
responsibilities for a regulated net. Even in the net,
moreover, there can be different degrees of competition.
The central grid monitor may be responsible for all
connections to the grid or private contractors may be
permitted to make such connections subject to inspection
by either state or utility officials. In this way, the entire
connectivity issue can be made competitive. Careful design
at the outset, therefore, can minimize regulatory burden
by promoting the best possible private sector competitive
participation in infrastructure supply.
Against this background, the discussion that follows identifies some of the
many problems created by monopoly arrangements for water, sanitation, and
telecoms services that typify many countries in the Pacific. Unregulated
monopolies charge more. However efficient they may be in reaping technical
production efficiencies, this higher monopoly price distorts resource allocation,
slows private sector development, and thus reduces the rate of economic growth.
Monopolies are, therefore, regulated.
Unregulated state-run monopolies present additional problems. Since their
managers and owners have little profit incentive, they are often slow to innovate
and have no motivation to provide good service. Although recent advances in
technology have reduced the natural monopolies present in areas like power
generation and telecommunications, the size of most Pacific countries makes
monopolistic behavior more likely. What, then, are the options for regulation?
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Local Regulation
Economically efficient regulation requires substantial technical and accounting
expertise. The cost of this expertise is more or less fixed for the type of
infrastructure: the same skills are needed to regulate the public sector of, say,
New York State as the public sector of a small Pacific nation. This fixed cost
weighs more heavily on smaller economies than it would on a larger economy.
Regulation, therefore, is relatively more expensive as a solution for Pacific
countries. Vanuatu avoids this expense by adopting “informal” regulation, which
has resulted in high power, water, and telecommunication prices. By contrast,
Samoa has proposed a general regulatory board that seems to be an efficient
use of regulatory skills. Nonetheless, regulatory burdens are reduced the
more the regulatory activity is handed over to competitive market forces.
Regulatory boards can then focus on key issues where competitive solutions are
not possible.
Foreign Regulation
One problem of regulation is regulatory capture—the entities being regulated
attain a strong influence over the regulatory body. This problem is exacerbated
by the smallness of the Pacific economies. It is unavoidable that the regulators
and the regulated know each other well and meet socially. This situation
complicates the task of arriving at impartial regulatory decisions. One solution
would be for the South Pacific countries to pool their
regulatory tasks or contract them out to a foreign regulator
who would visit regularly. If no South Pacific-wide
consensus can be secured, another option would be for
individual countries, or perhaps subgroups of countries
in the region, to contract out their regulation requirements
to a foreign regulatory expert.
Some cautions regarding this solution are, however, in order. Regulation always
involves transfers between the public body and the regulated company, and
therefore tends to be controversial. Effective regulators withstand this pressure
because they have the backing of many interest groups, their actions are
transparent and widely publicized, and they are familiar with the country and
industry. The controversy surrounding these decisions does not go away when
the regulatory authority is international. It is only the reputation of the regulator
as an independent expert and the willingness of politicians to support his
decision that gives his decisions legitimacy.
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Competition
The best regulation is a competitive market. Market forces are cheap, unforgiving,
and generally provide service wherever it is profitable to do so. Organizing the
infrastructure sector so that much provision is competitive has the enormous
advantage of promoting a publicly optimal outcome with minimum government
intervention. Introducing competition is not a question of ideology or one that
requires a yes or no answer. If the process of providing a public good can be made
partially competitive, then it will be easier to regulate than without competition.
Governance and Public Goods Issues
Legal Framework
One of the prime functions of government in promoting private sector
development is the provision of a legal framework that supplies the basis for
contracting and resolving disputes. There is a wide variation in the quality of
laws both within and between countries in the Pacific. As a general observation,
most countries have laws that are either outdated or inadequate and require
reform. In Samoa, which is moving to revise its commercial law completely,
businesses have been operating on a law based on an outdated New Zealand
companies act from the 1960s. In the Marshall Islands, the commercial code is
unclear and crucial elements such as a bankruptcy code are missing. In Papua
New Guinea, the arbitration act dates from 1951, which in turn is based on an
English arbitration act passed at the turn of the 20th century. Most laws require
review and updating.
An additional problem is that in most countries, the codification of the law is
inadequate, making it difficult to determine which rules and procedures businesses
should follow. This situation encourages corruption by giving discretion to
officials. Codification is urgently needed, both to increase the transparency of
government and as a first step in modernizing the legal basis for business.
A further legal issue is that Pacific countries are too small to have specialized
commercial courts in a situation where out-of-court arbitration and conciliation
are uncommon. This situation increases the burden of dispute resolution on
the court system and exacerbates the time and cost of obtaining justice. Delays
and costs in the legal enforcement of contracts are an impediment to the
expansion of contracting and need to be reduced by removing the bottlenecks
in the process.
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Policy Consistency
Members of the private sector complain about policy inconsistency on the part
of government. To some degree, this issue is part of the democratic process, but
is exacerbated in the Pacific, due to the small size of the commercial sectors
relative to the total electorate. Moreover, many politicians and bureaucrats do
not understand the private sector. The result has been significant policy instability
in many countries. In some, such as the Fiji Islands, it has been exacerbated by
political instability, which discourages investment and encourages the most
enterprising citizens to leave.
Political consistency issues underscore the need for continued consultation
between governments and the private sector. Typically, genuine consultations
between businesspersons and governments in the Pacific are infrequent and the
understanding between the groups is fair at best. One suggested remedy is for
funding agencies to finance forums where facilitated interaction can occur.
Corruption and Regulation
Government credibility is a necessary component of confidence regarding the
future of a business and thus of private investment. An absence of credibility
reduces investment and the returns to capital. Using surveys of the private
sector in several countries, the World Bank has created indexes of government
credibility. The components of the indexes relate to the predictability of changes
Table 6. Labor Regulation/Conditions
Country Legislated Minimum Ave. Length Of Work Paid Holidays
Wage (US$/hr) Week (hours) (days/year)
Fiji Islands 0.63–1.09 45 13
Kiribati 1.08a 36 13
Marshall Islands 2.00 – –
Micronesia, Fed. States of 1.35 – –
Palau 2.50 – –
Samoa 0.45 40 15
Solomon Islands 0.30 40 11
Tonga – 40 11
Vanuatu 0.71 40 14
a Not legislated.
Source: Forum Secretariat. 2001. Foreign Investment Climate in Forum Countries and World Bank staff
consultations.
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in laws and policies, stability of government, security of property (crime),
reliability of the judiciary, and incidence of corruption. Countries that scored
high on the credibility index had much higher investment rates and experienced
higher economic growth than those that scored poorly. Some Pacific countries
scored consistently poorly in the index.
Some countries in the region experience endemic corruption, with Papua New
Guinea constituting perhaps the worst example. A recent survey in Solomon
Islands also cited corruption as a major impediment to
business success.54 There are reports of corruption in other
countries in the region, although its extent is difficult to
gauge.
Corruption is a crime of calculation, not passion. When
the size of the bribe is large, the chance of being caught
small, and the penalty is a mere “knuckle rap” if caught,
many officials will succumb to temptation. Simply
making the practice illegal does not work unless there is
adequate law enforcement. A concerted set of actions plus
a change in incentives is the only way to deal with such problems. Robert
Klitgaard (1991) maintains that there are three steps necessary to reduce
corruption:
• reduce the degree of monopoly control government has over activities or
services;
• reduce the discretion granted to government agents; and
• increase accountability on the part of these agents.
Corruption flourishes when regulation is endemic and nontransparent.
A reduction in the role of government through deregulation, privatization,
lowering tax rates, eliminating selective policies, freeing trade, and making
local and national regulations consistent also reduces the potential for corruption.
Copies of commercial rules and regulations should be readily and cheaply
available so that businesses can keep current and have the information available
to fend off bribe seekers. These steps are consistent with others suggested here
to promote private sector development.
54 John Hardin, technical expert to the Solomon Islands Industries Rehabilitation and Retention Project supported
by the International Labour Organization (ILO) and the Industries Rehabilitation and Retention Task Force
(IRRTF).
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A Dysfunctional State and
Private Sector Development
A question that arises is how could private sector development be supported
when the state is dysfunctional? A well-functioning state assists private sector
development by providing public goods and institutions that minimize
transaction costs and hence promote investment and specialization. The question
of what drives states to perform this role is unanswered. Does the private sector
drive democratization and good government (as in the Western historical
experience), or is private sector development an outcome of democratizing
political change? Is macroeconomic stability an outcome of political stability?
Typical responses to a dysfunctional state are:
• short, spot, and “hostage” contracts, barter, and contracting within closed
groups; and
• the emergence of stationary and roving bandits.
Economists do not have a suitable definition of the
“dysfunctional state” and states that do not work can vary
in terms of how they are dysfunctional (e.g., dysfunctional
African states that have had Western structures
unsuccessfully imposed on top of semisuccessful
traditional structures, or post-USSR Russia, which is
struggling to form stable institutions from prereform
structures). Some states function well in some respects, but poorly in others.
Cuba does not provide a welcoming environment for private sector development
but, until recently, delivered social services to its population. Chile, under the
Pinochet regime, enabled private sector development, but at a high cost to civil
freedom. A crucial policy issue for donors is what can be done to restore
functionality, or—in the case of Papua New Guinea or until recently, in Solomon
Islands—to stop the state from slipping into dysfunctional behavior. Several
questions require answering.
• Is it possible to exploit traditional social structures that tend to be
collectivist and may resist market-driven solutions?
• Is it possible to induce (through foreign aid) dysfunctional states to
become more functional?
• Is there scope for private collectives to promote markets?
• Why does a spontaneous group not emerge to govern and what are the
obstacles to collective political/military action?
• Do modern markets necessarily imply a modern, functioning state?
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• Can one start with a large free trade zone administered by a foreign firm
under contract, or large foreign enclave companies (mining, petroleum,
tourism, etc.), and then allow these to proliferate until they dominate
economic activity and coalesce to form a government?
Until there is a better understanding of the causes of state dysfunctionality and
the process of creating or restoring functionality, it will be difficult for
international funding agencies to achieve dramatic results in driving
development, and in particular, stimulating private sector
development in these countries.
Trade Policy for the Pacific
Tariff Levels
There is a wide range of trade policies in the Pacific—from regimes that have
low tariffs and few exemptions, such as Samoa, to regimes like the Cook Islands
with 18 tariff bands that vary from 0 to 150%, and Vanuatu, which has high
and variable tariff rates and numerous exemptions.
The general case for free trade is strong—for Pacific countries, it is absolutely
necessary.55 Free trade is an essential ingredient of policies that reduce private
sector costs. It maximizes Pacific countries’ possibilities for capitalizing on their
comparative advantage. High tariffs penalize services and agriculture as well as
any embryonic export industries by effectively increasing the prices of inputs.
Free trade reduces the costs of inputs for the businesses that exist in the region
and reduces the price level for everybody, minimizing the costs of the wide
range of goods that countries in the region import. If industries need protecting,
that is prima facie evidence that they are not competitive and resources would
be better used in other activities. Further, it is common thinking in international
settings that providing short-term protection for start-up firms—the so called
“infant-industry protection”—is not good policy, as the protected industry
seldom matures into a healthy industry, returning repeatedly to the government
for special concessions.
In the study countries with high tariffs, there were numerous complaints about
individuals and organizations (including churches) that were abusing exemptions
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55 For an excellent and detailed discussion of trade issues in the Pacific, see ADB 1999. The main arguments
of which are summarized briefly in this section.
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on imports. For example, in the Marshall Islands, there were claims that
building supplies supposedly imported for government contracts were diverted
to other uses. Similar complaints were registered in Vanuatu. In both cases,
these were accompanied by assertions that importation frequently involved
payoffs to government officials.
Similar issues arose in the cases of countries where goods
could be imported for export manufacture and then
reexported under drawback. In all the countries visited,
there were widespread complaints from the private sector
regarding competitors not paying duties or obtaining
drawbacks unfairly or illegally. While it is hard to judge
the validity of such claims, casual inspection of customs
receipts give them some credence. Furthermore, drawbacks
and exemptions are often awarded to government
departments and SOEs, which then use preferential
treatment to crowd out the private sector. In the Marshall
Islands, government vessels used for interisland shipping
obtain fuel at a lower price than some of their competitors.
The result has been the dwindling of private shipping.
Such exemptions and drawbacks should be eliminated as part of a plan to
reduce tariffs as exemplified by the successful trade reform in Samoa.
Free trade reduces
the costs of inputs
for the businesses
that exist in the
region and reduces
the price level
for everybody,
minimizing the
costs of the wide
range of goods that
countries in the
region import.
Figure 16. Trade Balance, 2000
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The only way to deal with abuse of exemptions and reduce the temptation for
bribery is to change the incentives governing trade. Optimally, this change
should reduce or eliminate tariffs and other trade restrictions. There is substantial
international evidence that employment lost in sheltered industries is quickly
regained through improvements in efficiency and job creation in other parts of
the economy. Samoa is a case in point from the region. Following a very
substantial tariff reform in which high rates of protection were reduced to
three simple tariff benchmarks, the economy grew at rates significantly above
regional rates, and registered one of the highest growth rates in the world
(ADB 2000b). While growth cannot be attributed to the tariff reductions only,
it is clear that they were a major contribution and a catalyst for growth.
World Trade Organization and Regional Trade
Agreement Issues
Most countries in the Pacific are asking what policies they should adopt for the
new round of the World Trade Organization (WTO). However, it makes little
Figure 17. Welfare Gains from Full MFN56 Liberalization (% of GDP)
56 MFN refers to “most-favored nation,” a technical term describing a World Trade Organization trade arrangement.
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sense for most countries in the region to attempt WTO access through
application. The process of applying is costly for the Pacific countries and it
will bring them little or no benefit because they are too small to be able to
obtain any concessions on the strength of negotiation. Furthermore, it will
hardly ever be cost-effective to bring cases before the WTO. Alternatively, Pacific
countries can “free ride” on the negotiations of other
developing countries and should state that they will
accept WTO provisions. Countries in the region will
continue to be accorded developing country status. Size
and remoteness will bring aid and other benefits regardless
of WTO privileges. By reducing or eliminating tariffs
unilaterally, they will gain all the benefits that are available
without tying up scarce resources and skills in the tortuous
process of the WTO round. One approach that could be taken toward the
current WTO round of trade talks that would increase access and participation
in the WTO is to share the cost of representation in Geneva with other countries
in the region or with one of the dominant free trading nations in the Pacific
(i.e., Australia or New Zealand).
Regional trade agreements that provide trade preferences for countries within
the agreement are also ill advised.57 They do not direct trade toward low-cost
and efficient manufacturers, but can instead result in higher costs. This situation
also applies to the South Pacific Regional Trade and Economic Cooperation
Agreement (SPARTECA), a one-way trade agreement with Australia and New
Zealand. The problem with regional agreements is that their effectiveness usually
relies on high external tariffs for those countries outside the agreement. As
Australia and New Zealand have reduced tariffs on all imports from all sources,
the value of preferences declines. If the industries in the Pacific that are exporting
are not competitive by world, rather than regional, standards, investments will
be wasted. The difficulties of the Fiji Islands garment industry illustrate this
point. As Australia reduces its tariffs on garments, imports from Fiji Islands
become increasingly uncompetitive in the Australian market and investment
and employment in the Fijian garment industry is threatened. Countries in
the region are better served by reducing tariffs unilaterally.58 Nonetheless, a
regional trade agreement signed in April 2003 between forum island countries
created a free trade area to be phased in over 10 years.
57 For a more complete discussion of the pros and cons of free trade areas, see ADB 1999.
58 In the 1980s in Latin America, Chile refused to join bilateral and regional free trade areas and simply reduced
tariffs to a uniform 10% across the board. It has consistently enjoyed the highest growth in that region.
It makes little sense
for most countries in
the region to attempt
WTO access through
application.
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The Pacific Island Countries Trade Agreement (PICTA) fulfills a vision by forum
leaders at their first meeting in 1971, when the idea of regional trade integration
was on the inaugural agenda. In 1999, forum leaders endorsed in principle the
establishment of a Forum Free Trade Area, and directed forum officials to draft
an agreement to lower trade barriers between member countries over 10 years.
While the PICTA will encourage trade and investment between forum island
countries, its economic benefits are likely to be minor. Its importance lies more
in the realm of politics where it has now been demonstrated that individual
countries within the forum can cooperate on an issue of strategic political
importance.
While trade agreements may not be a panacea for the Pacific, agreements that
deal with technical issues concerning simplification of trade procedures,
standardization of trade regulation, and other trade facilitation arrangements,
are beneficial.
One such agreement is the Pacific Agreement on Closer Economic Relations
(PACER), a sister agreement to PICTA, signed by the 16 Pacific leaders at their
annual forum meeting in Nauru in August 2001. The PACER is a framework
agreement providing for the future economic cooperation of the forum region
as a whole. It envisages this taking place in stages, with the initial step being a
free trade agreement in goods among forum island countries. In the short term,
the focus of the PACER is in customs procedures, sanitary and phytosanitary
measures, and standards and conformance. The PACER also provides for financial
and technical assistance for forum island countries, including capacity building.
Clearly, facilitating trade between countries by simplifying, clarifying, and
standardizing procedures is a beneficial activity, and one that funding agencies
should support—and join, in the case of bilateral funding agencies.
Free Trade Zones
No country in the region—with the exception of the Fiji Islands—has potential
to establish a significant manufacturing base. Nevertheless, in some countries,
the notion persists that development is inextricably associated with
manufacturing, a belief that has sometimes been supported by funding agencies.
As part of an industrialization strategy, free trade zones have been advocated as
ways of bringing goods in duty free for processing and reexport. This idea is
not sensible. In virtually every country in the Pacific, the size of the labor force
is too small, the skills do not exist, and the transportation costs and infrastructure
costs are too high to make manufacturing for reexport viable. Rather, the Pacific
countries should become free trade zones in their entirety by abolishing or
126 SWIMMING AGAINST THE TIDE?
reducing import duties to low levels, which will then allow them to exploit
their comparative advantage in agriculture, tourism, and fishing.
Foreign Investment Procedures
Foreign investment brings with it substantial benefits in skills, technology,
capital, and managerial expertise, and is considered the fastest path to promoting
development. Nevertheless, in most Pacific countries, processes involving foreign
investors are complex, time consuming, and costly. Tonga, for instance, is
considered to have a lengthy approval process (ADB 1996) and even after
reform of foreign investment regulations, approval of
applications from foreign investors in the Fiji Islands can
take from 2 months to more than a year to wend their
way through the process, by which time many foreign
investors have lost interest (ADB 2000a). Similar situations
exist in most other Pacific economies.
To some degree, caution regarding foreign investment is
understandable because of considerable anecdotal evidence
of exploitation or fraudulent projects by the “$2 investors”
(Hughes 1998).59 The Pacific countries do not attract
large multinational companies because they are too small
to be economically interesting. As a result, foreign investors are often of unknown
quality or of dubious repute.
Nevertheless, these countries are in competition with each other and with other
parts of the world for foreign investors. Procedures in the Fiji Islands or the
Marshall Islands contrast starkly with those in, say, Chile or El Salvador where
special offices exist to assist foreign investors with all aspects of setting up
companies and where the process takes no more than a few weeks.
Some Pacific countries are considering moves to strengthen the vetting and
monitoring of new proposals. It is doubtful that a command and control approach
is the best way of accomplishing this aim. Fraudulent schemes occur everywhere,
and eliminating all fraud would probably result in discouraging most genuine
investment. There is also the possibility that intensifying the rules would have
the opposite effect. Where complex and often poorly understood systems exist,
they become particularly vulnerable to confidence tricksters who get around
the system with promises and bribes.
The Pacific
countries should
become
free trade zones
in their entirety
by abolishing or
reducing import
duties to low
levels.
59 Hughes maintains that there are no documented cases of “$2 investors.”
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The alternative to intensifying scrutiny would be to simplify and speed up the
process, yet reduce the offers of incentives and direct assistance. One of the
unfortunate consequences of having direct government involvement in the
private sector is that it provides a climate in which fraud thrives.
Conclusion
The governments of most Pacific countries have taken the
view that because of various handicaps imposed by size
and isolation, the state needs to take a central role in the
economy. The result is widespread ownership of assets,
the reservation of particular activities for the state, and
widespread regulation. Until very recently, funding
agencies have supported this view through numerous loans, grants, and technical
assistance that, over an extended period, has amounted to the highest aid flows
per capita in the world. The results, however, have thwarted rather than
promoted the development of the private sector in the Pacific. The state-oriented
strategy has raised infrastructure costs to among the highest in the world,
promoted inefficient government ownership in these countries, and failed to
promote sustainable economic growth. Costly ownership of airlines has drained
government budgets and raised fare levels. In short, the intrusive nature of the
state in the Pacific economies has exacerbated rather than alleviated the problems
of size and distance, the very rationale on which it is based. Furthermore, in
some cases, it is difficult to be confident about the proposed solutions. Reducing
the presence of the state by corporatizing government departments into SOEs
often amounts to no more than papering over the fundamental inefficiencies
rather than addressing the root causes of the problem.
At the same time, states in the region have failed to supply the public goods
and institutions that are the foundation of private sector development. Fixed
property rights remain extremely problematic, rights for movable property are
inadequate to provide effective security for loans, commercial codes are weak,
and contract enforcement is often inadequate. Some states appear to be failing
and in many cases, regulation is so discretionary as to encourage corruption.
Often policies toward the private sector in the region have been variable and
inconsistent, resulting in short investment horizons and attracting opportunistic
investment, which further exaggerates the suspicion and hostility with which
foreigners are viewed.
Reform efforts are under way. Samoa’s reform attempts should be encouraging
as they illustrate that reducing the role of the state in the economy is possible
In most Pacific
countries, processes
involving foreign
investors are
complex, time
consuming, and
costly.
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and at the same time promotes rapid growth. ADB, along
with other funding agencies, must encourage and support
these efforts. Perhaps what is more encouraging is that
several governments in the Pacific recognize that growth
can be generated by private sector activity and that they
are willing to change the business environment toward
promoting efficiency and reducing costs. This situation
should provide optimism for the future and encourage
others in the Pacific to follow suit in reducing the size of
their public sectors and creating the enabling environment
for the private sector.
Samoa’s reform
attempts should
be encouraging as
they illustrate that
reducing the role
of the state in the
economy is possible
and at the same
time promotes
rapid growth.
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IX. Sectoral Issues
T his section discusses the sectors that are fundamentally important to thePacific and reviews the issues that hamper businesspeople in primarysectors. The paper will make recommendations on how these issues can
be overcome so that the state can provide an enabling environment for the
private sector that operates in these sectors. The primary sectors are tourism,
agriculture and forestry, and fishing.
Tourism
Many Pacific countries are idyllic, peaceful tourist spots. Some countries are
already attracting tourists and the industry is often an important component
of GDP for many Pacific nations. In several countries, however, the true potential
of the industry remains underdeveloped, a problem that is exacerbated by the
lack of infrastructure support provided to the industry in many countries of
the region. For example, wide-bodied aircraft are unable to land in many
countries of the region including Kiribati, Federated States of Micronesia, Tonga,
and Vanuatu, which effectively cuts them off from being included in main
airline routes and thereby increases the costs of getting to these locations. Given
the natural physical beauty of many Pacific countries, they have the potential
to be premier tourist locations, but they are not. In part, this situation is due
to the disabling environment for the private sector that exists.
Benefits of the Tourism Industry
Tourism has numerous benefits that Pacific countries can tap. Most importantly,
the sector has great potential to be a source of income and competitive advantage
given the natural resources that most countries in the Pacific possess. The
industry can be a major source of employment directly and indirectly through
subsidiary activities that support the sector. The industry provides revenue for
many service providers including hotels, restaurants, taxies and bus services,
the handicraft industry, and the fishing and farming industries. Tourism also
increases the rate of return on fixed capital assets such as land and property
used by the industry.
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Important Elements for a Properly Functioning
Tourism Industry
From the Tourists’ Point of View
Unless a country is attractive to tourists as a destination, it is impossible for
that country to really develop its tourism industry. A good start would be to
look at what is important from a tourist’s point of view when considering a
vacation and to what extent the state can control it. (Attributes such as physical
beauty and pleasant climate are assumed to already exist in most Pacific islands
and are therefore, not discussed here, although it should be noted that they are
subject to deterioration if not managed and conserved.) The following are critical
elements from the tourist’s point of view.
Infrastructure. Infrastructure such as the following must be functional.
Transportation. The country should be easy to get to and easy to get around,
particularly if the country is geographically dispersed (like Kiribati or
Vanuatu). The airlines, therefore, must have a convenient schedule that
makes it easy to get to and from the destination quickly and easily. Nearly
a week in travel time—as is the case of Kiribati and Vanuatu—is too long to
expect all but the most determined vacationers to spend. In addition, boats
must be available to transport tourists between and around islands easily
and safely, and roads must be available and in suitable condition as well.
Figure 18. Tourism, % of GDP, 1999
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Figure 19. Tourism, % of Exports, Select Pacific Countries
The more inconvenient the transportation, the less likely tourists will visit.
In addition to convenience, the transportation must be priced at a rate that
is competitive with other tourist locations. Currently, it is extremely expensive
to get to most of the Pacific islands. Given this cost obstacle, tourists are
more likely to choose other cheaper and more convenient locations for their
vacations. Accordingly, the bulk of tourists in the Pacific countries come from
within the region, with Australia and New Zealand being the main sources.
Accommodation. There must be accommodations available for tourists that
is of a sufficiently high quality to meet international standards. The cost of
this accommodation must also be comparable with other tourist locations.
If this accommodation is not available or relatively expensive, tourists will
go elsewhere.
Health Infrastructure. The country will be more attractive to a tourist if it is
free of most diseases that plague many tropical locations and the medical
facilities are of sufficiently high standards in case of an emergency.
Attractions. Consideration must be given to economic development to ensure
that it complements the preservation of the environment that is necessary
for encouraging tourist visits. But, a location must not only be physically
beautiful, it should also have activities for tourists once they get to their
location.
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Stability. The environment needs to be sufficiently politically stable so tourists
do not have to be concerned about physical safety while on their vacation.
Political stability is particularly important in the post-September 11th world
where generally, people are more concerned about unrest. Crime levels should
be low for the same reasons.
From the Private Sector’s Point of View
If a country can sustain a tourism industry by having the necessary features to
attract tourists to begin with, the next step is to ensure that the businesses
within the industry are not unnecessarily hampered by elements that are within
the control of government. Those elements include an enabling environment
that has the following characteristics.
A Favorable Land Policy. Land issues are complex and often wrapped up with
traditional culture in many Pacific countries. (See the following discussion of
cultural issues.) It is necessary, therefore, that governments tread carefully in
this area by ensuring that there are proper consultations to engage the public
in a discussion of the benefits of tourism for economic growth and how to
encourage that growth without clashing with traditional culture. Central to
these issues is land policy. Land is often closely linked with traditional culture.
It is, however, also a critical component to ensuring development in the tourism
industry. Ultimately, most investments in tourism are associated with the
purchase (or long-term lease) and development of land. To encourage and lower
the risk of those investments it is important that the land, in which the
investment is made, is secure. Land for tourism development must be available
for purchase or lease and not bound up in the customary requirements of the
country. If there are customary requirements, however, they must be well known
to remove any uncertainty from contracts for tourism development. In other
words, it is critical that all parties can confidently invest in tourism because—
Box 11. The Impact of Political Instability:
The Case of the Fiji Islands
The Fiji Islands have experienced two major periods of political unrest.
One incident occurred in 1987 when there were two military coups, the
second incident occurred in mid-2000 when there was an attempted coup.
This negatively affected the tourism industry as visitors were put off by
civil unrest. In 1987, visitor arrival declined by 26.4%, tourism’s share of
exports went from 29.9% to 19% of GDP, and tourism receipts declined by
37.3%. In 2000, visitor arrivals declined by 28.3%, tourism’s share of exports
went from 25.9% to 15.1% and tourism receipts declined by 37.87%.
Source: Asian Development Bank and World Development Indicators.
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without security surrounding land agreements—it is costly and difficult to
obtain financing for such investments.
Low-Cost, Available Infrastructure. Infrastructure must be available so
businesspeople can run tourism facilities at par with international standards.
In other words, water and electricity must be available continuously, and potable
water must be readily available. If these utilities are not available for tourism
facilities, it becomes necessary for them to install expensive backup systems.
These systems add to the capital and operating costs of
tourism development and act as a tax on tourism
businesspeople. Poor quality infrastructure can mean the
necessity to install backup systems. For example, in Samoa,
it is necessary for hotel operators to install expensive surge
protection equipment to guard against power variations
(ADB 200b) and in Kiribati, electricity provision is so
unreliable that backup generators are necessary (ADB
1998b). In Vanuatu, electricity, while reliable, is so
expensive that power and water costs add the equivalent
of 12–15% to the standard room rate at the upper market hotels.60 These
expenditures reduce the competitiveness of Pacific tourism businesses relative
to businesses in countries where the infrastructure is in place, working, and
reasonably priced.
To encourage and
lower the risk of
those investments
it is important that
the land, in which
the investment is
made, is secure.
Figure 20. Travel and Tourism Employment (% of Total 2000 Labor Force)
60 From consultations with local hoteliers.
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The airline and airport infrastructure must be developed to allow lower cost
options for transporting tourists (e.g., runway facilities that allow wide-bodied
aircraft to land). In many Pacific countries, hoteliers, as well as freight users,
complain that there are not enough flights while the airlines complain that
there are insufficient hotel rooms of the quality desired by tourists to justify
more. The major issue is that tourist numbers are too small to support the air
services to most Pacific countries, with the exception of the Fiji Islands. In the
same way, there are too few overseas tourists to support major hotel developments.
Moreover, there is insufficient demand for tourism services,
probably because there are limited tourist facilities and
activities, and there has been inadequate promotion of the
countries in major potential markets. It is a classic “chicken
or egg” problem. Which should come first? The lesson
from other countries, such as Fiji Islands and New
Zealand, is that tourism is successful when there is a
coherent national plan and strategy, considerable private
investment in facilities combined with equally large public
investment in infrastructure, and significant public and
private promotion of the destination.
Low Taxes. The taxes on tourism facilities must be at a
level that encourages investment. The tariffs on tourism
industry inputs must be low enough so as not to tax the
industry too much. For example, in Vanuatu, the tax on
inputs is high and acts as an indirect tax on the industry.61
By imposing this indirect tax, the industry’s growth is limited and future
investment is discouraged. In addition, a burdensome tax system creates
incentives for trying to avoid it.
Available Credit. Credit must be available so local and foreign businesspeople
can invest in tourism facilities. Without it, or if credit is only available at high
cost, the industry will be limited by what money is available to businesspeople
personally or from close acquaintances. The limitation this situation creates
becomes obvious. To this end, a framework for secured transactions must be in
place in every country in the Pacific. (See previous discussion of secured
transactions.) Without it, the private sector is constrained in its ability to fund
investments and projects, consequently limiting economic growth. A secured
Tourism is successful
when there is a
coherent national
plan and strategy,
considerable private
investment in
facilities combined
with equally large
public investment in
infrastructure, and
significant public
and private
promotion of the
destination.
61 This is true even though there is zero income tax. The question is the incidence of tax and how it is reflected
in the cost structure of the economy.
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transactions framework has enormous power to reduce the cost of obtaining
funding, and without a framework for securing loans, the cost of financing can
become prohibitive—an element critical for the development of any industry,
including tourism.
The Tourism Industry: Other Issues
Expatriate Visitors
For many Pacific countries, emigration of the local population is thought to be
a problem. But the islands have a strong traditional culture that emphasizes
familial ties and obligations. As a result, many of those visiting the islands are
expatriates coming home for visits. These visitors are a benefit to the airlines,
but they do not provide the same economic benefits to the tourism industry as
traditionally defined tourists. Expatriate visitors do not generally stay in hotels,
purchase meals in restaurants, use taxis, or visit local attractions. The airlines
often end up catering to these visitors as opposed to the traditional tourists as
they form the largest part of the market. Tourist arrivals must be analyzed from
the point of view of bona fide tourists to ensure that real tourist numbers are
increasing and that promotional efforts are aimed at tourists rather than returnees.
Without this analysis, it is impossible to really know what is happening to the
tourism industry in the Pacific. In some PDMCs, such as Samoa, detailed data
on expatriate visitor arrivals are available and thus their impact to the industry
versus a real tourist can be estimated. Nonetheless, expatriate visitors are usually
welcome as they bring cash and consumer items for their relatives.
The Conflict of Culture
In the Pacific, traditional culture plays a central role in citizens’ lives and is
actively preserved. For tourists, cultural aspects of the Pacific are interesting
and attractive. But cultural preservation is also seen to be in conflict with the
development of the tourism industry. Many people see tourism as having a
negative impact on the country and its resources, thereby destroying traditional
life. At the same time, tourism is seen as a panacea for the growth and economic
development of many Pacific economies. This ambivalence often hinders true
development of the tourism industry in the Pacific. The governments are unable
to make a true commitment despite paying lip service to industry development,
and the citizens often do not help tourism investment by resenting visitors.
These sentiments discourage businesspeople from taking advantage of
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opportunities. To this end, governments need to engage
citizens in a dialogue to resolve this ambivalence. Settling
some of these concerns is also critical from the point of
view of land policy, as land issues are often wrapped up
with traditional culture in many Pacific countries. In
addition, examples of countries with strong traditional
culture that have successfully balanced preservation with
tourism development need to be studied by the governments (Box 12). These
issues will be resolved only by tackling them directly through a national
discussion, and by governments following through on commitments to create
an enabling environment for business.
Box 12. Tourism Development, Cultural Preservation, and
Environmental Protection: The Example of Cirali, Turkey
Cirali is a small village on the Mediterranean coast of Turkey. It is important
environmentally because its beaches are traditional breeding grounds for
sea turtles, and culturally because the beaches are the site of the Olympos
archaeological ruins (an ancient acropolis where natural gases keep flames
burning eternally among the rocks). During the 1990s, tourism development
in and around the village began to threaten the turtles and the integrity of
the Olympos site. A project was started with the aim “to promote
environmentally and socially sound development through local participation
and planning, promoting traditional and alternative economic activities in
Cirali.” The hope was that the project would allow the promotion of tourism
while ensuring cultural and environmental sustainability. Attempts were
made to ensure local participation. A plan was developed in conjunction
with the ministries of Culture, Tourism, and Forestry. Public awareness,
training, and discussions formed a central role in the project. Experts on
ecotourism offered practical training courses and several beach cleaning
days were organized as educational opportunities. Project organizers
communicated the importance of protecting the turtles and the surrounding
areas as well their potential as a draw for tourists. Sea turtle nests and the
number of hatchlings have been on the rise since the project was instituted
and both locals and tourists are now aware of the turtles and involved in
their protection. In 2000, the project was judged the top 10th (out of 110
projects from 700 countries) by the United Nations Human Settlements
Programme. The local people are now invested in protecting the turtles and
the Olympos site. They see turtles as an asset rather than a nuisance and
join tourists in watching the hatchlings make the journey to the sea. One
local said, “I waited until 4:30 in the morning to see them. I worry about
the animals. Before, sea turtles were just an ordinary animal. Now people
know they will attract tourists.’’
Sources: Global Environment Facility, United Nations Development Programme,
and the World Wildlife Fund.
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The Role of the State in Tourism
The public sector has a role to play in tourism development in the Pacific
countries. This role is fourfold.
Establishing an Enabling Environment. It must provide the enabling environment
for the private sector as discussed above—they must understand the problems
that the private sector faces and remove any bottlenecks so it can operate
efficiently and be encouraged. In the face of regional competition and scarce
capital resources, an overriding objective for the government must be to create
a policy and regulatory environment conducive to tourism development and
expansion. From the standpoint of investors, whether in tourism or in other
sectors, the environment for doing business becomes attractive when they have
confidence in
• the certainty of private contracts;
• the consistency and timeliness of government decisions;
• the provision of reliable and cost-effective infrastructure and services such
as power, water, telecommunications, roads, and air connections;
• the reasonableness of fees and taxes charged by government; and
• the availability of credit.
Facilitating National Dialogue. The state must facilitate the dialogue
surrounding development of the tourism industry to resolve any issues that the
citizenry may have with the industry and its impact on the region.
Developing an Overall Industry Strategy. The government must work with
the private sector and citizens to develop an overall tourism strategy for the
country and must adequately fund tourism development and promotion
activities. The government must be involved because of the free-rider problem
associated with tourism promotion. Importantly, this strategy must be
appropriate given the size of most Pacific nations, and targeted toward groups
that are more likely to visit. For example, for most Pacific countries, targeting
the United States as a whole would not make sense, whereas targeting people
living on the West Coast, particularly Los Angeles, would be strategically sound.
Governments should develop this strategy in conjunction with industry
representatives because there are externalities that require private-public decision
making related to the location of tourist facilities. With limited financial
resources, tourism infrastructure cannot be constructed wherever development
occurs.
Incorporating Tourism Considerations into Economic Development Plans.
Overall, economic development must be considered within the context of its
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impact on the tourism industry. For example, industrial activity might be
concentrated in a certain region to limit its effects on the environment and
thereby tourism. This industry planning must be incorporated into the overall
economic strategy, but any government involvement in the industry must be
light-handed.
Finally, it is not a foregone conclusion that PDMCs have an enormous tourism
potential. That remains to be seen. But what is known is that without public-
private industry collaboration and an inviting business environment for the
industry, the potential for traditional broad-based tourism will never be tested.
Agriculture and Forestry
As noted earlier, the Pacific countries are heavily dependent on natural resources
for their livelihood and are likely to remain so for some time. This reality makes
the management of agriculture and forestry—the two major land-based
activities—important for their future.
The natural endowment of countries within PDMCs is vastly different. On
the one hand, there are the volcanic islands in the west and south that are
forest-covered and receive abundant rainfall to wash soil and nutrients down to
agriculturally fertile lowlands. Steep upland areas are not cultivated and
population pressure on the land is not great. The coral atolls to the north and
east, on the other hand, rise only a few meters above sea level, have little
agriculture or forests, other than coconuts, and rely on the sea for a large share
of sustenance. Their population densities are higher yet their ability to expand
food production is more limited.
Traditional use of land has been for current family consumption—food, fiber,
fuel, and construction materials—with each family having a plot for a garden
and certain harvest rights over a larger area of tribal land. Traditional cropping
systems of the Pacific have evolved by human trial and error over long periods.62
Much land was, and remains, under a “swidden” system of agricultural
production—a type of slash-and-burn system that allows large areas to remain
fallow for some years before burning and replanting again. Such a system is
labor intensive and although sustainable, is not well suited to commercial
production. Even today, more than 80% of agriculture is semisubsistence and
part-time, with farmers selling surpluses at local stalls. Only in the Fiji Islands
62 Archaeologists estimate taro cultivation in Papua New Guinea to be 9,000 years old.
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and Papua New Guinea—and to a lesser extent, Samoa—has larger scale
commercial agriculture made inroads into the traditional system.
Agriculture
The majority of the population of the Pacific live in rural areas and undertake
some form of agriculture as part of their daily life. In the Solomon Islands,
a typical example, nearly 80% of the people depend on agriculture for their
daily livelihood—their food, shelter, and cash from surplus commodities to
purchase daily essentials such as sugar, salt, matches, kerosene, and payment
for school fees.63 Given the share of the population it supports, agriculture is
the only sector in the Pacific that has the potential to rapidly affect the livelihood
of the majority of the population and impede the flow of rural migrants to the
urban centers (a growing problem).
Major crops for subsistence are root crops (cassava, sweet potato, and taro),
bananas, a mix of vegetables, and, in some countries, kava. Pork and poultry are
also raised, and beef cattle are important in Vanuatu. Some commercial agriculture,
mostly plantation-based, has survived the colonial period. Coconuts (copra)
are the main crop, but cocoa and palm oil are also produced, and sugar is
important in the Fiji Islands. In most countries, the colonial plantations have
Figure 21. Agriculture, Value-Added (% of GDP)
63 While primary education is technically free, in practice parents are required to provide “contributions” to fund
schools.
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been returned to customary owners and so smallholders also produce cocoa,
coffee, copra, kava, and taro. Virtually all commercial crops are exported either
raw or semiprocessed. Most countries are looking for new crops to diversify
production. All are producing tropical fruit and off-season vegetables, others
are producing sandalwood, organic vegetables, squash (pumpkin), and all seem
to be interested in developing vanilla. All are interested in maintaining or
expanding agriculture exports, typically the most or second most important
export product. In most cases, overseas entrepreneurs with market access have
teamed up with island-based growers to develop new crops for export niches.
The inherent variability of agricultural production and exports is a problem for
economic management. For this reason, while enhanced agricultural production
is a stated government strategic priority in most Pacific countries, official policy
also emphasizes a strategy of product diversification, adding value, and
producing for niche markets including the organic niche. Given the natural
and geographic disadvantages faced by the Pacific, this is a sensible strategy.
Governments have been slow to realize the importance of agriculture as an
essential component of private sector-led growth. Increasingly, governments
regard agriculture as a private sector activity where government intervention
should be light and carefully targeted. While many government interventions
remain, some Pacific countries have moved forcefully to reform agricultural
policies that have hobbled the industry. Gradually, more governments see their
role as providing a business environment for agriculture that is conducive to
growth.
Figure 22. Rural Population, 2001
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Unfortunately, agriculture sector growth in the Pacific has been disappointing.
Despite the varied and potentially dynamic picture, with opportunities for
diversification, niche product development, postharvest value-adding activities,
and modern marketing, agriculture has grown at an unimpressive rate—generally
below that of population growth. Much land appears unused or underutilized
and despite quality soils and a favorable climate free of many diseases and
pests, agriculture underperforms. Low productivity is a concern and it appears
difficult to break the low-input, low-return practices.
For funding agencies, the results of financing development in the primary
production sectors have been frustrating and disheartening. It is, in fact, difficult
to find a single agriculture project by any funding agency that has fully met its
objectives.64 Institutional issues along with sociocultural issues have been
identified as the main causes of project failure. Another study found cultural
conservatism, lack of secure land tenure, fear of risk-taking with respect to land
use, variability of crop yields and prices from new varieties, and government
intervention in price stabilization, loans schemes, and taxation, as the major
sources of failure with the latter being the most significant (Andrews 1987).
Projects targeted at enhancing productivity have been singularly unsuccessful.
Figure 23. Arable Land, 1999
64 For an evaluation of agriculture projects, see ADB 1996a.
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Despite considerable external funding to agriculture in the Pacific, there are
still very few full-time farmers. Traditional patterns of production and lifestyle
remain dominant, with production aimed at subsistence and a little cash and
output shared among the extended family or clan. There are examples of
indigenous farmers surmounting this model to become successful commercial
farmers of export crops, but they are few.
Another important agricultural productivity issue,
particularly in Melanesian countries, is gender and the
treatment of women. Women undertake most agricultural
work in traditional farming systems—planting, weeding,
and harvesting—in addition to child care, food
preparation, and collection of water. Women provide
approximately 45–70% of agricultural labor and make a
large contribution to smallholder coffee, cocoa, copra, and
rubber production, as well as fishing. “Men’s crops” tend
to be commercial crops also. In addition, they concentrate
on land clearing and fencing. There does not seem to be an extension or improved
technology program aimed specifically at women producing food crops.
Agricultural extension services are not oriented to the needs of women.
Past government policies for promoting agriculture were price supports,
subsidized term lending, tariff and nontariff barriers against selected agricultural
commodities, input subsidies, income tax exemptions, foreign investment
regulations (in some countries farming is restricted to indigenous people),
marketing through monopoly boards, and partial or complete ownership of
farms and agro-processing facilities by the government. Governments have begun
to remove these policies to focus on nondistortionary measures designed to
improve domestic incentives for agriculture, but even so, several interventions
remain. On the other hand, government financing of public goods needed for
agriculture is often missing. Poor roads and communications, expensive ports,
uncertain ownership of land, poorly allocated research budgets, weak extension
and information systems, an inadequate framework for secured credit, insufficient
law and order,65 and macroeconomic instability have all contributed to poor
agriculture sector performance. Samoa has gone the furthest in undertaking
agricultural reforms while the Fiji Islands has made larger strides in partially
dealing with the serious and politically sensitive issue of land tenure.
65 In some countries, theft and destruction of crops has reached serious proportions and threats of violence
prevent the harvest of some crops. See ADB 2003c.
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Some governments have also used sectoral policies to meet social goals. In the
past, certain preferences have been given to agriculture, such as input subsidies
and zero tax on agricultural income, on grounds of the perceived social needs of
the sector. It is important for governments to resist this temptation, as providing
preferential treatment of this nature is poor public policy for the instrument
and target are misaligned. Social policy should be targeted at social issues and
commercial and sectoral policies should be targeted at commercial and sectoral
issues.
Most governments in the region wish to stimulate private
sector-led economic growth. In the case of agriculture,
many governments appear to equate this objective with
attracting foreign investors (ADB 2002c), but relying
exclusively on this connection is a mistake.
Rural people of the Pacific make up a majority of the
population and represent a huge untapped pool of human
resource that collectively own about 95% of the land, in
plots ranging from less than a hectare to several hundred
hectares. Initially any increase in production will most
likely come from existing smallholders responding to
improved incentives and margins for their products.66
Development experience from other countries that have
achieved high agriculture sector growth demonstrates the
importance of increasing smallholder productivity and
output as one of the most powerful and cost-effective drivers
of private sector growth. Continuing efforts to accelerate
smallholder-based agriculture sector growth therefore
remains a key development objective. The potential for farmers to become
involved in export crop production is one of the opportunities for private sector
development in the Pacific countries.
Current arrangements for export crops draw on the strengths of the private
sector, evade the weaknesses of the public sector, and promote a user-pay
approach to extension services and inputs, thus avoiding problems caused by
inadequate government budgets. A strong smallholder export crop subsector
brings cash incomes into the local economy and creates demand for more goods
66 For example, all large-scale investments in agriculture over the last 20 years in Vanuatu, whether public or
private, have failed (ADB 2002c).
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that in turn promotes further investment opportunities in private farm and
nonfarm activities. It is often complemented by the efficient plantation and
estate sector, which provides important production, marketing, and processing
linkages to smallholders. Policies need to reflect the mutual interdependence
of smallholders and plantations.
The ideal for the Pacific would be to transform agriculture over the next 10
years into an effective and efficient driver of economic growth. The sector would
be characterized by a vibrant smallholder system coexisting with an efficient
commercial plantation sector producing for export, overseas niche markets,
and import substitution. It would be more diversified, competitive, and
sustainable than at present, exploiting the Pacfic’s
agronomic suitability for the production of a wide variety
of tropical, semitropical, and temperate climate crops and
livestock.
To do this, further relaxation of government intervention
is needed in activities that could be better performed by
the private sector; while more government activity is
needed in establishing land laws, securing financial
transactions, conducting appropriate research, and
financing needed public infrastructure.
Figure 26. Forest Area, 20004
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Forestry
Two key characteristics of forestry in the Pacific are a lack of management resulting
in unsustainable harvesting rates and poorly structured financial returns for
resource owners. Some smaller island nations have been virtually clear-felled in
a matter of few years (e.g., Solomon Islands) while others are in danger of a
similar fate if they do not act (e.g., Vanuatu). It is not the felling of trees for
local use that is the issue here, but large-scale commercial harvesting, often by
foreign companies. Attention needs to focus on establishing a sustainable
harvesting plan along with the regulatory capacity to enforce it and a framework
for the equitable distribution of royalties. The plan would include long-term
agreements with landowners to allow for forest regeneration.
All the larger island countries in the Pacific have now developed their own
codes of logging practices and are in various stages of implementing or enforcing
them. Fiji Islands, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, and Vanuatu have
undertaken forestry reviews and introduced legislation. Cook Islands, Niue,67
and Samoa are currently revising their legislation. There is a regional forest and
tree program where the ministers or heads of forestry from member countries
discuss policies and priorities at biannual meetings. In the past, some priorities
have been acted on by individual countries, and the technical and administrative
cooperation that is derived from the meetings is valuable.
The lessons on the management of natural resources for the long-term
development of the Pacific are that property rights must be clarified to ensure
that competition results in the benefits of resource extraction being shared
fairly between the island states and those doing the extraction. Lack of clear
property rights will hinder the fulfillment of this necessary condition. Second,
the rents from extraction, which represent a payment for the depletion of capital,
need to be invested in an alternative form of capital so that the aggregate capital
stock of the community or country is maintained. Mining in Papua New Guinea,
forestry in both Papua New Guinea and Solomon Islands, and phosphate mining
in Nauru, are examples where resource rents have been consumed and/or
squandered. Despite existing large policy and institutional gaps, willing and
dedicated governments can meet the conditions. Funding agencies should
encourage such reforms.
67 Not an ADB member country.
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Challenges for the Rural Economy
The rural economy is not performing well and is even in crisis in some countries
particularly Papua New Guinea and Solomon Islands (Baxter 2001). A serious
concern for government and funding agencies is what actions should be taken
to modernize rural industries so that they are aligned with
global market opportunities and become sources of private
sector growth rather than pockets of poverty. As noted
earlier, the agriculture sector remains a vital component
of the livelihood of the people of the Pacific and is too
important to be ignored. While agriculture is inherently
a private sector activity, there are many actions governments
can take to stimulate its development. Some involve
removing present government interventions and others
involve adding more government activities. Some are
direct actions in the sector and others are actions in other sectors that affect
agriculture and forestry. Overall, the changes mean re-aligning the role that
governments provide to the rural sector so that effort is put into providing
public goods. In approximate order of importance they are
• moving toward a more formal land use market and introducing some
formality into land tenure so that durable leasing agreements can be
made and secured financing can be placed over land use;
• providing an intervention-free and regulatory-light business environment
that will attract local and foreign investment and be friendly to value-
added activities;
• eliminating tax and tariff preferences for agriculture;
• investing in physical and social infrastructure such as roads, ports, health,
and education;
• lowering the cost of utilities through reform of the structure, regulation,
and ownership of utilities;
• concentrating public services in the sector, such as extension and research
on subsistence and semisubsistence farmers, especially women, and not
on commercial operators;
• divesting government assets and activities in the sector, and abolishing
monopoly marketing boards;
• enforcing commercial codes, regulations, and contracts, especially with
respect to logging;
• protecting personal property and providing personal security in countries
where theft and violence are a problem; and
• preserving a clear distinction between policies designed to assist social needs
versus policies toward a productive sector (in countries where this is an issue).
While agriculture is
inherently a private
sector activity, there
are many actions
governments can
take to stimulate its
development.
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Making these changes would revitalize the rural economy, create employment
opportunities, and allow the rural economy to be an engine of private sector
growth. Domestic and foreign investors would find the sector attractive for
investment. And the demonstration effect of a few successful countries and a
few successful entrepreneurs will serve as a catalyst for further commercial
agricultural development by smallholder and part-time families throughout
the region.
For funding agencies, complementing and supporting
governments will be needed. ADB has some recent
successes in pilot projects and using the successful features
of these pilots will build a pipeline of agricultural projects
in the Pacific (ADB 1998c). A pilot in Papua New Guinea
uses private contractors to deliver various demand-driven
extension services, provides a fresh-food marketing information
system, and establishes an Internet training program for
rural residents. Another option may be a “central
enterprise” model, as exemplified by oil palm estate and
smallholder arrangements in Papua New Guinea. A coffee
plantation, for example, could provide a bundled set of
services (e.g., inputs, advice, transport, processing, and marketing) to small
farmers. Central facilities tend to act as growth poles encouraging multiplier-
type investments in commercial enterprises, and as a central point from which to
expand transport and other infrastructure services.
But most of all, funding agencies can assist in supporting the extensive reform
agenda outlined above. The provision of technical assistance, adjustment
financing, and policy and implementation advice is critical to success.
Fishing
An attribute of being an island is that it is surrounded by water, and in the case
of the Pacific, it is surrounded by a great deal, a large portion of which is rich in
fish. It is not surprising, therefore, that the fishing industry is considered
important to the Pacific countries.68
Fishing is important in the Pacific not only because of its contribution to GDP
but also for its great potential to contribute to private sector development and
Making these
changes would
revitalize the rural
economy, create
employment
opportunities, and
allow the rural
economy to be an
engine of private
sector growth.
68 A great deal has already been written on this subject by ADB in several publications, as well as in other
sections of this paper; therefore, this section will only briefly cover the critical issues related to private sector
development of the fishing resources in the Pacific.
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thus to jobs and income. In addition, fish are important from an economic and
revenue generation point of view and also because they provide a large portion
of the diet in the Pacific.
Fishing in the Pacific can be divided into three types.
Artisanal Fishing. Small-scale fishing (excluding sport fishing) generally limited
to the nearshore and inland water bodies. It is a strategically important form of
fishing because it provides rural employment and helps with poverty reduction.
Commercial Fishing. Fishing undertaken on a large, capital-intensive scale.
Generally, industrial fishing vessels are the ones licensed to fish in the offshore
waters of the region.
Figure 25. Contribution of Fishing to GDP
Figure 26. Ranges in Annual Per Capita Fisheries Consumption, 1990s
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Table 7. Employment in Fishing
Country Basic Information on Fisheries-Related Employment
Cook Islands About 22% of the population, or some 4,435 people, were involved in
subsistence fishing. The 160 jobs in fisheries represent about 3% of all
formal employment.
Fiji Islands The 6,246 jobs in fishing represent about 2.2% of the 280,505 people
formally and informally employed in the country, as reported in the 1996
census.
Kiribati Of the 7,848 people who had “cash work,” 349 people (4.4%) had fisheries-
related jobs (e.g., seaweed grower, coastal fisherman, deep-sea fisherman,
etc.). About 12% of the households in Kiribati do not fish. Of those that do
fish, 17% fish commercially full-time, 22% fish commercially part-time, and
61% fish only for subsistence.
RMI As estimated, 2.8% of all employment is in fishing.
FSM In 1997, 10,285 private sector employees were enrolled in the social security
system. Of these, 767 individuals (7.4%) were from the fishing sector.
Nauru There are 100 part-time commercial fishermen, which would be
equivalent to 50 full-time fishermen. The census indicated 1,917 formally
employed people.
Niue Around 61% of households performed some form of fishing activity.
Palau There are 200 commercial fishers and 1,100 noncommercial fishers in a
population of 19,000. These fishers represent about 6.8% of the total
population.
PNG About 23% of rural households (out of 130,963) catch fish. Of this, about
60% caught fish for their own consumption, the remainder caught fish for
selling as well.
Samoa In Samoa, 500–600 people appear to be formally employed in the fishing
sector. One third of the total number of households in Samoa is engaged in
some form of fishing.
Solomon Islands About 6% of employment in “paid work” is in “fishing and related
activities.” About 5% of the people involved in unpaid work had fishing
as the main activity.
Tonga Approximately 8% of paid employment is in the fisheries sector and
3.2% of economically active people are in the fisheries sector.
Tuvalu Fisheries represent around 5.3% of all formal cash employment. Traditional
fisheries activity for subsistence represents 19.6% of all traditional activity.
Vanuatu An estimated 35% of the 22,000 rural households in Vanuatu were engaged
in fishing during the 7-day period prior to the census. Of these fishing
households, 40% reported selling fish for some form of income.
RMI = Republic of the Marshall Islands, FSM = Federated States of Micronesia, PNG = Papua New Guinea.
Source: Asian Development Bank 2002a.
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Aquaculture. The cultivation of fish or shellfish under controlled conditions
(e.g., oysters, pearls, etc.).
The Pacific’s fishery resources are contained within areas called exclusive economic
zones (EEZs), which were established by international treaty during the 1970s
and 1980s as a means of controlling the resources in the surrounding waters.
EEZs are spread over nearly 19 million square kilometers (km2), are 36 times
as large as their combined land area, and are more than double the land area of
the United States (ADB 1998a). It is here that deep-sea fishing is undertaken
and the rights to fish are often sold by the countries. EEZs are not uniformly
stocked with fish, however, and there are large variations across the region in
terms of the depth of the fishing resource.
As far as commercial fishing is concerned, tuna is the most important species of
fish. The western Pacific, in fact, is the most important tuna fishery in the
world and it is estimated that the annual catch value is worth around (1998)
US$1.9 billion (ADB 2001c). This amount means that tuna alone makes up
11% of the combined GDP of all of the countries in the region and half of
exports (ADB 2001c).
The revenue obtained from fishing in the region is primarily through the US
treaty negotiated by the Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA) and bilaterally negotiated
agreements between fishing countries and individual PDMCs. The fees are
based on the market value of the fish and usually about 4–5% of the value of
the fish caught is provided annually to the Pacific governments. There is a lack
Table 8. Land and Exclusive Economic Zone Areas for the Pacific
Country Land Area Exclusive Economic Zone Area
(km2) (km2)
Cook Islands 240 1.9 million
Fiji Islands 18,333 1.3 million
Kiribati 810 3.5 million
Marshall Islands 181 2 million
Micronesia, Fed. States of 702 2.6 million
Papua New Guinea 462,243 1.6 million
Samoa 2,820 98,500
Solomon Islands 27,556 1.3 million
Tonga 600 680,000
Tuvalu 25.6 900,000
Vanuatu 12,200 680,000
Sources: Asian Development Bank and Secretariat of the Pacific Community.
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Figure 27. Estimated Annual Fisheries Production by Value, Late 1990s
of transparency in setting quotas and rents, and individual countries are secretive
and reluctant to involve FFAs. In general, it is considered that agreements are
ineffective in capturing the rents associated with the resource (ADB 1998).
Currently, most revenues obtained from the fish resource
in the region have accrued to foreign companies. The
development of a larger domestic fishing industry by
providing the enabling environment for local companies
to expand, would result in more of this revenue being
captured by the Pacific countries rather than simply relying
on the money obtained through access fees.
It is thought that fishing supplies between 21,000 and
31,000 direct and indirect jobs in the region, or 5–8%
of wage employment (ADB 2001c). Most formal
employment in the sector is related to tuna fishing. The
sector, however, also provides an important source of informal employment for
many others, particularly those in the outer islands whose catch supplies the
local market. The outer islands are suffering from rural-urban migration, and
towns are becoming congested. By boosting private sector development in fishing
and fish marketing, more jobs could be provided to those in the outer islands
and thereby slow urban migration. Funding agencies have encouraged the further
development of small fishing in coastal villages, and coastal fishing is an
important source of livelihood and food.
By boosting private
sector development
in fishing and fish
marketing, more
jobs could be
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in the outer islands
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Because fishing is a sector where the barriers to entry for local businesspeople
are relatively low, particularly for coastal fishing where capital requirements are
not as high, the sector has high potential to be an engine for private sector
growth in the region. There are, however, issues that must be considered,
including the following.
Ensuring there are appropriate policies to manage the resource. A growing
concern will be overfishing of the resource as human population growth
increasingly places pressure on the Pacific fisheries sector. It is important that
the Pacific countries undertake appropriate measures to ensure the ownership,
sustainability, and economic rents of the fisheries for years to come. This effort
will include reevaluating the access fees charged to foreign vessels for fishing
rights to ensure that Pacific countries obtain maximum value while sustaining
the resource. Enforcing the regulations by policing the fishing rights in the EEZs
will be critical, but regulations must be neither too cumbersome nor financially
onerous so that they either remove incentives to fish at sustainable rates or
could encourage illegal fishing.
Important progress has been made recently in developing regional approaches
to managing tuna resources.69
• Transshipment at sea has been prohibited, significantly reducing the
opportunities for underreporting and increasing domestic returns.
Figure 28. Estimated Access Fees from Foreign Fishing Vessels, 1999
69 Important since tuna is a migratory fish.
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• A cap has been placed on the future number of vessels from distant water
fishing nations.
• Some of the member countries of the FFA have agreed to allow access to
each other’s exclusion zones for domestically registered vessels.
Future management of fisheries stocks and maximizing of returns will depend
on such regional cooperation. The management of coastal fisheries by state and
local regulation—while equally important from the point of view of jobs and
food—is less developed in most islands, and many
government-sponsored development projects in the Pacific
have failed. Lessons can be learned from these failures and
village or district fish management schemes can be
developed in some circumstances.
Facilitating access to credit. Without capital, private
businesspeople are unable to fund their business and drive
expansion. As discussed, lack of access to credit is a chronic
problem in the Pacific and improvement depends on land
tenure and financial sector reform. It is only through access to credit that new
entrepreneurs will have adequate incentives to establish a business and existing
entrepreneurs will be able to expand their operations.
Figure 29. Estimated Values of Fisheries Exports, Late 1990s
It is only through
access to credit that
new entrepreneurs
will have adequate
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Ensuring the availability of reliable and cost-effective infrastructure. The
private sector cannot get off the ground unless the appropriate infrastructure
exists in the country to support it. In the case of fishing, this infrastructure
includes harbors, electricity, roads, freshwater, and most importantly, freight
services. In Apia, Samoa, even the water supply to the fishing dock is a limiting
factor. If fish are caught and the ports and freight services are unable to handle
the product and get it to market quickly, huge costs are imposed on
businesspeople and those local fisherfolk who are providing the fish. In addition,
if the utilities are poorly operated and unduly costly (e.g., high electricity
costs, docking fees, etc.) an implicit tax is imposed on that activity and raises
the costs of doing business, thereby hindering economic activity.
Examining state-owned enterprises. Government
ownership of fishing-related businesses is a major
obstacle to private sector development (ADB 1997a).
Government-owned businesses are generally not well run
and crowd out efforts by the private sector. Privatization
of these SOEs, however, is needed and must be carefully
structured to ensure an equitable arrangement for both
the investor and the country involved. The chapter on
privatization examines the issues on selling SOEs.
Removing industry preferences and protection. Foreign governments often
provide preferential access to their markets for some products from some
countries. These preferences give a false sense of profitability to the products
and distort investment. When preferences are removed by opening market
Government
ownership of
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to private sector
development.
Box 13. The Response to Overfishing in Vanuatu
Villagers have conducted coastal fish management since the early 1990s.
By the late 1980s, it was evident that fishing pressure on coastal resources
was leading to resource depletion, especially of trochus, a commercially
important coastal product. The Department of Fisheries and the
Environmental Unit launched public awareness campaigns to encourage
traditional, village-based conservation. The response from villagers was
enthusiastic and widespread, and led to the reintroduction of “closed seasons”
in 1990 (i.e., assigning a period when catching certain fish species is
prohibited). Their success in improving catch rates has led villagers to extend
closed seasons from trochus to other species, and to adopt further
conservation measures such as bans on night spear fishing. The success of
village-based management is higher where traditional authority remains
strong in rural areas and where populations have alternative sources of
cash income and food during the closed seasons.
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Box 14. The Impact of No Infrastructure
In Vanuatu, anecdotes abound about how rural enterprise could expand but
for the absence of one or two conditions. For instance, there was a budding
fish export industry established where a private operator supplied ice and
iceboxes to small fishing communities on the outer islands and returned to
pick up the fish for export. But capacity to airfreight the produce was
unreliable and he lost several shipments that were bumped off flights. As a
result, he did not pick up fish from the local fishermen when promised and
they lost interest in supplying him.
access to all, the investment and jobs in that activity are often lost, as the
industry is not globally competitive. The fishing industry in the Pacific receives
this preferential treatment. The region, however, cannot expect this protection
to remain as the world moves towards freer trade. General border protection in
the form of tariffs, imposed by Pacific governments adds to the cost of inputs
for the fishing industry and discourages onshore foreign investment in fishing.
It also reduces competitiveness of the local industry in the region. These factors
dampen private investment and divert investment in other industries. Short of
totally removing tariffs, the protection of inputs to critical industries such as
fishing must be removed so that investment and growth are encouraged.
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X. Small and
Medium Enterprise
Development
Providing Special Consideration and Assistance for
Small-Scale Rural Enterprises
T he private sector assessment of the Pacific reveals a strong dependenceby the majority of the population on rural-based activities for theirlivelihoods. Further, the income level of rural people is well below those
in urban areas, and in fact, majority of the poor are rural residents or rural
migrants to the fringes of major cities. This situation makes it necessary for a
private sector strategy to address this often neglected group and provide more
direct poverty reduction efforts. While there continues to be a need to assist
the poor—especially the poor in rural areas—through social assistance, there is
also an argument for assisting the development of commercial opportunities
for small and emerging rural businesses.
The argument for rural businesses is based on the need to explore all possibilities
for creating viable income-generating opportunities for communities, families,
and individuals that would thereby reduce the numbers dependent on social
assistance. This approach is especially relevant in the case of “failing states”
where the potential for more general business environment reform is low. In
such circumstances, operating at the local level, particularly in rural areas, may
be the only opportunity to assist businesses. However, this is not an argument
for more general direct intervention to promote business, but rather a suggestion
that pilot projects along the lines of those suggested for SMEs in the section
below, could be tried in rural areas, especially in cases where the central
administration is in disarray.
Of the many variants of assistance directed to communities and small businesses
by the multilaterals, ADB is presently piloting an innovative approach in Papua
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New Guinea. The Nucleus Enterprise Project (ADB 2001b) promises to build
communities while providing the type of assistance to small and emerging
businesses that are likely to succeed. Since it is operating in what is almost an
enclave environment, it ameliorates some negative effects of the generally highly
unfavorable private sector environment in the country. This project should be
monitored carefully as an approach to private sector development, which may
be applied to other PDMCs, especially those where the state is dysfunctional.
Is There a Need for Generic SME Policies?
If small-scale rural enterprises are to be a focus of targeted assistance, a further
relevant question is whether there should be specific SME interventions. Any
answer to this question should emerge more generally from the justification for
SME policies. Much of the rationalization of many SME interventions does
not, in most cases, stand up to a careful examination of the evidence.70 However,
it is undeniable that SMEs suffer from particular handicaps because they face
higher transaction costs, both on a per unit of output and on a per employee
basis than large firms do.
By international standards, there are few large businesses
in the Pacific, with the exception of a small number of
natural resource companies that operate in Papua New
Guinea and other island economies. A specific SME policy
would therefore be targeting almost all businesses in the
region. Such a policy would be redundant in the sense
that the resulting strategy would apply to all SMEs, which
constitute nearly all Pacific businesses. Consequently, there
is no need for a separate policy for SMEs.
Since nearly all businesses in the Pacific are small or
microenterprises, should “traditional” SME policies such
as business development services, loan guarantees, incubators, and small business
investment funds be an important part of policy in the Pacific? We suggest that
it should not be. A major theme of this analysis of the private sector in Pacific
70 Arguments include (i) small businesses create more jobs (they do, but they also fail at a much higher rate than
larger companies, so they also lose more jobs—SMEs on a net basis do not create a disproportionate number
of new jobs); (ii) SMEs are more innovative (research indicates the opposite); (iii) SMEs are more flexible
(there is no convincing evidence to support this contention); and (iv) SMEs are more entrepreneurial than large
companies (there is no convincing evidence to support this statement).
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countries is that previous interventionist “bottom up” approaches to private sector
development have produced disappointing results over an extended period. This
paper recommends that private sector development policies focus primarily on
the enabling environment for business rather than sector-specific interventions.
A similar theme is beginning to appear in more recent work on policies toward
SMEs. While the strategy should not necessarily rule out all specific
interventions, they should be strictly on a pilot basis with very carefully designed
success criteria that are directed at output variables such as sustainability, cost
per intervention, and contribution to business value added, rather than input
variables such as businesses that have been “helped.” Only in this way can the
viability of such approaches be tested.
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XI. Toward a Strategy
for Private Sector
Development in
the Pacific
We have discussed the common concerns experienced by manycountries in the Pacific that are realizing their earlier policies havefailed to bring prosperity to the region in spite
of the highest per capita aid flows in the world. Donors are
concerned that in spite of their substantial efforts in granting
aid to the Pacific islands, poverty has increased in the region.
At the same time, policymakers in the Pacific countries fear
that reforms designed to open their economies could result
in more intense competition and lead to even higher
unemployment.
These concerns are understandable. However, Samoa’s recent
history illustrates that there can be policy shifts, trade
reform, and moves toward reducing the role of the state in
the economy while promoting rapid growth at the same time.
Furthermore, several Pacific governments now acknowledge
that growth can only be generated by private sector activity
and there are signs of willingness to change the environment for business by
improving incentives, promoting efficiency, and reducing costs. This situation
provides optimism for the future.
Countries in the region are looking for a way forward and are seeking support
(technical as much as financial) from funding agencies to assist in designing
and carrying out reforms that would stimulate the private sector and in so
doing address the employment/poverty nexus. This circumstance represents an
opportunity for individual countries, ADB, and other funding agencies. The
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private sector assessments undertaken for this publication provide the elements
for the development of road maps for Pacific countries.
By following private sector-friendly growth-oriented policies, Pacific countries
will ensure that they capitalize on the growth of the world economy. In many
ways, the issues raised here represent the confluence—or conflict—of tradition
versus modernization. The countries of the Pacific wish to secure improved
opportunities and incomes for their people, but the fundamental question
they wrestle with is whether they must modernize—and by implication
give up cherished traditions and customs—to do so.
Modernization is a necessary condition for development
but this modernization does not necessarily mean foregoing
traditions and customs. Incentive structures can evolve to
include local cultural practices, just as they have
in other parts of the world. The countries of the Pacific
have already embarked along this journey toward
modernization. The key issue for Pacific countries to
determine is how far along that road they wish to travel
and at what speed.
Considerations for Pacific Governments
The Countries and Private Sector Development Policy
While generic problems are widespread, details vary from country to country,
and in the case of private sector development policy, effective solutions require
thorough investigation. For example:
• Legal systems on which commercial transactions are based are inadequate
in most countries. But reform requires microlevel analysis.
• Although land arrangements have many common features across the
Pacific, in each country there are crucial and important differences.
• Utility provision is almost invariably high-cost, but arrangements as to
which utility services are supplied vary—from government electricity and
water departments to high-cost, barely regulated monopolies.
• The weak systems of property rights for both movable property (chattels)
and for land, which exclude the large majority of the local population
from access to the financial system, require urgent attention, but specific
solutions will vary from country to country and will depend upon local
conditions, practices, and customs.
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necessary condition
for development but
this modernization
does not necessarily
mean foregoing
traditions and
customs.
TOWARD A STRATEGY FOR PRIVATE SECTOR DEVELOPMENT IN THE PACIFIC 161
These examples illustrate that there can be no substitute for comprehensive
country-level analysis in diagnosing and prioritizing local solutions. Further, it
is important that differences between Pacific countries be accounted for in any
solution. Interventions for reform must take into account cultural traditions of
individual countries—there is no single formula to be applied across the region.
Furthermore, the implementation of policies must be based on a high-profile
and broad-based discussion of the issues within PDMCs themselves before
reform should be attempted—long-lasting and far-reaching change will only
be brought about if the Pacific countries are sufficiently convinced that it is the
appropriate course to follow. Funding agencies can indicate that they will no
longer support failed policies of the past. They can encourage the search for
new solutions. They can describe initiatives that have been effective in other
countries. But effective solutions can only emerge at the will and leadership of
the countries themselves. In addition, aid coordination is essential if policies
toward the private sector are to be consistent and carry an
unambiguous message.
Improving the environment for business requires commitment,
analysis, persuasion, political action, and coordination at
the country level between governments and the private
sector, plus coordination and support on the part of funding
agencies.
• First, no successful strategy can be implemented
without the wholehearted support and cooperation of the government of
any country where it will be implemented.71
• Second, success requires carefully identifying priorities for reforming the
enabling environment.
• Third, it requires a prioritization and commitment on the part of funding
agencies to make private sector strategy the centerpiece of country
programs.
Alternatively, the funding community might seek to convince Pacific countries
that changes in policies toward the private sector will lead to improved growth
and prosperity. They might achieve this end through initial analysis and
discussion at the country level, which can lead to requests for assistance. There
is no single path that promotes private sector development. The discussion
71 The governments must also engage their citizens in a dialogue so there is a general understanding of the need
for change and support for it.
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that follows outlines a general approach at the country level, the international
donor level, and then, in some detail, options and suggestions for funding
agencies such as ADB. In practice, however, the process is likely to be the result
of focused interaction, which will not follow any predetermined pattern.
The role of the government in private sector development lies in establishing
an enabling environment that promotes long-term contracting and a planning
time horizon that is not distorted by political uncertainty. It requires clear
rules and the absence of corruption. In some Pacific states, governance is either
weak or nonexistent, with several states being on the verge of failing completely.
Funding agencies have tried to address issues of governance, but the knowledge
of what to do and how to promote good governance is still in its infancy.
For government to provide an environment in which the private sector can
flourish, it needs to understand the problems that affect the business community
while at the same time maintain sufficient insulation from special interests
seeking to promote their own concerns at the expense of economic efficiency.
In the final analysis, competition will always bring about the best solution to
problems of efficiency, allocation, and growth.
Need for Interaction Between Government and Business
To appreciate fully the factors that affect private sector development, the
government and the private sector need to understand and interact on problems
and issues. In addition, the government and the funding agencies must be
prepared to guard against the initial reaction of the private
sector to probably request special concessions, often in
subsidized credit and protection against competition. A
striking feature of the private sector assessments undertaken
as part of this regional technical assistance was the low level
of communication between the business community and
the government in the countries visited, which has resulted
in suspicion, resentment, and at times, hostility between
the two parties. A unique exception occurred in Vanuatu
in October 2002 when the Chamber of Commerce and
the Government held a weeklong seminar in which
grievances were aired and action plans for future cooperation
were developed. On the one hand, this dialogue was clearly
constructive, while on the other, there were signs that special
interests were being promoted, and calls for subsidized credit and insulation
from foreign competition illustrated this point. Nevertheless, Vanuatu’s business
forum process is certainly a step in the right direction and other Pacific countries
Government needs
to understand the
problems that affect
the business
community while at
the same time
maintain sufficient
insulation from
special interests
seeking to promote
their own concerns.
TOWARD A STRATEGY FOR PRIVATE SECTOR DEVELOPMENT IN THE PACIFIC 163
should be encouraged to establish similar mechanisms of dialogue between
government and business.
The Need for Analysis
The Vanuatu example illustrates the necessity for the parties involved in such
an interchange to have a view of the parameters that define the debate.
Nevertheless, without close cooperation between the private sector and the
government, many opportunities for improvements in the business environment
are foregone. An additional area where understanding of problems and issues is
required is the informal sector. The needs of rural communities attempting to
start and grow commercial ventures of their own are often virtually ignored by
both government and the formal private sector operating in urban areas. Since
they do not yet formally exist, they do not have a voice. Yet, policies for such
private sector development need to be formulated.
Foreign Workers, Foreign Investment, and Incentives
Most Pacific economies are critically short of skills of all types, which is one of
the causes of low productivity in the region. Yet, in most countries, there are
restrictions and cumbersome procedures for obtaining or renewing work permits
for foreigners who have the needed skills. This policy, like many others
implemented with intent to help the economies of the region—whether explicit
or implicit—has a contrary effect. It drives down overall productivity levels,
keeps salaries low, which in turn encourages the emigration
of skilled Pacific workers. Reluctance to approve work
permits for foreign workers is based on what is known as
the “lump of labor fallacy,” namely that there is a limited
amount of work to be divided among the workforce. In
terms of this fallacy, it follows that if a worker is brought
in from outside, a local must lose a job. The reality is far
different, however. A skilled foreign worker will raise
productivity and create output and jobs for the local
population. In addition, the foreign worker provides an opportunity for skills
transfer to local workers. Every country in the Pacific should welcome any
skilled foreigner with open arms. Rather than make it difficult for businesses to
bring in skilled workers, processes should be simplified and expedited.
Similarly, the fastest way to upgrade business practices is to learn them from
foreign investors. The world abounds with examples of foreign investors bringing
improved business practices and methods to developing countries, which are
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then learned by locals who use them to start businesses of their own. Foreign
investment is one of the best ways for countries to acquire skills and techniques,
generate employment, and promote growth. Unfortunately, in much of the
Pacific, foreign investment procedures are mired in red tape and delays, onerous
registration requirements, and difficulties in bringing projects to fruition. Tales
abound of potential investors leaving frustrated and going elsewhere.
A Schematic of Government Policy for
Private Sector Development
The first step in promoting country-level private sector development must be
a commitment to promoting it and an acceptance by government that sustained
growth and prosperity can only be achieved through a dynamic, expanding
private sector.
The central theme of any private sector strategy is not fostering specific
companies or sectors. It is not whether countries have potential because of
endowments of natural resources. Rather, it is ensuring that the incentives and
conditions that affect business and entrepreneurship
promote productivity and growth.
As a result, private sector issues encompass almost every
area of the economy. In addition, the government is not
the only one responsible for implementing a strategy to
encourage private sector development. The private sector
itself must play a central role in formulating policy, and
both have responsibilities—the government must not erect
barriers to business and commercial activities; the private
sector must not expect special preferences.
The process that the countries could undertake entails
• identifying problems that hinder the development of the private sector,
which require significant technical expertise, especially in the early phases
(an area where funding agencies can be particularly effective);
• consulting with the private sector to prioritize and reduce the large
number of identified problems (including changes in the law or the
ways in which services are provided), and communicating this to
politicians and the public; and
• consulting a second time with the private sector to maintain enthusiasm
and involvement with the implementation of new policies in the design
(including feedback mechanisms and quantifiable criteria) and evaluating
periodically to monitor implementation.
The central theme
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An Agenda for Governments
The private sector in PDMCs faces numerous challenges. Solving them requires
a commitment and action plans (road maps) by governments to address
adequately those challenges through regulatory and legislative reform. The
agenda is large, and issues of sequencing, selectivity, and priority will arise.
Since this report is regionwide, it is not possible to provide detailed country
road maps. Rather, in this report, the most important issues are identified in a
general context. Individual countries will need to decide what specific actions
within a particular issue they should take and in what order the improvements
should be made. Priority issues that inhibit private sector development across
the region are
• state interference in the economy
• poor provision of public goods
• high-cost operating environment
• underdeveloped financial markets
• land rights issues
• poor investment policies
• natural resource management issues
State Interference in the Economy. The size of government in PDMCs,
compared with other developing countries, is large. Even when it does not
constitute a large percentage of GDP, in many Pacific countries, governments
have imposed burdensome regulatory regimes on private business and own a
large number of business enterprises—many of which are monopolies. Private
business is regulated out or crowded out of much business activity. This situation
distorts investment and returns to capital, and results in a less efficient economy
than one with fewer controls and fewer state enterprises.
Where public goods require public finance, modern practice suggests separating
financing from the delivery of service, and introducing, where possible,
competition-based private sector participation in service provision, even if it is
financed by the state. In the Pacific, an improved regulatory regime that allows
for competition and the rapid adoption of technical change, combined with
the sale of government-owned commercial businesses, would greatly lower costs,
and decrease the size of the state. This then, is the beginning of a reform
agenda. It will be difficult for the private sector to perform at its full potential
and create jobs at the needed rate until these aspects are resolved.
Poor Provision of Public Goods. The state fails to supply public goods that
underlie an effective and efficient private sector—secure property rights, a legal
system that allows contracting with confidence, and efficient and low-cost
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infrastructure and regulations. There is the paradoxical situation in the Pacific
where states are engaged in activities where they should not (owning commercial
businesses) and are not supplying what they should supply (secure property
rights, a well-functioning legal system, low-cost infrastructure, etc.). This
misallocation of government effort is a primary contributing factor to the low
rates of return on capital, aggravating the problems of size and distance, and
acting as a tax on development. Reorienting the role of the state should be an
early and continuous agenda item.
High-Cost Operating Environment. The most common complaint heard from
the business community during country visits was the high costs of conducting
business. Part of the problem arises from the size and remoteness of the countries,
but these effects are compounded by misguided government intervention and
policies that further push up costs and reduce competition. Electricity generation
and distribution are typically state monopolies as are telecommunications and
water supply, and the state owns and operates critical infrastructure such as
ports and airports. These businesses are operated and often owned by the private
sector in much of the world. Where monopolies exist, they are regulated, but
often, competitive or contestable solutions can be found so that heavy regulation
is unnecessary. Novel solutions for small island economies, such as an offshore
regulator, could also be considered. When the costs of doing business are high,
firms are discouraged from establishing or expanding their business. There is a
great deal that can be done to escape the costs associated with the regulation of
businesses and monopolies. It is here that PDMCs should strive to introduce
international best practice to provide an environment conducive to private
sector development.
Underdeveloped Financial Markets. The financial markets of the Pacific are
underdeveloped and do not provide sufficient support for the private sector.
While interest rates and the money supply are no longer controlled by fiat, the
banking industry is poorly developed—banking services seldom reach beyond
urban areas, credit to indigenous entrepreneurs is extremely limited, interest
rate spreads are large (with some exceptions), and informal lending substitutes
for commercial banking. The poorly developed financial sector is related to
shortcomings in the secured transactions framework and the incompatibility
of the customary land system with secured lending. When banks cannot secure
their lending with collateral, lending is costly. In PDMCs, the system for using
property as security is cumbersome, expensive, and often unavailable. To deepen
financial markets and increase credit availability, these two elements should be
addressed. The longer-term aim should be to strengthen property rights so
that financial markets can channel funds from savers to investors to stimulate
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economic development. While external funds are substitutes for financial
deepening, they are not a long-term solution and will not aid in the development
of the financial sector.
Land Rights Issues. Secure ownership and the ability to exchange land is
needed to create a positive investment climate for small entrepreneurs, in addition
to being a precondition for the emergence of financial markets—a situation
that does not exist in PDMCs. The institutional framework for land ownership
and use (land use, land rights, and land tenure) is one of the most long-lasting,
culturally sensitive, and politically controversial issues
in Pacific societies. Suggestions to modify customary
land systems are extremely contentious and are usually
considered by politicians to be too hard to undertake. Yet
maintaining the current form of customary ownership
comes at a huge economic cost to the Pacific countries.
The largest asset of the Pacific region is generally not
useable as collateral to raise capital for investment. Over
90% of land in PDMCs remains under customary
ownership without formal ownership. In most developed
countries, the bulk of small businesses are started using
loans that are backed by land or residential property. This
facility is not available in the Pacific. The problems in
land tenure in PDMCs include
• unclear ownership and boundaries because of a lack of records;
• restrictions on transferability because of unclear ownership;
• weak dispute resolution practices; and
• ineffective enforcement.
Because of the huge opportunity cost of not improving the existing land tenure
system, Pacific governments will sooner or later be compelled to tackle the
problem. As noted earlier, simply introducing conventional western land tenure
systems will not solve the problem in a politically durable way. The new system
must closely complement the customary system of land rights yet permit more
land to serve as collateral. Many Pacific countries are cautiously reviewing their
land rights systems to see how they can be changed to meet present-day needs.
But progress is slow, unsystematic, and lacks commitment. It would be
desirable—in the interests of private sector development and the wider interests
of development, civil harmony, and good governance—for countries of the
Pacific to start taking a series of small, systematic, and conclusive steps toward
solving the identified shortcomings of the existing land tenure system.
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Poor Investment Policies. An enabling investment climate requires many
actions from the government. It requires sound macroeconomic management,
and trade and investment policies that promote openness, productivity, and
growth. While PDMCs are doing much better in this regard, more can be
done. In addition, an attractive investment climate requires sound governance,
promotion of competition, and prevention of corruption, with a solid foundation
of basic physical and social infrastructure. Again, PDMCs have moved in the
right direction, but much more is needed. Without a predictable environment
for people, ideas, and money to work together, investment will simply not
occur. The role of government is to provide an environment for entrepreneurs
to invest in productive activities. An environment conducive to overcoming the
natural disadvantages of size and distance is not the norm in any PDMC.
Importantly, a secured transactions framework is missing, it is usually expensive
to establish and register a business, incorporation is not easy, and often, specific
industries are targeted for assistance while obstacles to investment are imposed
on others.
Governments of the Pacific have tried to control foreign
investment largely out of fear of business failure from
exploitive investors who put little capital at risk. They
have generally held the view that investors have to prove
their bona fides and often require them to go through
lengthy vetting procedures before allowing investments
to proceed. Results have been less than satisfactory. The
process is haphazard, and at times, governments have been defrauded by
investors to whom they have offered special inducements but who have then
absconded. Other investors have been discouraged by lengthy review processes
and have lost interest. A relatively recent study found no instances of fraud on
the part of businesses that were not given special incentives (Hughes 1998).
That does not mean, however, that some foreign investments will not fail.
Business is inherently risky and failure is common worldwide. But investors,
domestic or foreign, who are willing to put their capital at risk, should be
provided an open investment environment where their success depends on the
merit of their business and not on the whims or performance of government.
In this respect, there is much work to be done by governments in the Pacific in
enhancing the environment for business investment. Screening procedures for
foreign investors should be minimal and, preferably, all should be welcomed
but none singled out for special incentives.
Natural Resource Management Issues. Pacific countries are heavily dependent
on natural resources for their livelihood. Most are renewable resources but
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some are extractive and some are renewable but treated as extractive. These
natural resource-based industries are agriculture, fishing, tourism, forestry, and
minerals. Resource management and the management of rents from extraction
are critical issues for the economic development of countries in the Pacific.
There is a great need to develop workable management protocols for the natural
resource endowment so that it continues to provide optimal returns not only
in the near future, but for generations to come.
This summary when broken down into specific actions
represents a formidable agenda for policy change, which
will take time and political will to accomplish. Many of
the changes are unavoidable if countries genuinely wish
to lift their economic performance and provide income-
growth opportunities for their citizens. Careful design and community
consultation will be needed, along with a clear explanation and expectation of
the benefits that will be derived from undertaking the changes as well as the
costs of not undertaking them. Bold political leadership will be required.
Funding Agencies and the Private Sector
Successful implementation of a private sector development strategy will depend
on implementing the vision of the private sector as the driver of economic
growth. Establishing an enabling environment for enterprise, providing
macroeconomic stability, reducing costs, and reducing the interference of the
state in the economy, will be the only way to achieve this success. It also depends
on convincing the Pacific countries that the state can promote growth by
supporting the private sector, rather playing the central role in the economy
itself, which effectively crowds out private sector activity. In addition, it is
important to convince states that past attempts to promote economic activity
and compensate for perceived disadvantages by putting the state at the center
of economic activity have had the opposite effect and have damaged and hindered
private sector development.
As a general rule, donors focus their respective private sector strategies on a
limited range of issues that appear to be the cause of the low rate of return on
capital and that lead to the binding constraints to business startup and
development. The approach involves promoting the shift in the mind-set of
government officials away from seeing the government as a producer of products
and services to viewing it as a facilitator of economic output by business. This
end can only be achieved through discussion and policy dialogue among
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governments, private sectors and the general public. Coordination among
funding agencies is critical.
Funding agencies should make private sector development a central part of
their overall development assistance strategies in the Pacific. Further, it is
important that this be consistent with a broader strategy to promote the private
sector in the region and in line with the interventions of other donors—
coordination of effort among donors makes aid much more effective. Analysis is
best performed by the multilateral institutions, which ideally should feed into
the overall donor strategy. This should be based on important general principles
such as ensuring political commitment, involving key stakeholders, accounting
for local culture, focusing on outcomes and impacts, and designing projects to
take account of local implementation capacity.
It takes time to communicate a need for reform. It takes time to implement
projects, to show results, to build staff-government relationships, and to build
expertise and reputation in specific areas. In focusing on few specific issues,
respective funding agencies and governments can collaborate to devise country-
specific strategies, and prioritize and implement solutions until the results
begin to make themselves evident.
Considerations for Funding Agencies
Funding Agency Involvement in the Pacific
Of the total net disbursement of official development assistance to PDMCs,
bilateral sources account for over 80%, with multilaterals being minor players.72
Official development assistance to PDMCs averages around $700 million per
year. There are great variations across PDMCs in the per capita aid level ranging
from over $1,000 in the Marshall Islands to less than $50 in the Fiji Islands.
Another feature of aid to the Pacific is the high proportion of technical assistance
to project lending.
Apart from ADB, and to a much lesser extent, New Zealand, there is something
of a vacuum in the area of assistance for private sector development. No other
donors are placing a consistent, focused effort on private sector development in
the Pacific. Many are undertaking activities that have the potential to influence
private sector development—infrastructure, governance, and trade issue projects—
but none have private sector development as a consistent priority.
72 Yet the multilaterals, with their reputation and “power to convene,” do have a leadership role disproportionate
to their financial support.
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Need for Aid Coordination
Coordination of international aid programs among various funding agencies is
important in providing a coherent program and consistent policy advice to a
country. During the past decade, the aid programs in the Pacific were largely
sponsor-driven, often uncoordinated, and placed pressure
on the absorptive capacities of PDMCs.
Lack of coordination led to a dependence on aid for
financing the capital budget and playing off funding
agencies by recipient governments. It also has meant that
the effectiveness of some funding agencies’ efforts have been
undermined by others, especially at the bilateral level. For
example, in the Marshall Islands, the Government was
persuaded by an IFI (and supported by a loan) to close
down a highly inefficient department of public works. A new government came
in and announced that it would reconstitute the department. The protests of
the IFI were completely undercut by a large donation of road-working machinery
to the new department by a bilateral donor. The validity of the IFI view is
proven by the fact that the machinery is now largely unused because of poor
maintenance and the resulting poor condition of the roads.
Coordination is improving, however, most notably in Papua New Guinea where
a joint strategy is being developed by a team drawn from three major funding
Figure 30. Official Development Assistance Per Capita, Select Pacific Countries
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agencies.73 ADB has played a lead coordination role for several PDMCs,
particularly in reform programs. The consultative group mechanism has become
a familiar structure through which ADB and the World Bank have brought
funding agencies and countries together to agree on priorities and efforts.
Consultative group or development partner meetings were convened over the
last few years for most countries in the region.
Without aid coordination, especially on some policy issues, the likelihood is a
zero sum outcome. For instance, if countries compete by offering incentives to
foreign investment, it is unlikely that net investment in the region will rise;
rather, one country will divert investment away from another, setting up a
“race to the bottom” where potential investors can play one country off against
another to extract the maximum concessions. Similarly, without the benefits of
lower travel costs, it is unlikely that tourism promotion in the Pacific will lead
to an overall rise in visitors. Hotel construction in many countries simultaneously
could lead to substantial overcapacity—there is the potential that funding
agencies helping individual countries without taking a regional perspective can
have an adverse impact on the region as a whole.
While the possibility of a “race to the bottom” exists, there is also a possibility
of a “race to the top.” If countries implement investment-friendly policies
through systemic reform that offers investors low regulatory barriers, simple
and transparent application procedures, low tax rates, and low import barriers,
the Pacific as a whole becomes attractive to foreign investors in a self-reinforcing
way. This arrangement sets up a virtuous circle in which positive reform in one
country induces similar changes in others. Not only will foreign investment
benefit from such measures but local investment as well. The Pacific, as a region,
could develop an international reputation of being a friendly environment for
investment.
Such actions, however, first, depend on government commitment, and second,
on funding agencies taking a unified approach to reform in the Pacific. This
adjustment also needs to occur in the area of technical assistance, as in the case
of the road-working equipment, which also needs to be coordinated. In the
countries examined here, the quality of technical assistance varied between
excellent and poor. Not only does poor advice dilute the reform message, but
there is a danger of advice that is politically expedient, driving out beneficial
advice. Furthermore, scarce technical assistance funds are wasted when the
same issues are studied by different agencies. Change will occur as a result of
73 ADB, AusAID, and World Bank 2003.
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focused advice that is technically sound, followed by widespread dissemination
that promotes discussion between civil servants, politicians, and the private
sector.
Funding agencies should encourage governments to be more active in planning
investment and assistance priorities, and integrating this action with national
budgets as well as donor interests, funding capacity, and expertise.
The Voyage Must Begin
The core theme of the strategy for the Pacific is that many interventions, justified
on the premise that Pacific countries require special policies because of their
size, remoteness, and vulnerability—such as government ownership of lumpy
capital investment projects—have had an adverse effect. Rather than ameliorate
problems, they have exacerbated them by raising costs and reducing rates of
return on capital. Rather than help the Pacific countries integrate more closely
with the global economy, policies have added to their isolation.
The strategy outlined here has focused on a relatively small
number of issues:
• reducing the role of the state;
• strengthening property rights for movable property
as well as for land;
• strengthening financial systems; and
• improving infrastructure by promoting more local
involvement in procurement and maintenance.
To obtain results, governments must focus on a few of the
most constraining issues. Many issues, particularly land
reform and the role of the state, are complex and will require persistence by
funding agencies and political will by governments.
Further, even if implemented, such reforms will not fix everything at once. It
takes time for an economy to respond to new incentives. It takes time for
potential emigrants to realize that new opportunities exist at home rather than
in countries to which many of their fellow citizens have migrated. It takes time
for financial institutions to adapt their lending practices to the realities of
reformed debt collection procedures. And it takes time for the beneficial effects
of one policy reform to spill over into other areas or sectors of the economy.
That the process may be lengthy is not an argument against beginning reform
immediately, but it is important to bear in mind that patience and perseverance
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are necessary. In addition, reform requires a major community information
campaign to apprise citizens of the benefits of economic changes for stimulating
the private sector.
Some strategic directions suggested in this strategy are
perhaps controversial because they are not conventional.
Since conventional approaches have not worked in the past,
more of the same will result in the same unsatisfactory
outcomes. Repeating the patterns will lead to more failed
aid programs, more hopes dashed, and further cynicism and isolation of the
people of the Pacific. There is no alternative to change if the future and aspirations
of the younger generation in the Pacific are to be met. The voyage must begin
anew now.
The voyage must
begin anew now.
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